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This dissertation explores several dynamics in insider and outsider activism in 
the anti-war movement: insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in protest coalitions; 
transnational protest events’ success in uniting insiders and outsiders; and coupling of 
insider and outsider tactics such as protesting and voting.  Insider-outsider 
cooperation in protest coalitions helps to facilitate successful protest events involving 
rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders.  Such events catalyze future insider-
outsider cooperation, illustrate which parties are movement allies, educate parties 
about protesters’ concerns, educate protesters about coupling insider and outsider 
tactics, and may help remobilize activists as voters in subsequent elections.   
Key rival arguments that are investigated are whether grievances opposing 
U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, on which there was a strong issue consensus, are as 
important as Tarrow’s politically opportune domestic targets, such as a government 
joining the “Coalition of the Willing,” in accounting for dynamics in insider and 
 
outsider activism.  Cross-national surveys of protesters are paired with content 
analysis of news coverage of transnational anti-war protest events and with elite 
interviews of activists. 
While domestic targets appear to exert some centripetal forces facilitating 
cooperation between insiders and outsiders, issue consensus or issue discord on 
grievances can create either centripetal forces that unite or centrifugal forces that 
unleash conflict.  Grievances have the power to unite or to divide us, and whether 
they do depends on the issue consensus in the movement and the public about them.  
Grievances with issue consensus unite us, exerting centripetal forces on insider and 
outsider activism, whereas grievances with issue discord divide us, wielding 
centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders.   
Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without the United Nations, on which 
there is issue consensus, brings together insiders and outsiders in protest coalitions, at 
protest events, and in protesters’ tactical choices, and thus has the potential to 
remobilize protesters as voters.  Conversely, linking opposition to war in Iraq with 
other grievances on which there is discord, such as opposition to war in all cases, 
opposition to globalization, and support of Palestine, divides insiders and outsiders in 
protest coalitions and at protest events and may lead protesters to expand their 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In 2004, Spain’s Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) regained power 
via unprecedented electoral mobilization following massive demonstrations against 
the war in Iraq.  These record-breaking protests, in which several million people were 
mobilized, reflected public opposition to the government’s decision to join the U.S.-
led “Coalition of the Willing,” and in particular, the tremendous opposition to 
unilateral military intervention in Iraq, without a formal United Nations agreement.  
This grievance, on which there was a tremendous amount of issue consensus, seems 
to have exerted a centripetal influence on the anti-war movement, facilitating linkages 
between insiders and outsiders as well as between insider activism and outsider 
activism.  Insiders in leftist opposition parties like the PSOE had a very direct, 
cooperative relationship with the anti-war movement, forming coalitions together to 
help organize multiple protest events.  Party insiders were thus given an opportunity 
to use the protest events to appeal to protesters about these grievances and to 
encourage them also to leverage insider tactics like voting to effect policy change. 
After the Madrid train bombings, the PSOE was able to capitalize on its 
opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq and its affiliation with the Spanish anti-war 
movement, as the record-breaking voter turnout in the March 2004 elections 
culminated in a PSOE electoral victory, an alternation of power in Spain, and a policy 
shift as the new Prime Minister worked to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq.  Many 
demonstrators were mobilized in global protests, and so too were many voters.  
Perhaps then the dramatic electoral outcome reveals that demonstrators in Spain’s 




How then do insiders and outsiders relate in different domestic contexts, and what are 
the implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections? 
In this dissertation, I explore the factors driving such cooperation between 
insiders and outsiders in the anti-war movement, such highly mobilized protests 
involving insiders and outsiders, and such coupling of protesting and voting.  In 
particular, I investigate whether centripetal or centrifugal forces are exerted on 
insiders and outsiders by the presence of strong domestic targets such as Spanish 
government support of the “Coalition of the Willing” or by grievances on which there 
is an issue consensus such as opposition to U.S. unilateralism.  The impact of the 
party system and electoral context; divergent histories of participation, protest, and 
civil society; and divergent paths of democratization are also addressed.  To begin, I 
discuss ties between insider activism and outsider activism, and address how three 
inter-related dependent variables gauge these ties at different levels of analysis. 
Insiders versus Outsiders 
Insider and outsider activism are terms used to demarcate insiders, who are 
focused on routine political action and effecting change inside political institutions, 
from outsiders, who specialize in unconventional tactics and work to effect change 
from outside those institutions.  Insiders work to effect social change in political 
institutions and policy intra-institutionally, either through direct contacts by lobbying 
or by working to achieve changes in institutions’ internal composition through voter 
mobilization and pressure politics.  Thus, insiders rely heavily on tactics such as 
lobbying and voter mobilization, and their engagement with political institutions is 




see insider activists in liberal social movements establishing good ties with 
individuals in leftist political parties and parties in the political opposition, and using 
those ties to help mobilize citizens electorally, with hopes of policy changes ensuing.  
At the international institutional level, Tarrow indicates that insiders are known for 
“gravitating to international institutions and taking part in highly institutionalized 
service and advocacy activities” as well as “lobbying and collaborating with 
international elites to the point of co-optation” (2005, 29, 45).   
Outsiders, in contrast, work to effect social change from outside political 
institutions, often by challenging these institutions and their policies.  Outsiders often 
use extra-institutional tactics such as protests to call for reforms, and are reluctant to 
engage in direct contact with institutions because they want to be able to maintain 
their critical, oppositional role.  Generally, outsiders do not want to risk any co-
optation that weakens their ability to levy criticism effectively, as they often perceive 
insiders falling prey to such pressures.  At the international level, Tarrow states that 
outsiders “challenge these institutions and organizations,” “challenge international 
institutions’ policies and, in some cases, contest their existence” (2005, 29).  
However, insiders and outsiders do not function in separate bubbles.  As they 
often are working to draw attention to similar grievances and targeting the same 
institutions, there are opportunities to form relationships with one another and to 
evolve in their tactics and in those used by their supporters.  In particular, insiders and 
outsiders in the anti-war movement have sometimes achieved significant cooperation 
in forming successful coalitions.  These cooperative coalitions were instrumental in 




parties or parties in the opposition, and remobilized activists from previous peace 
movements and anti-globalization movements.  Additionally, they were important in 
educating demonstrators about the linkages between insiders and outsiders and the 
opportunities at the individual level to link their outsider tactics like protesting with 
insider tactics like lobbying and voting.  However, in some cases, insiders and 
outsiders had relationships fraught with conflict, protest mobilization was less 
successful and not as tied to insider allies in political parties, and demonstrators were 
specialized in global protesting. 
It is also important to point out that these insider and outsider ideal types 
represent opposite end points on a broad spectrum of activism, and that many activists 
fall somewhere in between.  Although some individuals and groups exclusively focus 
on being insiders or outsiders, there are many that belong somewhere in the murky 
middle between insider and outsider activism.  As groups and individuals interact 
with others who are poised at other locations on the insider-outsider spectrum, 
dynamics in the relations between insiders and outsiders and in the linkages between 
insider activism and outsider activism emerge, which need to be accounted for. 
In this dissertation, I explore several inter-related dependent variables:  
insider-outsider cooperation in protest coalitions; successful transnational protest 
joining insiders and outsiders; and protesters’ coupling of outsider and insider 
activism.  These phenomena correspond to different levels of analysis:  the meso- or 
organizing-level, the macro- or event-level, and the micro- or individual-level.  After 
explaining how these dependent variables gauging ties between insider and outsider 




Dynamics in relations between insiders and outsiders, both in meso-protest 
coalitions and at macro-protest events, are intertwined with one other, and have 
important implications for the linkages between insider activism and outsider 
activism in participatory choices made by individual protesters.  Successfully 
organizing cooperative protest coalitions of insiders and outsiders is important in 
driving successful transnational protest events that bring together insiders and 
outsiders and educate protesters about pairing insider tactics and outsider tactics.  
Successful protest events are able to bring about more opportunities for cooperation 
and also for coupling insider and outsider activism.  Demonstrators attending 
transnational protests organized by these coalitions learn about possible insider allies 
in leftist parties or parties of the opposition as well as about opportunities to pair their 
protest with insider activism.   
Thus, meso-level coalition dynamics influence macro-level protest events that 
in turn influence prospects for more meso-level coalition building.  Moreover, both 
meso-level coalition dynamics and macro-level protest events influence protesters’ 
micro-level behavioral decisions on whether to pair insider and outsider tactics, 
coupling their protesting with voting.  Thus, this dissertation also examines how 
transnational activism has the potential to mobilize demonstrators as voters, with 
important implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections, 
such as the historic Spanish election in 2004. 
Insider-Outsider Cooperation in Protest Coalitions (Meso-level) 
First, insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in transnational protest 




cooperative coalitions together, many obstacles tend to arise, and in some cases, 
cooperation has proved elusive and conflict has been the norm.  Insider-outsider 
cooperation is thus defined as a regularized pattern of planning, communication, and 
teamwork between insiders and outsiders in protest coalitions across multiple protest 
events.  It is characterized by extensive interactions and compromises agreed on and 
enforced in the planning process and by successful cooperation at the actual protest 
events.  In contrast, insider-outsider conflict occurs over a prolonged time frame 
between particular insiders and outsiders and across multiple protest events in which 
there are failed attempts to build coalitions.  It is characterized by fractures en route to 
planning common events, and at the extreme, cooptation and conflict at the few 
events that actually get off the ground.  In some cases, neither cooperation nor 
conflict is consistently the case, and insiders and outsiders involved in organizing 
coalitions shift back and forth.  
At the meso-level or organizing-level, cooperation between insiders and 
outsiders is instrumental in achieving successful protest events with insider 
involvement.  It also facilitates the broadening of protesters’ tactical repertoires when 
they choose to pair tactics like lobbying or voter mobilization with their protest 
activity.  In the process of negotiations between insiders and outsiders who are trying 
to cooperate, it quickly becomes evident on which grievances there is a broader issue 
consensus.  Grievances with issue consensus can be leveraged when strategically 
framing protest events so as to enlarge the breadth of the coalition that develops, to 
maximize the mobilization level, and to include both insiders and outsiders.  Finding 




facilitate the strategic framing of protest events so that more people are mobilized and 
the broadest coalitions possible can be formed.  This information can, in turn, help 
opportunistic parties of the opposition in knowing which issues are better to target in 
trying to get potential voters to couple their protesting and voting.   
While the British anti-war movement opposing the intervention in Iraq has 
been characterized by lots of enduring cooperation, the American anti-war movement 
has instead faced much conflict, with episodic bursts of limited cooperation.  The 
meso-level puzzle that thus needs exploration is:  what accounts for the dynamics in 
cooperation and conflict between insiders and outsiders in social movements, and 
what are the implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections? 
Successful Transnational Protest Joining Insiders and Outsiders (Macro-level) 
Second, I discuss the success of transnational protest events in mobilizing 
demonstrators and in joining insiders and outsiders.  The objective of insiders and 
outsiders who are forming cooperative coalitions is mobilizing the largest number of 
protesters, drawing out a rainbow coalition of protesters who range from insiders to 
outsiders, making connections between insider activism and outsider activism, and 
getting individual protesters remobilized for more demonstrations and also for insider 
activism.  Thus, successful transnational protest joining insiders and outsiders is 
defined as protest with high mobilization levels; involvement by insiders such as 
leftist parties or parties of the opposition; involvement by an inclusive, rainbow-like 
array of civil society groups; and involvement by activists who have been mobilized 




At the macro-level or event-level, successful protest mobilization that draws 
in insiders from leftist parties or parties of the opposition, facilitates further 
cooperation with insiders and does so in ways that can help them gain electoral 
dividends if coupling happens.  In particular, when insiders are present at protest 
events, it makes clear to protesters and to the public, how they can effectively couple 
their insider and outsider tactics, if they choose to do so.  Likewise, party insiders 
learn about the grievances of protesters and of the organizers so they can better target 
these potential constituents in their platforms and remobilize them as voters. 
Anti-war protests targeting the military intervention in Iraq mobilized millions 
of demonstrators in some countries and effectively brought together rainbow 
coalitions including party insiders and historic outsiders, activists involved in 
previous protest movements.  However, protests in other cases were far less 
mobilized or less successful in bringing together such rainbow coalitions of insiders 
and outsiders.  At the macro-level, the puzzle needing investigation is:  what accounts 
for these dynamics in transnational protest events joining insiders and outsiders, and 
what are the implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections? 
Coupling of Outsider and Insider Activism (Micro-level) 
 Third, I discuss the coupling of insider and outsider activism by individual 
protesters.  The aim of insiders and outsiders who ally together in protest coalitions 
and at protest events is to remobilize their supporters in “coupling,” or pairing 
outsider tactics such as protesting with insider tactics such as voting.  For instance, 
they may emphasize other planned activities, such as lobbying dates of action paired 




by making linkages to allies in parties on the left or in the opposition, they may work 
to elicit and drive the direction of coupling amongst protesters.  Coupling involves 
engaging in both global protesting and voting, whereas decoupling involves engaging 
in global protesting, but not voting.  Protesters can also choose to expand their 
outsider activism to multiple types of global protest. 
Certainly, these protesters are potentially influenced by the kinds of party 
insiders they see and the types of coupling they hear about at the macro-protest events 
produced through meso-organizing.  If and when transnational protesters are indeed 
remobilized as voters, coupling their global protesting with prospective voting, 
electoral outcomes may therefore shift in favor of opposition parties or leftist parties 
linked to the protest movement.   
Anti-war protesters in Spain clearly coupled their record-breaking protest 
mobilization with massive voter turnout, favoring leftist opposition parties that were 
allied with the anti-war movement.  Conversely, the same level of coupling did not 
occur in other countries.  The micro-level puzzle which is therefore explored is:  what 
accounts for the dynamics in demonstrators’ coupling of protesting and voting, and 
what are the implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections? 
Overview of the Dissertation 
The global anti-war movement against the intervention in Iraq offers a natural 
quasi-experiment as many industrialized democracies faced sustained, historic 
mobilizations, but differed markedly in terms of the dependent variables:  insider-
outsider cooperation or conflict in the anti-war movement; the transnational protest 




demonstrators coupled outsider tactics like protesting with insider tactics like voting.  
I now introduce the theoretical framework, the methodology used to explore each of 
the inter-related dependent variables, and the overall organization of the dissertation. 
Tarrow argues that having a strong domestic target, such as a country joining 
the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing” supporting the intervention in Iraq, is very 
important in accounting for cooperation between insiders and outsiders in the anti-
war movement.  He also suggests that having such strong domestic targets helps 
facilitate highly mobilized anti-war protests involving rainbow coalitions of insiders 
and outsiders.  Additionally, Tarrow argues that a strong domestic target can help to 
bring about the coupling of insider and outsider tactics.  Although targets are 
important in accounting for some centripetal forces uniting insiders and outsiders, I 
suggest they only account for part of the puzzle.   
Moreover, we must attend to opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, a 
movement-related grievance on which there is an issue consensus in the movement 
and in the public, to fully account for centripetal pulls on insiders and outsiders.  
Opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq has the potential to bring about insider-
outsider cooperation, successful transnational protest involving insiders and outsiders, 
and the coupling of insider and outsider activism by protesters due to the issue 
consensus on this grievance.  Movement-related grievances on which there is issue 
discord create obstacles in strategic framing and exert centrifugal forces between 
insiders and outsiders.  Thus, such grievances account for some of the conflict 




protest events, challenges pairing protesting and voting, and impetus for extensive 
global protest involvement.  
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework at the heart of the dissertation 
and broad propositions concerning the observable implications of these arguments.  
This theoretical framework, in addition to causal factors particular to different levels 
of analysis, is used to derive propositions concerning the dependent variables in each 
of the three empirical chapters.  These propositions are reexamined as evidence is 
presented at each level of analysis.  When accounting for dynamics in anti-war protest 
coalitions, the impact of the party system and electoral context is also explored.  
Further, in accounting for the variance in transnational anti-war protest events in the 
older and newer member states of the European Union, divergent histories of 
participation, protest, and civil society as well as divergent paths of democratization 
are addressed.   
The research methodology is presented in Chapter 3, and subsequent chapters 
explore each of the three dependent variables concerning insiders and outsiders, each 
of which corresponds to a different level of analysis and different type of empirical 
evidence.  The dependent variables are explored in the following order:  insider-
outsider cooperation and conflict in protest coalitions (meso-level), transnational 
protest events mobilizing insiders and outsiders (macro-level), and the coupling and 
decoupling of protesting and voting (micro-level).  Qualitative methods are applied to 
explore the meso- and macro-level phenomena, and quantitative methods are applied 




Insider-outsider cooperation and conflict is examined in Chapter 4 by studying 
dynamics in the relations between actors in anti-war coalitions across multiple global 
protest events, as efforts are made to organize protest coalitions.  Successful, 
enduring cooperation, mixed cooperation and conflict, and enduring conflict are 
studied via several comparative case studies.  Evidence is collected via content 
analysis of archival news and Internet coverage of protests, activists’ own written 
documentation of the anti-war movement, and elite interviews with activists.   
Macro-level transnational protest is explored in Chapter 5 by studying how 
transnational anti-war protest events emerged across different domestic contexts on 
February 15, 2003, the most globalized date of anti-war protest.  Dynamics in 
mobilization levels, actors, insiders and outsiders, targets, and grievances at the 
protests are investigated. Qualitative methods such as content analysis of protest news 
coverage and of online resources are useful in investigating commonalities in 
transnational protests occurring cross-nationally, and tracing out causal factors.   
In chapter 6, micro-level behavioral choices by individual demonstrators, in 
deciding whether to couple global protesting and voting and whether to extend protest 
involvement to multiple types of global protest, are investigated.  Data collected in 
cross-national surveys of demonstrators at globalized protests is analyzed using a 
multinomial logistic regression, to test rival arguments concerning protesters’ 
decisions to pair types of global protesting and voting.  
Chapter 7 reviews the key findings of the research in light of the broad 
propositions developed in Chapter 2.  Domestic targets created when states join the 




outsiders at the macro- and micro- levels.  However, the findings also confirm the 
importance of movement-related grievances, the issue consensus or discord on those 
grievances, and their strategic framing, in accounting for the dynamics between 
insider and outsider activism.  In particular, opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, a 
grievance on which there is much consensus, is instrumental in exerting centripetal 
forces uniting insiders and outsiders, facilitating cooperation in anti-war coalitions, 
bringing about successful transnational protests involving insiders and outsiders, and 
eliciting the coupling of protesting and voting.  Conversely, grievances with issue 
discord exert centrifugal forces and unleash conflicts between insiders and outsiders, 
and may motivate a specialization in global protesting.   
Additionally, I turn back to the broader question that underlies the 
dissertation:  how do transnational social movements matter and what are their 
implications for remobilizing activists as voters in subsequent elections and for 
mainstream politics?  Understanding dynamics of global protest behavior has 
important implications for understanding how global protest movements impact 
mainstream politics, policy outcomes, and political behavior.  In particular, I argue 
that transnational social movements can provide inroads for getting demonstrators in 
the street remobilized as voters and activists, combining or coupling these tactics.   
I conclude the dissertation by examining the implications of the research for 
the remobilization of activists as voters in post-war elections, in several cross-national 
cases.  Transnational social movements may be able to provide electoral dividends to 
parties of the opposition which are in tune to protesters’ grievances and which form 




United States in supporting the intervention in Iraq, getting demonstrators to couple 
their protesting and voting, may be a challenge because protesters are skeptical about 
how efficacious insider activism may be in effecting change.  I suggest that the issue 
consensus on movement-related grievances and the party system context may be 
instrumental in determining how optimistic protesters feel about the efficacy of 




Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 The impact of domestic and international targets and of movement-related 
grievances on insiders and outsiders are juxtaposed in this chapter.  First, the 
centripetal influences of Tarrow’s domestic and international political institutions on 
insiders and outsiders are explored, followed by several propositions outlining 
observable implications of these arguments at the meso-, macro-, and micro- levels.  
Next, I discuss some of the limitations of these targets in accounting for the dynamics 
between insiders and outsiders, and discuss some evidence that suggests that 
movement-related grievances concerning war and globalization need to be examined 
in the study of transnational social movements.  Finally, I explore grievances with 
issue consensus and with issue discord and the centripetal versus centrifugal forces 
they may exert on insiders and outsiders, developing several propositions of the 
observable implications of these arguments at the meso-, macro-, and micro-levels.   
Domestic and International Targets 
Tarrow argues that domestic and international institutions provide targets that 
exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders, facilitating insider-outsider 
cooperation, successful transnational protests involving rainbow coalitions of insiders 
and outsiders, and the coupling of insider and outsider tactics.  He suggests that 
dynamics in targets created by the international and domestic political opportunity 
structure explain dynamics in transnational contention in recent global justice and 
anti-war movements, stating,  
February 15 also symbolizes some of the key problems in transnational 




peace protest; the difficulties of maintaining transnational collective action 
once a temporary focal point has been left behind; and the complexities of 
forming sustained coalitions among people from different countries with 
different sets of interests and values (Tarrow 2005, 16).  
 
Tarrow therefore argues that shared targets in the political opportunity space permit 
transnational cooperation in anti-war coalitions and successful mobilization at 
transnational protest events, and that expired, outdated or abandoned focal points lead 
to conflict in anti-war coalitions and demobilization at protest events.  Tarrow 
emphasizes the continued explanatory power of states’ domestic structures in 
accounting for transnational contention, but also looks at the impact of the 
international institutions that states have created.   
In explaining the historic February 15, 2003 global anti-war protests, which 
mobilized 16 million demonstrators, Tarrow focuses on the targets presented by the 
domestic political opportunity structure (2005, 15).  Acknowledging that targets in 
international institutions were lacking since the European Union and the United 
Nations had taken oppositional stances on the war in Iraq, Tarrow argues that the 
common presence of domestic targets (domestic governments that took positions 
supporting the war) were key in eliciting successful global collective action.  Tarrow 
also argues that “the resurgent militarism of a hegemonic state” was an important 
“internationalist” target shared by transnational protesters during the February 15, 
2003 global protests (16).  Although Tarrow paints the United States as a hegemonic 
target, he may in fact be hinting at the impact of grievances concerning global 
democratic deficits created by U.S. unilateralism in Iraq.   
Certainly, the presence of strong domestic targets is successful in accounting 




mobilization was much higher in several countries such as Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom, which combined a strong internationalist target of a hegemonic 
U.S. government with domestic targets, when these countries’ governments joined the 
U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing” and supported the military intervention in Iraq.  
However, there are certainly important dynamics of contentious activity in 
transnational protests against the Iraq war which are not accounted for by the 
presence of domestic and international targets, and thus rival arguments dealing with 
the different interests and values of the protesters mobilized, need more exploration.   
In accounting for the transnational anti-globalization movement, Tarrow is 
more focused on the impact of multilateral economic institutions (MEIs) like the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and World Trade 
Organization (WTO), rather than on globalization and patterns of international trade.  
MEIs provide activists with a “‘coral reef’ where they both lobby and protest, 
encounter others like themselves, identify friendly states, and from time to time, put 
together successful global-national coalitions,” organizing transnational protests and 
transnational advocacy networks (Tarrow 2005, 219).  Certainly, the most important 
meetings of such international institutions as the IMF, WB, WTO, regional 
development banks, World Economic Forum (WEF), Free Trade Agreements, G8, 
United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and regional organizations, are 
periodically targeted for transnational contention concerning global justice. However, 
transnational contention differs in many ways both within and across international 




Tarrow contends that internationalism provides both domestic and 
international targets that exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders, facilitating 
insider-outsider cooperation in protest coalitions, successful protests involving both 
insiders and outsiders, and the coupling of insider and outsider tactics.  The meso-
level implications of this argument for protest coalitions are first explored, followed 
by the macro-level implications for transnational protest events and subsequently the 
micro-level implications for protesters’ coupling of insider and outsider tactics.   
At the meso-level, Tarrow argues that internationalism provides structured 
opportunities for cooperative relations and coalition-building between outsiders and 
insiders seeking to influence a common target.  Internationalism is defined as “a 
dense, triangular, structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and 
international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in 
collective action at different levels of this system” (Tarrow 2005, 25).  The costs of 
internationalism elicit oppositional tactics or outsider activism from non-state actors, 
whereas the opportunities of internationalism elicit participatory tactics or insider 
activism from non-state actors.  Tarrow’s opportunity space inherently structures 
relations between insiders and outsiders, permitting greater insider-outsider 
cooperation and coalition-building that transgresses across borders against the 
common targets posed by internationalism (25).  However, it is possible that this rosy 
lens misses some of the conflicts inside transnational protest coalitions. 
The end result of internationalism’s structured opportunities for cooperative 
insider-outsider relations are the increasingly transnational but still domestically-




states, “Through the use of both domestic and international resources and 
opportunities, domestic-based activists – citizens and others – move outward to form 
a spectrum of ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ who engage in regular transnational practices” 
(35).  His rooted cosmopolitans are “individuals and groups who mobilize domestic 
and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external 
actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with 
transnational allies” (29).  Despite their transnationalism, they are rooted via 
continuous domestic linkages “to place, to the social networks that inhabit that space, 
and to the resources, experiences, and opportunities that place provides them with” 
(42).  Transnational activists, more precisely, are a subset of rooted cosmopolitans, 
“people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts but who engage in 
contentious politics activities that involve them in transnational networks of contacts 
and conflicts” (29).  What distinguishes transnational activists from rooted 
cosmopolitans is “their ability to shift their activities among levels” and to take 
“advantage of the expanded nodes of opportunity of a complex international society” 
(43).  Particularly noteworthy is the emphasis on the continued domestication of 
transnational contention, and the cooperation that is possible due to shared targets. 
At the macro-level, the presence of such strong domestic and international 
targets are said to produce successful transnational protest events, involving high 
mobilization and broad rainbow coalitions characterized by the involvement of both 
insiders and outsiders.  Tarrow notes the impact of targets on protest mobilization and 
on bringing insiders and outsiders together at particular protest events (2005).  




between insiders and outsiders.  However, it is important to acknowledge the 
diversity of interests and issues brought together by actors in such coalitions.  Insiders 
and outsiders brought into such coalitions include parties on the left or in the 
opposition; organized labor; global justice, human rights, anti-war, peace, 
environmental, development, religious, and local organizations; and yet further to the 
left, anarchists and anti-capitalists.   
This diversity of issues and interests is the hallmark of a rainbow coalition, 
and is very difficult to sustain across multiple protest events.  Particularly the 
question of whether or not insider-oriented organized labor decides to join outsider-
oriented diffuse interests that represent various social ideals seems to be important 
because of the mobilizational power of unions. At several of the largest anti-
globalization protests, the majority of protesters in fact hailed from organized labor.  
Tarrow suggests that the Battle of Seattle rainbow coalition “reveals a combination of 
a labor-NGO-social movement convergence of interests” against a common target, 
the WTO (Tarrow 2005, 171).   
However, it is possible that we must turn to the diversity of issues and 
interests to find out which ones have the capability of acting centripetally to pull 
together successful rainbow coalitions, and conversely which ones act centrifugally 
and pull them apart.  Without grievances concerning neoliberal globalization, global 
democratic deficits, U.S. hegemonic action, and U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, and 
debates concerning how these grievances should be framed, the ideals and interests of 
dissent might be absent.  Thus, their influence on insiders and outsiders in protest 




At the micro-level, the cooperation between insiders and outsiders in protest 
coalitions and at protest events brings about behavioral changes amongst 
transnational protesters, and in particular, facilitates their coupling or pairing of 
insider tactics with outsider tactics.  Tarrow’s approach is inherently relational, as the 
political opportunity space structures transnational relations of rooted cosmopolitans 
in such a way as to change the participatory versus oppositional roles of groups he 
calls “NGO insiders” and “social movement outsiders” (2005, 29).  Meyer and 
Tarrow had already alluded to the blurred boundaries of insider activism and outsider 
activism in a “social movement society” (1998).  Tarrow now suggests that shared 
domestic and international targets facilitate the coupling of conventional and 
unconventional forms of political participation, or of insider and outsider activism 
(2005).  He also suggests, however, that it is possible in the long run that the 
changing relations between insiders and outsiders could lead insiders to become 
resocialized as outsiders, decoupling insider and outsider activism and supplanting 
conventional participation with unconventional participation (2005). 
Tarrow accordingly suggests that the line between insider and outsider 
activism is no longer clearly demarcated, and that insider-outsider relations are 
increasingly cooperative (2005).  Tarrow describes a now fuzzy insider-outsider 
divide, increasingly frequent and successful insider-outsider coalitions, and the 
resultant fusion between domestic and transnational contention, stating,  
But as in contentious politics in general, the line between NGO ‘insiders’ and 
social movement ‘outsiders’ is difficult to draw with precision, and coalitions 
between these two families of activists are increasingly common.  
Internationalization is producing mechanisms and processes that escape the 
narrow confines of international institutions and may be leading to an ultimate 





Moreover, Tarrow also cites the rise in activists who “face both inward and outward,” 
and as a result he suggests the “distinction between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ may be 
blurring” (47).  Key in Tarrow’s argument is increasing insider-outsider cooperation 
“around international institutions, conferences, and processes” (48, 211).   
The coupling argument that has been put forth thus suggests that the 
boundaries between these two forms of popular mobilization are fuzzy and 
permeable, the linkages fluid and dynamic, as insider activism is increasingly 
coupled, or paired, with outsider activism.  The same actors and the same 
organizations are expected to engage simultaneously in routine and nonroutine 
politics.  In complex repertoires of action, conventional and unconventional activities 
are expected to be coupled.  Political parties, interest groups, and social movements 
are likely to be mutually dependent, simultaneously cause and effect.  And protest 
politics and conventional politics are expected to be consequences of forms of access 
and opportunity structures.  Meyer and Tarrow have referred to these comingled and 
overlapping interconnections as the social movement society (1998).   
On the other hand, Tarrow’s argument delves further by suggesting that a 
decoupling can also occur:  that in the long-run outsider activism may become the 
norm if internationalization leads insider participation to be supplanted by outsider 
opposition (leading activists to decouple or stop pairing insider activism and outsider 
activism and to even perhaps specialize in outsider activism).  He explains that 
outsiders’ “numbers seem to be increasing” (2005, 45).  He argues that 
internationalism may in the long run be leading insiders to substitute their 




outsider activism, decoupling the two types of activities due to their new relations and 
experiences engaging in collective action with outsiders.  Tarrow thus focuses on how 
the targets and focal points of internationalization bring about coupling, but also 
considers how they could eventually also bring about decoupling and even a 
specialization in outsider activism (48).  However, Tarrow’s discussion of decoupling 
suggests that it may actually be a radicalization in response to perceptions of ongoing 
global democratic deficits.  
Based on the centripetal structuring influence of Tarrow’s domestic and 
international targets on linkages between insider activism and outsider activism, 
several general propositions are developed below.  Each of the empirical chapters 
contains related propositions, particular to each level of analysis.  In the concluding 
chapter, the empirical evidence across three levels of analysis is summarized and 
analyzed in light of the broader propositions developed here. 
2.1.    The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that 
supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the 
internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government,  increase the odds of 
cooperation between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, and cooperation 
will stem from shared agreement over institutional targets.  Countries lacking such 
strong domestic institutional targets are likely to have more conflict in anti-war 
coalitions, divides stemming from the lack of agreement over targets.   
2.2.    Demonstrators at successful transnational protest events are likely to perceive 




2.3.    The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that 
supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the 
internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government, increase the odds of 
highly mobilized transnational anti-war protest events which involve broad rainbow 
coalitions and are able to drawn in key insiders and remobilize key outsiders.  
Countries lacking such strong domestic institutional targets are likely to have protest 
events with less success in mobilization and in drawing in key insiders or outsiders.   
2.4.    The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that 
supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the 
internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government, increase the 
likelihood of coupling protesting and voting.  However, in the long-run such targets 
may lead to decoupling of protesting and voting or even a resocialization of protesters 
to a new specialization in outsider activism.   
2.5.    Grievances about war and about globalization, representing different issues, 
interests, and ideals of activists, are not key in accounting for dynamics in the ties 
between insider activism and outsider activism:  insider-outsider cooperation and 
conflict in anti-war coalitions; the success of transnational protests uniting insiders 
and outsiders; and the coupling and decoupling of insider and outsider tactics. 
2.6.    Domestic targets are more important than international targets in accounting 
for dynamics in the ties between insider activism and outsider activism:  insider-
outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions; the success of transnational 





Limitations of Targets and Bringing Grievances Back In 
Tarrow’s internationalism seems to be geared at finding the shared elements 
of insiders and outsiders and may thus be more likely to lead to observations of 
cooperative coalitions, while missing some of the conflict and sources of contention, 
such as concerns about how to frame grievances about war and globalization.  As a 
result of his lens, he is likely to observe the set of cases of successful transnational 
activism, but less likely to observe the set of cases that have more conflict, run into 
mobilization difficulties, and involve coalitions that are not so rainbow-like, as well 
as the causal mechanisms that account for these types of cases.  The dynamics in 
insider-outsider relations and changing rainbow coalitions need further exploration. 
While some anti-war protest coalitions were characterized by tremendous 
cooperation and success at bringing together disparate groups into rainbow coalitions, 
it is also noteworthy that conflicts were rife in coalition-building elsewhere, even if 
there was an important domestic target.  For instance, in the United States, which 
arguably had the strongest domestic target, two of the most important national 
coalitions against the war, United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) and International 
A.N.S.W.E.R. (ANSWER), have had a divisive relationship, fraught with tensions 
and in which cooperation or co-endorsement of events was difficult and infrequent, 
and contentious the few times some headway was made.1  Disagreements stemmed 
from differences of opinion regarding movement-related grievances and how to frame 
those grievances in a way that appeals to both the movement and the public. 
                                                 
1 Ferguson, Sarah. 2003. Don't fence them in. Village Voice, February 18, 37.; Murphy, Jarrett. 2005. 




Tarrow argues that internationalism explains the dynamics of transnational 
contention, but he acknowledges that globalization is a process which influences 
internationalization and is a source of protesters’ “interest, ideology, and grievances” 
(2005, 19, 26).  He also suggests that there are many other issues that serve as 
grievances for transnational activists.  However, Tarrow argues that the targets of 
internationalization are more important in accounting for dynamics of contention than 
are these grievances and related framing issues.  In effect, he is reacting to a literature 
that has put a lot of emphasis on such grievances, especially concerning globalization, 
and saying that the domestic and international political opportunity structure is most 
important in accounting for dynamics in transnational activism. 
Tarrow suggests that globalization played only a small role in motivating 
transnational protest against war on February 15, 2003, whereas the presence of 
domestic and international targets was more important (2005, 17).  He states, “The 
main target was statist militarism, not global neoliberalism; it found objective allies in 
the form of several European governments; and both the European Union and the 
United Nations were international fulcrums of opposition to the war.”  However, he 
also acknowledges that the shift to international peace protest accompanied a 
“wrenching” shift away from global justice activism (16).  Tarrow thus bears witness 
to a controversial framing debate in recent social movements that is tied to issue 
discord over movement-related grievances: whether globalization is more important 
to oppose than war, and whether opposition to war should be framed as opposition to 
globalization.  Clearly, more theorizing is needed to investigate the implications of 




Even better documented, in the global justice movement, is the important role 
that grievances concerning globalization have in explaining conflict and cooperation 
in transnational anti-globalization coalitions between insiders and outsiders.  Several 
recent studies on transnational coalitions in a volume edited by Bandy and Smith 
suggest that across several cases, strategic framing decisions concerning grievances 
about globalization play a key role in accounting for dynamics of cooperation and 
conflict.  This common thread arises in global justice movements involving 
transnational coalitions, across many different world regions. 
Both Macdonald and Cullen observe the effect of grievances concerning 
globalization in transnational coalitions in industrialized states.  For instance, 
Macdonald observes that the U.S. women’s movement was not receptive to 
embracing frames that link issues of gender and trade liberalization, and thus has not 
become an active collaborator with the free trade movement, whereas major 
organizations in the Canadian women’s movement were much more willing to make 
this linkage and successfully collaborated on the issue of free trade (2005, 36).  
Similarly, Cullen finds that significant cooperation and enlargement of the Platform 
of European Social NGOs was feasible precisely because the organizations involved 
were able to find “transversal frames” linked to globalization on which they could all 
agree, committing to “manage and sublimate the more contentious aspects of their 
disagreements” (2005, 89).   
Juska and Edwards observe a parallel pattern in East-West coalition 
formation, when detailing the efforts to create a U.S.-Poland Coalition against 




because of “the compatibility of their ideological critique of corporate capitalism and 
agreement about preferred strategies and tactics” because these groups “saw their 
political activism as moral crusades against the common enemy—transnational 
corporations,” even though there were clear differences in their “attitudes toward 
nature and animals” (198).  In contrast, conflict occurred with one group which “saw 
(regulated) international capital as one of the most important factors in the 
modernization of Polish agriculture” and did not espouse “an anticorporate ideology,” 
and thus it did not join the transnational coalition (196-7).   
Dynamics in contention in transnational alliances between Northern and 
Southern activists working on global justice issues also seem to be accounted for by 
strategic framing issues linked to grievances about globalization.  According to 
Foster, a key source of conflict in the Trinational Alliance Against NAFTA was 
fueled by “the ongoing reluctance or inability … [of other, especially American, 
alliance partners] to take on … ‘the social agenda,’ which advocated equity and social 
justice claims that went well beyond trade-related debates” which the Mexican 
activists advocated (2005, 218).  While the presence of a common target (NAFTA) 
was important in bringing these activists together, distinctive perspectives on 
globalization also play a role in accounting for some contention.  Likewise, Brooks 
notes the difficulties in forming transnational campaigns on child labor which stem 
from divides between Northern and Southern prescribed reforms to globalization, due 
to the “ways that global capitalist development structures the choices of workers and 




Finally, Waterman discusses the difficulties of bringing in key international 
union insiders to the World Social Forum and to other discussions with 
nongovernmental organizations and social movement leaders from the North and 
South, as divergences stemming in part from “differing postures toward the labor-
capital relationship” lead to difficulties building “a common agenda on workers, 
development, and globalization” (2005, 143).  Notwithstanding these differences, the 
March 2001 International Roundtable of Unions, Social Movements, and Non-
Governmental Organizations in Bangkok, Thailand, brought together the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) as well as major NGOs and social 
movement organizations, in an effort to see whether collaboration could be worked 
out.  However, in the discussions at Bangkok, it was evident that unions’ 
“identification with free trade, growth, and ‘social partnership’ with capital and state” 
had not adapted to “the new, globalized understandings the global justice movement 
offers,” but that they were rather sticking to “an increasingly self-limiting or even 
self-defeating twentieth century labor paternalism” (147, 148).  Waterman suggests 
that unions’ ambiguity stems from the incongruity between their strategies in being 
careful not to be painted as anti-globalization or anti-capitalist as they are working to 
combat threats to their partnerships with industry, and their other strategies in 
forming ties with civil society that is taking action on issues affecting workers and 
suggesting alternatives to neoliberalism.  
Admittedly, the presence of targets in the domestic and international political 
opportunity structure does account for some mobilization opportunities that permit 




that were previously confined to mutually exclusive activities, such as specializing in 
lobbying from within or in protesting on the outside.  However, taking these targets 
into account, there may still be other dynamics in such contentious activities which 
are unaccounted for.  Tarrow rightly hints that we need to develop more nuanced 
understandings of the structuring effect provided by internationalism and to explore 
rival arguments that may account for transnational contention.   
At the macro-level, Tarrow’s story is focused on the success of this global 
collective action, especially against the war in Iraq, and not on coalition-building 
problems and divisive issues, and thus, he may not notice the tremendous divides 
between insiders and outsiders in some coalitions and at some protest events within 
this global anti-war movement.  There are certainly important dynamics of 
contentious activity in transnational protest events against the Iraq war which are not 
accounted for by the domestic and international targets of internationalism.  Examples 
include the enormous dynamics in patterns of cooperation and conflict in protest 
coalitions and in mobilization success of protest events uniting insiders and outsiders.  
Perhaps, then, movement-related grievances about the war in Iraq and agreements and 
disagreements about how these grievances should be framed help account for 
coalition-making dynamics?  Although dynamics in anti-war movement mobilization 
levels in 2003 somewhat correspond to the presence or absence of domestic targets in 
a country, there are also enough cases that do not fit such generalizations.  The United 
States is a key example of such exceptions, given the presence of such a strong 




mobilized, relative to the mobilization magnitude of protests in other states in the 
“Coalition of the Willing.”   
Further, protests targeting international institutions and their meetings vary in 
systematic ways, and we need to further theorize to account for the contentious 
variation within and across institutions, especially in whether or not rainbow 
coalitions are mobilized successfully.  Although many EU Summits have indeed been 
targeted for protest involving transnational actors mobilized at the meeting location or 
for protests organized simultaneously internationally, there are important differences 
across EU Summits, and it is important to note that some very successful protests in 
terms of mobilization have not involved rainbow coalitions and have actually been 
characterized by conflict.  For instance, during on-site protests of the December 2000 
EU Summit in Nice, France, trade unionists were not able to cooperate with anti-
globalization and other campaigners because of prognostic differences on what the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights for European citizens and on what a European social 
agenda should look like.2  The different standpoints and grievances that unions and 
other activists have on neoliberal globalization seem to have been the main 
contributing factor to the divergent diagnoses, conflicting policy prescriptions, and 
different frames that organizers favored, which prevented cooperation.3  Hence, the 
actions organized at Nice did not involve cooperative rainbow coalitions.  Rather, the 
main marches of tens of thousands of trade union activists organized by the European 
                                                 






Confederation of Unions (CES) and of a few thousand anti-globalization, human 
rights, and other activists were mobilized separately.4   
Moving on to the micro-level, the coupling and decoupling arguments offer 
rival explanations that are too easily consolidated.  For instance a specialization in 
different types of global protest may be possible, and further, it is perhaps even 
possible, that coupling and decoupling may vary amongst insiders and outsiders, in 
response to changes in the political context.  For instance, in some sectors of the U.S. 
anti-war movement, there has been a conclusion that protests alone were ineffective 
in producing policy change during 2003.5  As a result, a refocusing on both lobbying 
and civil disobedience, to better target policy makers and produce public 
consciousness of the anti-war movement, has been a recent priority, as exemplified by 
the September 2005 weekend of demonstrations, lobbying, and civil disobedience.  
Clearly, there has been a transition back to some insider activism (and not merely a 
resocialization to outsider activism) in some sectors of the U.S. anti-war movement.   
Tarrow argues that dynamics in transnational contention can be accounted for 
by domestic and international targets, much more so than by movement-related 
grievances concerning issues such as war and in particular, globalization.  In 
discussing the alter-globalization movement and the anti-war movement, Tarrow 
focuses on the role of meetings of international institutions as targets.  However, 
Tarrow’s own examples suggest rival explanations dealing with other interests and 
values around which theoretical development is needed.  Tarrow explains,  
                                                 
4 Ibid. 




Participation in international protests may even resocialize insiders into 
outsiders:  many of the protesters who went to Seattle, Genoa, or Quebec City 
as insiders became outsiders when they were attacked by the water cannon 
and stun grenades of the police.  What insiders and outsiders have most in 
common is that they gravitate to and mobilize around international regimes, 
practices, and institutions (2005, 48). 
 
Perhaps in these cases of anti-globalization protest, international institutions may not 
have been what turned insiders to outsider activism.  Rather, what does seem to have 
been important in leading some in the global justice movement to specialize in 
outsider activism is grievances concerning a global democratic deficit as states cede 
sovereignty to international institutions to promote neoliberal globalization and 
economic integration, especially when this process is also linked to a repression of 
civil society that is normally fostered in such democracies.  As a result of this 
democratic deficit, a strategic debate has ensued about how to respond to police 
repression at several summits.  These grievances concerning a global democratic 
deficit may well be important in accounting for ties between insiders and outsiders in 
anti-war activism, especially given the unilateral approach taken by the United States 
in its intervention in Iraq. 
Just as Tarrow may miss the conflicts between insiders and outsiders in 
certain contexts, he may also overlook the participatory specialization in insider or 
outsider activism in other contexts, which may be driven by movement-related 
grievances and how these grievances are framed.  Tarrow, like many on the outside, 
perceives increasing cooperation between insiders and outsiders at Seattle, Cancun, 
Genoa, and Quebec City (2005, 48, 211).  However, in addition to some cooperation, 
there is also noteworthy fragmentation, division, and conflict in both the anti-




transnational activism of the social movement variety, and social movements have an 
interest in being portrayed as unified successfully, perhaps he is very likely to observe 
unified coalitions and a lot of successful outsider activism.  He may thus be missing 
some of the insider-outsider conflicts as well as the insider or outsider specialization 
that characterizes activism in some political systems. 
Accounting for grievances concerning globalization and war and how they are 
framed, I suggest, helps to fine-tune our understandings of the coupling argument; 
namely, some variants of claims, perhaps more palatable to insiders and viewed as 
more likely to be effectively pursued using insider activism as well as outsider 
activism, are much more likely to result in coupling, whereas other claims may in fact 
be perceived as more effectively pursued using just one type of activism.  Rival 
arguments need to be developed concerning the impact of movement-related 
grievances concerning war and globalization, whether they exert centripetal or 
centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders and promote coupling, decoupling, or 
extensive global protesting.   
Movement-Related Grievances and Issue Consensus or Discord 
While shared domestic and international targets play some role in uniting 
insiders and outsiders, I suggest that movement-related grievances with issue 
consensus may also be important in eliciting centripetal pulls on insiders and 
outsiders and on their activism.  Moreover, movement-related grievances with issue 
discord may exert centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders and on their activism.  
The impact of movement-related grievances, I suggest, depends on the kind of 




issues.  Opposition to unilateral intervention in Iraq, a movement-related grievance 
that is shared by much of the general public and is agreed on by most activists in the 
anti-war movement, may thus exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders in 
anti-war coalitions, at protest events, and in protesters’ participatory decisions.  In 
contrast, opposition to military intervention in Iraq in many different scenarios, 
opposition to globalization, and support for Palestine, are movement-related 
grievances with more issue discord in movements and in the public, and may exert 
centrifugal influences on insiders and outsiders.  However, support for Palestine, on 
which there is agreement in certain contexts, may lead to different choices on 
coupling and decoupling. 
Several theories suggest movement-related grievances are important to 
insiders and outsiders.  U.S. hegemony or imperialism theories suggest the 
importance of opposing military intervention in Iraq for its unilateralism as opposed 
to other justifications for military intervention (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2003; Lake 
2006). Economic and world systems theories suggest the linkages that may be drawn 
between opposing war and opposing globalization (Chase-Dunn 1989; Friedman 
2000; Rodrik 1997, 1999, 2001).  Global democratic deficit arguments suggest that 
movement-related grievances about the war are tied to perceptions of democratic 
deficits, especially those linked to neoliberalism, because of the constrictions it places 
on political space, civil society space, and democracy, or those linked to U.S. 
hegemony, because of the constrictions it places on sovereignty, international law, 
and democratic principles (Brown 2003; Rodrik 2001; Ruggie 1982, 1991).  U.S. 




perceived as a pertinent global democratic deficit.  These movement-related 
grievances, which range from having issue consensus to issue discord, are likely to 
have robust explanatory value in accounting for links between insiders and outsiders.  
Indeed, supporting a particular movement-related grievance seems to predict 
protest activity, tactical choices, and transnationalism (Bean 1991, 270, 271; 
Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave 2004; Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005).  
The degree to which the grievance is agreed on within the social movement and also 
is shared by the general public, also plays a role in determining the effect of opposing 
the issue. Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave (2004, 48) find that foreign 
(transnational) protesters targeting European Union Summits in Belgium  
are less satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their own country, … 
agree more with the idea that the political system in general is not very 
responsive to the needs and demands of citizens, and they endorse more a 
radical movement strategy, not opposing violence and agreeing with the 
statement that `talking is not enough' to reach the movement's goals. 
 
The aforementioned grievances lie outside of both the policy and public opinion 
mainstream and seem to lead to a specialization in outsider activism rather than 
leading to the coupling of outsider and insider activism.  
Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, without the international community and 
especially without United Nations involvement, is the key grievance on which there is 
issue consensus in the anti-war movement and in much of the general public, and 
which I argue has the potential to centripetally pull insiders and outsiders together in 
protest coalitions, in successful protest events, and in protesters’ participatory choices 
in coupling insider and outsider activism.  Lake (2006) attends us to the grievances 




industrialized democracies that were former U.S. allies.  There are several aspects of 
these grievances that Lake accentuates which I argue have important implications for 
the mobilization of transnational activism against the war in Iraq.  In particular, he 
attends us to the opposition that has arisen to the United States’ unilateralism in its 
approach to militarization in Iraq; to its implicit denial of the legitimacy-conferring 
authority of the United Nations; to the new authority the U.S. claimed in instituting 
regime change in a sovereign state; and to the linkages between this unilateralism and 
a broader project to institute a new world order and U.S. hegemony. 
How do grievances concerning U.S. unilateralism in Iraq facilitate 
cooperation between insiders and outsiders in coalitions and at protest events, and the 
coupling of insider and outsider tactics?  Coalition formation between insiders and 
outsiders is likely to be facilitated when this grievance leads to the adoption of broad 
transversal frames that insiders and outsiders can agree upon.  Thus, opposition to 
U.S. unilateralism is likely to be a grievance that pulls together insiders and outsiders 
at successful transnational protest events.  Further, supporting this grievance, on 
which protesters see an issue consensus and thus perceive a political opportunity to 
couple their insider and outsider activism successfully, is likely to facilitate 
protesters’ coupling of protesting and voting.  In contrast, grievances on which there 
is more issue discord, grievances such as opposing war in all cases, linking opposition 
to war to opposition to globalization, and linking opposition to war in Iraq to the issue 
of Palestine, will likely account for many of the conflicts between insiders and 
outsiders in coalition-formation, less mobilized protest events that have difficulties 




When there is a mixture of discord and consensus across different contexts, such as 
on Palestine, a mixed effect may emerge. 
 
For each of the following propositions, 
tell me if you agree or not? 
Agreeing Disagreeing 
Oil is the main motivation for which the United States wants to 
intervene militarily in Iraq (6c) 
73% 23% 
The United States should intervene militarily in Iraq even if the 
United Nations does not give its formal agreement (6g) 
17% 80% 
Do you consider it would be justified or not that our country 
participates in a military intervention in Iraq? 
Justified Unjustified 
If the Iraqi regime does not cooperate with United Nations 
inspectors (7a) 
41% 53% 
If the United Nations inspectors discover weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq (7b) 
59% 37% 
If Iraq threatens other countries in the region (7c) 59% 37% 
If the United Nations Security Council decides on a military 
intervention in Iraq (7d) 
57% 38% 
If the United States intervenes militarily in Iraq without a 
preliminary decision of the United Nations (7e) 
15% 82% 
Table 2.1: Support of an Intervention in Iraq in the EU-15 (Gallup Europe 2003) 
 
Note:  This table presents 2003 percentages in the EU-15 (member states acceding through 1995).  
Table 5.2 compares these percentages with those in the CC-13 (Central and East European and 
Mediterranean member states acceding between 2004 and 2007 as well as candidate state Turkey). 
 
To bolster my argument about this issue consensus on U.S. unilateralism in 
Iraq, I present Gallup Europe poll data from the 2003 International Crisis Survey in 
which respondents were asked about several possible scenarios in which the U.S. 
could initiate military intervention in Iraq.  As Table 2.1 illustrates, throughout the 
fifteen industrialized democracies that had acceded to the European Union through 




in Iraq on which the general public reached consensus, and which I therefore argue 
have the potential to facilitate transnational protest, catalyze cooperation in anti-war 
coalitions and protest events between insiders and outsiders, and lead to a coupling of 
insider and outsider activism, or protesting and voting. 
The Gallup Europe poll reveals that Lake’s grievances are indeed arising 
among citizens of countries that used to be U.S. allies.  In fact, a sizeable majority of 
Europeans oppose a military intervention in Iraq that is unilateral, occurring 
preemptively and without a previous UN decision authorizing the use of force.  Many 
also feel that the militarization in Iraq is motivated by oil interests.  However, many 
Europeans in the EU-15 were more predisposed to permitting an intervention in Iraq 
under other scenarios, if weapons of mass destruction had been found by UN 
inspectors, if Iraq had threatened countries in the region, or if the UN Security 
Council had authorized an intervention.  While there is a pan-European issue 
consensus on grievances concerning U.S. unilateralism in Iraq and the linkage of 
militarization and oil interests, there is issue discord on whether to oppose war in 
other circumstances.   
Similarly, within the anti-war movement, the one framing of anti-war 
grievances on which there was much issue consensus was opposing U.S. 
unilateralism, a military intervention in Iraq without a previous UN decision 
authorizing action.  While some activists felt strongly that the framing of grievances 
should be expanded to include opposing war in all cases, and that opposition to war 




these issues were much more divisive.  Evidence concerning issue consensus and 
discord amongst anti-war activists will also be discussed in Chapter 4. 
Opposing the war in Iraq in the case of U.S. unilateralism, without the 
international community and without a preliminary decision by the United Nations, 
on which there was issue consensus, may have elicited a centripetal pull on insiders 
and outsiders.  Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq may thus facilitate insider-outsider 
cooperation, successful mobilization of insiders and outsiders at global protest events, 
and the coupling of protesting and voting.  Next, a host of other grievances with some 
issue discord, including opposing war in other scenarios, all-encompassing opposition 
to globalization, and supporting Palestine, are addressed.  Movement-related 
grievances with issue discord may have elicited centrifugal pulls on insiders and 
outsiders, eliciting conflicts in transnational protest coalitions, difficulties 
successfully organizing protest events involving insiders and outsiders, and expansion 
of demonstrators’ global protest involvement. 
How do divisive movement-related grievances facilitate insider-outsider 
conflict in protest coalitions, mobilization hurdles uniting insiders and outsiders at 
protest events, and the expansion of global protest involvement?  Conflict is likely to 
ensue between insiders and outsiders when issue discord regarding movement-related 
grievances leads to framing disagreements within the movement.  Further, conflicts 
between insiders and outsiders and disagreements over grievances are likely to feed 
into mobilization challenges at protest events.  Finally, grievances with such issue 
discord are not likely to be viewed as grievances on which the general public and the 




can be more effectively pursued via globalized protest, and are likely to facilitate 
protesters’ expansion of their global protest involvement.  
Opposing war in many different scenarios, on which there was much discord, 
may have exerted centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders, eliciting conflict, 
mobilization difficulties, and extension of global protest involvement.  An influential 
debate about the justification for war has certainly emerged between insiders who feel 
that opposition to the war should just focus on its empire-seeking unilateralism and 
outsiders who feel a broader opposition to war in many different scenarios should be 
adopted. Many countries politicized the unilateral intervention in Iraq and actively 
opposed it, but would have supported intervention under a variety of other scenarios. 
Additionally, much of the global public did not feel that the global democratic system 
was functioning properly when President Bush proceeded with military intervention 
in Iraq without the support of the UN, but would have supported military intervention 
in a host of other scenarios, evident in Table 2.1.  
There was also much disagreement within the peace movement about the 
cases in which intervention could be justified. All-encompassing opposition to 
military intervention in Iraq seems to characterize outsiders, whereas moderate 
insiders seem to adopt a particularistic opposition to war.  Differences concerning 
these grievances and disparate viewpoints on the justification for war account for 
dynamics in insider-outsider coalition-making and behavior. The more outsider 
ANSWER links an array of scenarios in which intervention is unjustified to U.S. 
imperialism and globalization, targeting the U.S. policy toward North Korea, Cuba, 




oriented but maintains more focus on opposing and “ending the occupation” of Iraq, 
“to the exclusion of making some of these links” (Hany Khalil, personal 
communication, March 11, 2005). Moreover, UFPJ differs from ANSWER because it 
is not willing to make statements supporting authoritarian regimes that the U.S. 
government considers to be threats. According to Hany Khalil, Organizing 
Coordinator of UFPJ, one reason that UFPJ has not been willing to collaborate with 
ANSWER, is ANSWER’s framing of the Iraqi insurgency as another type of 
resistance to U.S. imperialism, part of its all-encompassing opposition to war. Thus, 
insiders and outsiders can cooperate on a grievance with issue consensus, such as 
opposing war in cases of U.S. unilateralism.  In contrast, opposition to war in other 
scenarios may bring conflict between insiders and outsiders and an extension of 
global protest involvement because issue discord results in differences over which 
frames should be adopted and makes global protesting appear a more effective tactic.  
Opposition to many facets of globalization, on which there is also more issue 
discord, may elicit a centrifugal force on insiders and outsiders, increasing the 
likelihood of conflict between insiders and outsiders and the extension of global 
protesting.  Most advanced industrialized democracies have adopted neoliberal 
models of globalization. Additionally, the general public tends to see many aspects of 
globalization positively, although concerns about how globalization affects domestic 
employment are quite salient in some countries, and many acknowledge that countries 
in the core benefit from it disproportionately compared to the periphery.  Likewise, 
competing visions of the globalization problematique characterize competing frames 




economic or political targets should be selected; whether a personal, domestic, or 
global focus should be applied; and whether economic, political, cultural, or multiple 
frames should be applied (Rosenkrands 2004, 64-5, 70). Many seem to take a broad 
view of grievances concerning globalization, though economic and political 
detriments of globalization are prioritized, and cultural issues of homogenization are 
not (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 110-1). Competing explanations of the 
globalization problematique, therefore, range from those that are focused on a single 
sphere of globalization-related problems (e.g., economic, cultural, or political; 
individual, domestic, or global) to those that are more all-encompassing.  
All-encompassing opposition to globalization seems to split outsiders from 
insiders and to protesters’ expansion of their global protest involvement. In contrast, 
opposing a limited number of aspects of globalization is likely to facilitate 
cooperation between outsiders and insiders who are more easily able to agree on 
broad transversal frames. Reforms to the new international economic order are sought 
by both camps, with some outsiders favoring the abolition of all international 
institutions and some insiders reorienting (and retreating) to become more reformist 
(Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 102). Thus, since the Battle of Seattle, some activists 
have focused on diagnosing what is harmful about globalization and others have tried 
to reframe the movement, promoting reforms and a vision of an alternate 
globalization, resulting in prognostic versus diagnostic framing divides tied to 
movement-related grievances, and certainly a good share of conflict between insiders 





Support for Palestine may also touch on perceptions of a global democratic 
deficit.  Although there is much discord on this issue, which results in a 
predominantly centrifugal pull on insiders and outsiders, there is also some consensus 
on the issue in certain contexts that may also provide for opportunities to couple 
insider and outsider activism. Given the historic ties between Israel and the United 
States, the issue of Palestine is highly politicized in the United States.  In terms of 
public opinion, Americans are much more supportive of the Israeli side than the 
Palestinian side, whereas Europeans are more supportive of the Palestinian side than 
the Israeli side.   
Within the global anti-war and anti-globalization movements, the issue of 
Palestine is also far from straight forward.  Organizations within the anti-
globalization movement that continued to protest in the aftermath of September 11 
also held a demonstration during the protests targeting the Spring 2002 WB/IMF 
meetings, in which they tried to highlight the plight of Palestinians and not the 
problems of globalization. There was little collaboration between the organizers 
trying to refocus the protests on the Israeli incursions into Palestine and the 
organizers focused on Third World debt reduction (Soren Ambrose, personal 
communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal 
communication, March 9, 2005).  
Palestine also became a key issue of contention in the anti-war movement. 
ANSWER was engaged in an ongoing debate with insider factions in the anti-war 
movement about whether Palestine should be prioritized as much as the military 




ANSWER coalition, Palestine prevented American protest coalitions from 
successfully collaborating on protests on several occasions (although attempts were 
continuously made to cooperate).  Becker asserts that ANSWER was “demonized for 
being with the Palestinians.” In the United States, insiders were reluctant to prioritize 
Palestine as much as Iraq whereas outsiders wanted to attend to both issues and view 
them as interrelated democratic deficits. 
Several general propositions based on the centripetal influence of grievances 
with issue consensus and on the centrifugal influence of grievances with issue discord 
on the linkages between insider activism and outsider activism, are developed below.  
Each of the empirical chapters contains related propositions, particular to each level 
of analysis.  In the concluding chapter, the empirical evidence across three levels of 
analysis is summarized and analyzed in light of the broader propositions. 
2.7.    Movement-related grievances with issue consensus within protest coalitions, 
especially concerning opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without UN involvement, 
increase the odds of cooperation between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, 
and insiders and outsiders will be united via shared agreement over these grievances 
and over how they should be used in framing the movement.  Movement-related 
grievances with issue discord within protest coalitions, especially concerning whether 
opposition to the war in Iraq should be linked to opposition of all types of war, to 
opposition to globalization, and to support of Palestine, increase the odds of conflict 
between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, with divisions between insiders 




should be used in framing the movement.  Occasionally, in some contexts there is 
more issue consensus on Palestine and this may facilitate some cooperation. 
2.8.    Demonstrators at successful transnational protest events are likely to perceive 
similar domestic and international grievances. 
2.9.    Issue consensus on movement-related grievances in public opinion, especially 
opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without UN involvement, increase the odds of 
highly mobilized transnational anti-war protest events which involve broad rainbow 
coalitions and are able to draw in key insiders and remobilize key outsiders.  Issue 
discord on movement-related grievances in public opinion increases the odds of 
protest events with less success in mobilization and drawing in insiders and outsiders.   
2.10.   Supporting movement-related grievances that have issue consensus in protest 
coalitions and in the general population, especially opposing U.S. unilateralism in 
Iraq without UN involvement, increase the likelihood of coupling protesting and 
voting.  Supporting movement-related grievances characterized by issue discord 
within protest coalitions or in the general population, especially concerning whether 
opposition to the war in Iraq should be linked to opposition to all types of war and to 
opposition to globalization, increase the likelihood of extending global protest 
involvement.  Supporting Palestine, on which there is considerable discord but which 
in some contexts there has been more agreement, increase the likelihood of expansion 
to multiple global protests and voting. 
2.11.   Movement-related grievances about war and about globalization are more 
important than the presence of domestic and international targets in accounting for the 




cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions; the success of transnational protests 
uniting insiders and outsiders; and the coupling and decoupling of insider and 
outsider tactics.  Grievances have the power to unite or to divide us, and whether they 
do depends on the issue consensus in the movement and in the public about them. 
2.12.   International grievances are more important than domestic grievances in 
accounting for dynamics in the ties between insider activism and outsider activism:  
insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions; the success of 
transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders; and the coupling and decoupling 
of insider and outsider tactics.  Similarly, internationalist targets trump domestic 
targets, in exerting influence on insiders and outsiders. 
To conclude, this dissertation investigates the impact of domestic and 
international targets and of movement-related grievances on insiders and outsiders in 
the transnational anti-war movement.  In the theoretical framework, twelve broad 
propositions were developed concerning the meso-, macro-, and micro- observable 
implications of these arguments.  Next, the research methodology that is used to 
explore these propositions at different levels of analysis is presented.  In each of the 
empirical chapters, a review of the theoretical framework and of alternate 
explanations particular to a given level of analysis is first used to develop 
propositions particular to that level of analysis.  Then, these propositions are analyzed 
in light of empirical evidence.  Once the three empirical chapters are presented, the 
overall findings are reviewed in the concluding chapter and analyzed in light of the 




Chapter 3: Methodological Overview 
 The following subsections outline the methods used to explore each of the 
dependent variables.  First, the content analysis and elite interviews of activists used 
to compare several cases of meso-level insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in 
anti-war coalitions are discussed, with the empirical results presented in Chapter 4.   
Second, the content analysis used to compare macro-level protest events is addressed.  
The resultant data concerning transnational anti-war protest events on February 15, 
2003 are presented in Chapter 5.  Finally, the sampling and methodology used to 
conduct the cross-national protester surveys are presented.  Chapter 6 presents a 
multinomial logistic regression to analyze respondents’ micro-level coupling and 
decoupling of protesting and voting. 
Insider-Outsider Cooperation and Conflict (Meso-level) 
At the meso-level, targets in the domestic political opportunity structure and 
different party systems were used in case selection of countries for archival research 
and interviews.  In other words, the dependent variable was left free to vary, and was 
not involved in case selection.  As will be explained in Chapter 4, at the meso-level, I 
also expected the party system and electoral context to be an important explanatory 
factor, and thus it was interesting to choose cases that varied along this dimension. 
Hence, I decided to hold the targets constant and allow the party system 
context to vary, selecting countries in the “Coalition of the Willing” which all shared 
strong domestic targets but had different party systems (the Netherlands with its 




the United States with its moderate two-partyism).  By holding the targets constant, I 
examine whether or not cooperation and conflict varied markedly, in juxtaposition to 
the high cooperation Tarrow would expect.  Additionally, I explore whether this 
variation in conflict and cooperation corresponds to variation in the party system 
context or in fact to other factors.  Archival work and elite interviews with activists 
were used to investigate dynamics in insider-outsider relations and the factors 
accounting for insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in these three countries. 
Archival work was particularly useful in obtaining information about the 
coalition formation process and to help sample interviewees (key insiders and 
outsiders affiliated with key anti-war and global justice organizations).  The sources 
used in the archival research include Lexis Nexis coverage, Google search results, 
current websites and archived websites available via Archive.org, Indymedia search 
results and other alternate media websites.  I conducted systematic searches for 
archived materials about the anti-war movement and key protests in each of these 
cases.  These searches enabled me to narrow down key social movement 
organizations and individuals of interest tied to these organizations.   
Table 3.1 displays a timeline of global anti-war protests targeting the 
intervention in Iraq, on which searches were conducted within each of the three cases.  
The first global protests against the war in Iraq occurred on October 26, 2002 and on 
January 18, 2003.  Most agree that the most globalized date of protest occurred soon 
thereafter, on February 15, 2003, involving millions of protesters demonstrating at 
hundreds of locations, spanning all continents.   On March 15, 2003, just before the 




started on March 20, 2003, global emergency response actions were held.  Massive 
protests occurred both in countries that were originally a part of the “Coalition of the 
Willing,” such as the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
as well as in countries that did not send military support to Iraq, such as Belgium, 
Canada, France, and Germany.  Transnational protests died down in mobilization 
level and in frequency after the war in Iraq started on March 20, 2003.  However, 
transnational protests against war still continued to occur, occurring simultaneously in 
several hundred locations and involving hundreds of thousands of protesters.  Global 
protests have occurred on key dates, to commemorate anniversaries of the start of the 
war in Iraq or after events like shifts in global public opinion of the U.S. in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.  
Date of Main Global Protest Date Range Description 
Saturday, October 26, 2002 
10/25/02-
10/26/02 
global anti-war protests, as the United States 
makes the case for an intervention in Iraq 
Saturday, January 18, 2003 
1/16/03-
1/19/03 
global anti-war protests, as the United States 
makes the case for an intervention in Iraq 
Saturday, February 15, 2003 
2/14/03-
2/16/03 
global anti-war protests, as the United States 
makes the case for an intervention in Iraq 
Saturday, March 15, 2003 
3/15/03-
3/19/03 
global anti-war protests, in anticipation of the 
start of the intervention in Iraq 
Thursday, March 20, 2003 
3/20/03-
3/30/03 
global emergency response actions, at the start 
of the intervention in Iraq 
Saturday, October 25, 2003 10/25/03 
global anti-war protests, on the 6 month 
anniversary of the intervention in Iraq 
Saturday, March 20, 2004 3/20/04 
global anti-war protests, on the 1 year 
anniversary of the intervention in Iraq 
Saturday, March 19, 2005 
3/18/05-
3/20/05 
global anti-war protests, on the 2 year 
anniversary of the intervention in Iraq 
Saturday, September 24, 2005 
9/24/05-
9/26/05 
global anti-war protests, after Hurricane Katrina 
news coverage and shifting public opinion 
Saturday March 18, 2006 
3/18/06-
3/20/06 
global anti-war protests, on the 3 year 
anniversary of the intervention in Iraq 
Saturday March 17, 2007 
3/17/07-
3/20/07 
global anti-war protests, on the 4 year 
anniversary of the intervention in Iraq 





In Lexis Nexis, I conducted full-text searches in World News Regional News 
coverage as well as in other useful sources such as Foreign Language News.  I looked 
for coverage of protest! and the country name or protest! and the capital city name, in  
one-week time periods around the dates of the most globalized protests in Table 3.1.  
When results failed to turn up, I replaced the word “protest” with “demonstration” 
and ran the searches again.  Other search terms such as “anti-war,” “peace rally,” and 
“global justice” were applied in searches of coverage from 2002 onwards.  Using this 
coverage, I began to construct a timeline to assess which organizations worked 
together at globalized protests and which were unable to work together.   
I conducted similar searches on Google, Indymedia, Protest.net, and other 
alternate media sources.  In addition, I searched for protest, the date of the protest, 
and if necessary, the country of the protest, to look for competing accounts of the 
most important transnational or global protest events.  I also searched for the websites 
of social movement organizations and coalitions, collected information from those 
websites, and gathered information from archived versions of those websites on 
Archive.org (which was particularly important in tracking changes over time).   
Insider-outsider relations were somewhat evident from the presence or 
absence of joint protest endorsements, whether or not separate events were scheduled, 
and whether or not the movements tried to coopt particular protest events or denigrate 
or support one another in open conversations.  However, although there is some 
transparency about these divides, much of the divisiveness is underreported in the 




work in forming coalitions occurs privately, out of the public eye.  This data primarily 
helped in interview preparation, and in knowing which events to ask more about.  
The sampling of social movement organizations to interview, as well as the 
sampling of individuals in those groups, was based on the aforementioned archival 
work and the recommendations of individuals with whom I spoke (snowball strategy), 
subject to availability constraints.  In every case, I made an effort to speak with 
representatives of the key coalitions responsible for organizing the most transnational 
protests and to explore the literature they themselves wrote about their activism, 
which was in some cases rather extensive.  In the archival work, I looked especially 
for the representatives responsible for organizing and for mobilizing protesters into 
different tactics, as well as finding out more about who was involved in inter- and 
intra-coalition negotiations.  
Interviews were conducted between February 2005 and January 2006, and 
involved informed consent procedures, protections for anonymity and confidentiality, 
as specified in the approved IRB proposal.  Table 3.2 summarizes the interview 
respondents, their affiliations, and the dates interviews were conducted.  The duration 
of the interviews ranged from one to four hours, and the interviews were tape-
recorded or digitally recorded and later transcribed into notes.  Both structured and 
unstructured questions were used to explore insider-outsider cooperation and conflict 
and factors accounting for these ties.  A list of structured interview prompts is 
available in Appendix 1.  I asked respondents to talk about their organizations; the 
issues about which they have grievances and the institutions that they target; the 




cooperation in coalitions over time; and their ties with parties and with the state.  
Besides these prompts, I also inserted many additional unstructured questions that 
arose during the interview process or during the archival research.    
Name Affiliations and Positions Date of 
Interview(s) 
Soren Ambrose Senior Policy Analyst at the 50 Years is Enough: U.S. 
Network for Global Economic Justice 
February 16, 2005; 
March 11, 2005 
Nihar Bhatt International Socialist Organization March 6, 2005 
Brian Becker National Coordinator, International A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition March 9, 2005 
Hany Khalil Organizing Coordinator, United for Peace and Justice 
Coalition 
March 11, 2005 
Neil Watkins  National Coordinator and Former Outreach Coordinator of 
Jubilee USA Network 
March 17, 2005 
Jan Gruiters Director, Pax Christi; Speaker at February 15, 2003 
Amsterdam Protest 
December 14, 2005 
Jan Schaake Spokesman of the Platform Against the ‘New War’; 
Secretary of Kerk en Vrede (Church and Peace); One of the 
key organizers of the February 15, 2003 Demonstration in 
Amsterdam; Member of the Board of the GroenLinks party 
December 14, 2005 
Tuur Elzinga Chair, Attac Nederland; Coordinator of XminY (a global 
justice group) 
December 15, 2005 
Pepijn Brandon Internationale Socialisten; Editor-in-chief of De Socialist  December 15, 2005 
Rene Danen One of the initiators of the Dutch Social Forum; 
Coordinator, Platform Keer Het Tij  
December 16, 2005 
Sylvia Borren General Director, Novib (Oxfam, Netherlands) December 16, 2005 
Hans van 
Heijningen 
Key Organizer in Platform Against the ‘New War’; XminY 
(a global justice group); General Secretary of the Socialist 
Party 
December 19, 2005 
Mient Jan Faber Secretary, Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (Inter-Church Peace 
Council) 
December 20, 2005 
Wytze de Lange XminY (a global justice group), important in groundwork 
for Amsterdam protest on February 15, 2003 
December 20, 2005 
Betty Hunter General Secretary, Palestine Solidarity Campaign January 4, 2006 
Claire Poyner Network for Peace January 4, 2006 
Kate Hudson Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament January 4, 2006 
Andrew Murray Chair, Stop the War Coalition; Director of Communications 
for the Transport and General Workers Union 
January 5, 2006 
Guy Taylor Spokesman, Globalise Resistance January 5, 2006 
Trisha Rogers National Coordinator, the Jubilee Debt Campaign January 6, 2006 
John Rees National Secretary of RESPECT the Unity Coalition, Co-
Founder of Stop the War Coalition 
January 9, 2006 
Lindsey German Convenor of the Stop the War Coalition January 9, 2006 
Sarah Sachs-
Eldridge 
International Socialist Resistance January 10, 2006 
Bob Russell, MP MP for Colchester; Spokesman for the Liberal Democrats 
for Defense Issues 
January 10, 2006 





Transnational Protests Uniting Insiders and Outsiders (Macro-level) 
Transnational protests on February 15, 2003 are examined via content analysis 
of news coverage and Internet coverage of protest during this time period, across the 
member states of the EU.  Both the member states through the 1995 accessions as 
well as those states that have joined during the 2004 and 2007 accessions enlarging 
the EU were included.  First, I explain the method by which I collected and analyzed 
archival news coverage on these protest events using Lexis Nexis and the Internet.  
Then, I will discuss the case selection, first addressing the EU member states through 
the 1995 accessions and next delving into the member states that have acceded with 
the recent enlargement.  Transnational protest varied considerably across these EU 
states as did the presence of domestic targets.   
Archival coverage of the February 15, 2003 protests in each of these countries 
was systematically collected using the following process.  The sources used in the 
archival research includes Lexis Nexis coverage, Google search results, current 
websites and archived websites available via Archive.org, Indymedia search results 
and other alternate media websites.  In Lexis Nexis, I conducted full-text searches in 
World News Regional News coverage as well as in other useful sources such as 
Foreign Language News.  I looked for coverage of protest! and the country name or 
protest! and the capital city name, in one week time periods around February 15, 
2003.  When results failed to turn up, I replaced the word “protest” with 
“demonstration” and ran the searches again.  Other search terms such as anti-war, 




Via a content analysis of this coverage, I began to construct a chronology of 
February 15, 2003 protests in each of these EU member states.  Based on this 
chronology, I next worked to create tables of mobilization levels; actors; prominent 
insiders and outsiders; domestic targets and domestic grievances; and international 
targets and international grievances.  I conducted similar searches on Google, 
Indymedia, Protest.net, and other alternate media sources to supplement the news 
coverage found using Lexis Nexis and to search for news coverage in a few cases 
where little turned up in Lexis Nexis.   
Now I turn to the case selection, first discussing member states that acceded to 
the EU through 1995.  In 1951, six countries joined together signing a treaty to form 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  In 1957, these countries signed a 
new treaty that created a more expansive European Economic Community (EEC) 
involving additional types of goods and services.  In 1973, 1981, and 1986, six 
countries acceded to the EEC.  In 1992, the Treaty on European Union was signed at 
Maastricht, adding areas of intergovernmental cooperation to the preexisting EEC and 
thereby creating the European Union (EU).  Three more countries acceded to the EU 
in 1995, bringing the total member states to 15:  Austria (1995); Belgium (1951); 
Denmark (1973); Finland (1995); France (1951); Germany (1951); Greece (1981); 
Ireland (1973); Italy (1951); Luxembourg (1951); the Netherlands (1951); Portugal 
(1986); Spain (1986); Sweden (1995); and the United Kingdom (1973).6  
More recently, the Copenhagen Summit’s conditionality principle has 
governed the accession criteria used in the enlargement process that has permitted 
                                                 
6 European Union Online. 2007. Key dates in the history of European integration. 




several Central and Eastern European states to join the EU.  According to Glenn, the 
first two criteria for EU membership (“fully functioning liberal democratic systems, 
including respect for human rights and the rule of law,” formally and in practice, as 
well as “a functioning market-based economy with the capacity to with stand 
competitive pressure and market forces in the EU”) are the first hurdle (2003b, 213-
9).  Having met the former criteria, candidate states move on to working to come into 
compliance with the third criterion for EU membership that involves adopting “in full 
the acquis communautaire, or the rights and obligations of membership deriving from 
the founding treaties and subsequent legislation” (Glenn 2003b, 219).  Hence, the EU 
has focused on how Central and Eastern European countries come into compliance 
with democratic conditionality, market conditionality, and acquis conditionality, and 
it has rewarded states with assistance and institutional ties as compliance improves 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 662-3).  Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
accordingly “define enlargement as a process of gradual and formal horizontal 
institutionalization of organizational rules and norms,” as “the group of actors whose 
actions and relations are governed by the organization’s norms becomes larger” 
(2004, 503).   
The hallmark of the recent enlargement phase was the wave of 2004 and 2007 
EU accessions, in which several post-communist states have acceded to the EU and 
enlarged it, upon meeting these criteria for accession.  In 2004, eight Central and East 
European (CEE) states acceded to the EU, followed by the accession of two more 
CEE states in 2007.  Namely, ten CEE states have acceded to the EU:  Bulgaria 




Hungary (2004); Poland (2004); Romania (2007); Slovakia (2004); and Slovenia 
(2004).7   
Although two Mediterranean states have also acceded and other states are 
currently considered candidate countries to the EU, Chapter 5 focuses on February 
15, 2003 protests in the fifteen member states through 1995 and the ten CEE member 
states joining in 2004 and 2007.  It is however noteworthy that two Mediterranean 
states recently acceded to the EU:  Cyprus (2004) and Malta (2004).8  Further, several 
states have been designated candidate states to the EU:  Croatia, Macedonia, and 
Turkey.9  These states will be addressed briefly, but detailed data concerning the 
protests in these states will not be presented or analyzed. 
Of the EU member states and candidate states, eleven of the fifteen older EU 
states, all ten of the CEE states that recently acceded to the EU, and one of the 
candidate states (Turkey) are now a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) with Canada, Iceland, Norway, and the United States.  The outliers are 
Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden of the older EU states, Cyprus and Malta of the 
newly acceded Mediterranean states, and Croatia and Macedonia of the other 
candidate states, all of whom are currently not members of NATO.10  For some of 
these states, it should also be noted that NATO membership has likely come in part as 
an incentive and as a reward in exchange for participation in NATO-led military 
intervention in Afghanistan. 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 European Union Delegation of the European Commission to the USA. 2007. The member states. 
http://www.eurunion.org/states/offices.htm (accessed February 19, 2007). 
10 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2007. NATO: The 26 NATO member countries. 




Coupling or Decoupling of Protesting and Voting (Micro-level) 
Protester surveys that I designed and collected during 2003 and 2004 anti-war 
and anti-globalization protests in Europe and the United States are analyzed in 
Chapter 6, to investigate linkages between protesting and voting.  On February 7 and 
8, 2003, protester surveys were conducted at an anti-war demonstration targeting the 
meeting between U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and N.A.T.O. Prime Ministers 
in Munich, Germany at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. On February 12, 
2003, demonstrators were surveyed at an anti-war protest against the usage of the 
Antwerp, Belgium harbor for weapons transports. On February 15, 2003, a global 
date of protest against war, I conducted surveys in Paris, France; Rome, Italy; and 
Glasgow, Scotland. The Glasgow protest also targeted a Labour Party conference in 
Glasgow, during which Prime Minister Blair was held accountable for his support of 
President Bush. On March 15, 2003, another transnational date of protest before the 
military intervention, anti-war demonstrators in Washington, D.C. were surveyed. 
Finally, in April 2004, surveys were collected from anti-globalization protesters at the 
Spring 2004 WB/IMF meetings in Washington, D.C.  
In sum, protesters were surveyed at a series of anti-war and anti-globalization 
demonstrations in Munich, Germany; Antwerp, Belgium; Paris, France; Rome, Italy; 
Glasgow, Scotland; and Washington, D.C., United States between 2003 and 2004.  I 
was unable to reach and survey protesters at European anti-globalization 
demonstrations targeting the 2003 G8 Summit in France and Switzerland. Hence, 
most protesters were surveyed at an anti-war protest, and for many, if a second global 




To assure compatibility with cross-national surveys, pre-existing survey 
questions were adapted for use in the protester surveys, and survey questionnaires 
were made available in English, French, Dutch, German, and Italian. Informed 
consent procedures and protections for anonymity and confidentiality were applied, 
as specified in the approved IRB proposal.  It is noteworthy that included were 
several survey items assessing support for movement-related grievances, and 
participants were asked in great detail about their global protest behavior.  
Clustered random samples were obtained through a two-fold process.  First, I 
surveyed the protest crowd attending a rally and divided it into sections, which were 
then assigned to each research assistant.  Research assistants were instructed to move 
vertically and horizontally across the entire section selecting clusters of 9 or 10 
respondents.  Members on the outer fringe of the cluster are located a distance of at 
least N people apart from members on the outer fringe of the subsequent cluster. 
Research assistants started by surveying the person at the center of the cluster, as well 
as respondents every Nth person away from the central respondent, maintaining an N 
person distance between respondents.  Typically, N was set to five, although 
occasionally every fourth person was surveyed.  When a respondent declined to 
participate, the research assistant was instructed to move to the next Nth person and 
to note a non-response.  In larger crowds, the distance that the research assistant had 
to move to obtain a new cluster was increased. The selected protesters were asked to 
complete a written questionnaire during the demonstration and to return it to an 





Protest Survey Location 
and Type 
Number of Cases Collected 
Originally 
Number of Cases Used in 
Analyses 
USA Anti-War 165 23.17% 130 22.18% 
USA Anti-Globalization 111 15.59% 99 16.89% 
Belgium Anti-War 51 7.16% 41 7.00% 
Scotland Anti-War 117 16.43% 104 17.75% 
Germany Anti-War 144 20.22% 118 20.14% 
France Anti-War 74 10.39% 55 9.39% 
Italy Anti-War 50 7.02% 39 6.66% 
Total 712 100% 586 100% 
Table 3.3: Distribution of Protester Surveys   
 
Note:  8.71% of the original cases were dropped due to non-responses.  8.99% of the original cases 
were dropped due to missing data. 
 
As shown in Table 3.3, the response rate is quite high, compared to 40% 
response rates in other studies, and fringe elements seemed pretty willing to 
participate in anonymous in-person surveys, whereas some colleagues report Black 
Bloc demonstrators’ reluctance to participate in mail-in questionnaires (Bédoyan, Van 
Aelst, and Walgrave, 2004). The sampling of respondents in any study of protesters is 
of course challenged by the dynamic nature of demonstration crowds and the number 
of research assistants available at a protest venue, but I suggest the benefits of what 
information we can glean about the coupling and decoupling of global protesting and 
voting still makes this research worthwhile, despite sampling limitations.  
Next, I discuss the operationalization of the regressand and the regressors used 
in the multinomial logistic regression analyzing the interaction of voting and global 
protesting.  The dependent variable is the product of the interaction of two dummy 
variables:  recent voting and participation in multiple types of global protests.  Recent 
voting indicates respondents who voted in the most recent parliamentary or 




both anti-globalization and anti-war protests, and not just one of these types of global 
protests.  Hence, there are four unordered categories of the dependent variable: 
• Single protest voting:  A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has 
participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (voting and one type 
of global protest). 
• Multiple protest voting:  A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has 
participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (voting and two types 
of global protest). 
• Single protest non-voting:  A respondent who has not voted in a recent election 
but has participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (non-voting 
and one type of global protest). 
• Multiple protest non-voting:  A respondent who has not voted in a recent election 
but has participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (non-voting 
and two types of global protest). 
A dummy variable was created to code respondents who had voted in a recent 
election, since respondents were queried about their party choice in the most recent 
parliamentary election, and in some forms, about their vote in the most recent 
Presidential election. In future research, especially as the 2008 U.S. Presidential 
election is nearing with the fifth anniversary of the start of the war in Iraq, it would be 
preferable to ask about both retrospective and prospective voting.  
Additionally, two survey items per movement queried respondents about their 
protest activity against globalization and against war, and the type of protest at which 




demonstrations of each type they had attended, and respondents were also asked to 
mark the types of demonstrations they had attended using a checklist. Two dummy 
variables were thus created to indicate respondents’ attendance at anti-globalization 
and anti-war protests singularly. The interaction of these protest type variables was 
used to create another dummy variable for attending multiple types of global protest.  
The dependent variable is thus the product of the interaction of the recent 
voting and multiple global protesting dummy variables.  It thus has distinct values for 
each of the four possible outcome combinations of voting versus non-voting and 
single type of global protest versus multiple types of global protest.  The distribution 
of the respondents across the four participatory outcomes assessed by the dependent 
variable, from most to least popular, is: multiple protest voting (46%), single protest 
voting (25%), multiple protest non-voting (16%), and single protest non-voting 
(13%). It is noteworthy that the majority of protesters are indeed coupling protesting 
and voting, and many are engaging in multiple types of global protesting.  Likelihood 
Ratio and Wald Tests conducted after the multinomial logistic regression reveal that 
the four outcome categories are indeed distinguishable and should not be combined.  
Likelihood Ratio and Wald Tests were also conducted to test whether each variable 
has a significant effect on the participatory outcomes, and only variables with 
statistically or marginally significant effects were included in the final analysis. 
Targets were coded based on the protesters’ survey location. “Coalition of the 
Willing” is a dummy variable created to indicate respondents who were surveyed in 
the United States, United Kingdom, and Italy, countries that took a clearly pro-war 




Belgium, Germany, and France lacked such a strong domestic target (although some 
of the latter countries eventually offered some low-level targets by permitting usage 
of domestic transport networks for weapons shipments and troop transports). “M.E.I. 
Meeting” is a dummy variable created to indicate respondents who were surveyed at a 
protest during an international meeting, the Spring 2004 WB/IMF Meeting in 
Washington, DC or the 2003 Munich Conference on Security Policy which involved 
N.A.T.O. member-states, and who thus had an internationalist target available.  
Opposition to military intervention in Iraq was measured using survey items 
that were adapted from Gallup Europe questions about 5 scenarios in which military 
intervention in Iraq could have occurred.11 One of those scenarios represents the 
actuality (intervention without a preliminary UN decision). The other four scenarios 
represent other possible cases for intervention: the Iraqi regime does not cooperate 
with UN inspectors; the UN discovers weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; Iraq 
threatens other countries in the region; and the UN Security Council decides on a 
military intervention. The “Opposing U.S. Unilateralism (Military Intervention 
without the UN)” dummy variable indicates an “absolutely unjustified” response to 
the first scenario. The “Number of Scenarios Military Intervention is Unjustified” 
variable is a count of the number of alternate scenarios a respondent deems military 
intervention “absolutely unjustified.” 
Opposition to globalization was assessed using a survey item adapted from 
Worldviews, asking respondents to assess globalization’s impact on four spheres: 
their country's economy; providing jobs and strengthening the economy in poor 
                                                 




countries; maintaining cultural diversity in the world; and their own standard of 
living. As more spheres are perceived as badly impacted, respondents’ grievances 
about globalization are more all-encompassing. Few perceived negative impacts are 
indicative of a more delimited framing of the globalization problematique. “Number 
of Aspects of Globalization that are Bad” is thus a count variable summing the 
number of spheres a respondent deems globalization to have a “Bad” impact.  
Palestinian sympathies were gauged using a question asking respondents 
whether they sympathized more with Israelis or Palestinians in the current conflict, 
based on an Anti-Defamation League survey item.  The dummy variable “Supporting 
the Palestinians More” indicates sympathizing more with the Palestinians than with 
the Israelis, with neither group, or with both groups.  
Only the interaction effects between opposing U.S. unilateral intervention and 
the presence of domestic and international targets were statistically or marginally 
significant and included in the final analysis. The interaction of opposing U.S. 
unilateralism and the presence of either type of target was assessed using two dummy 
variables: “Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and Coalition of the Willing” 
and “Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting.” 
The country location and type of protest at which respondents were surveyed 
were not significant, and thus were not included in the final analysis.  Factors such as 
class and income which assess cleavages that used to be important in accounting for 
routine participation were omitted from the final regression because they were not 
significant predictors. However, being born 1979 or later (being 24 or younger during 




against the W.T.O. in 1999) and having attended some university or completed 
university with a degree were both statistically significant predictors of participatory 
choices and were controlled for in the final analysis.  
 To conclude, qualitative and quantitative methods were used to explore the 
impact of domestic and international targets and movement-related grievances on 
insiders and outsiders.  In Chapter 4, meso-level insider-outsider cooperation and 
conflict in anti-war coalitions are explored using content analysis and elite interviews 
of activists.  In Chapter 5, macro-level protest events on February 15, 2003 are 
investigated using content analysis.  Further, micro-level coupling and decoupling of 
protesting and voting is studied in Chapter 6, using a quantitative analysis of cross-





Chapter 4: Meso-level: British, Dutch, and American Anti-
War Coalitions 
What accounts for the dynamics in cooperation and conflict between insiders 
and outsiders in social movements, and what are the implications for remobilizing 
activists as voters in subsequent elections?  In this chapter, I explore dynamics of 
insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in the British, Dutch, and American anti-war 
movements via case studies that involve content analysis of archival news coverage 
and elite interviews.  First, I discuss the possible influences of domestic and 
international targets and movement-related grievances on conflict and cooperation in 
the anti-war movement, developing meso-level propositions.  Next, I develop an 
alternative meso-level argument dealing with the party system and electoral context, 
with added meso-level propositions.   Finally, I summarize my findings concerning 
insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in the British, Dutch, and American anti-war 
movements, and the factors accounting for dynamics in the relations between insiders 
and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, in light of these propositions.   
I find that despite the common presence of domestic targets in all three cases, 
there is considerable variation in the presence of conflict and cooperation in the anti-
war movement coalitions, and not the high cooperation that Tarrow would predict.  
Rather, movement-related grievances and the issue consensus and issue discord on 
those grievances are important in accounting for the framing agreements and 
disagreements and accordingly cooperation and conflict in the anti-war movements.  




conflict.  As the party system includes more parties that can be movement allies, 
possibilities for cooperation increase.  However, when there are many possible allies 
and a period of government formation characterized by uncertainty, conflict can arise, 
despite the presence of many allies. 
Domestic and International Targets 
Tarrow argues that domestic and international institutions provide targets that 
exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders, facilitating insider-outsider 
cooperation.  In explaining the historic February 15, 2003 global anti-war protests 
which mobilized 16 million demonstrators, Tarrow focuses on how targets presented 
by the domestic political opportunity structure facilitated successful cooperation 
between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions (2005, 15).  In particular, at the 
meso-level, this causal mechanism works because the pairing of domestic targets with 
the broad international target of a hegemonic U.S. government provides structured 
opportunities for cooperative relations and coalition-building between outsiders and 
insiders seeking to influence a common target, permitting greater insider-outsider 
cooperation and coalition-building that transgresses across borders against the 
common targets posed by internationalism (25).  He emphasizes the continued 
domestication of these transnational coalitions, and the cooperation that is possible 
via shared domestic targets, especially in states whose governments joined the 
“Coalition of the Willing.”  Several meso-level propositions are developed based on 
the centripetal influence that Tarrow argues domestic targets exert on insiders and 




4.1.   The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that 
supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the 
internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government,  increase the odds of 
cooperation between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, and cooperation 
will stem from shared agreement over institutional targets.  Countries lacking such 
strong domestic institutional targets are likely to have more conflict in anti-war 
coalitions, divides stemming from the lack of agreement over targets.   
4.2.   Grievances about war and about globalization, representing different issues, 
interests, and ideals of activists, do not account for dynamics in insider-outsider 
cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions. 
4.3.   Domestic targets are more important than international targets in accounting 
for dynamics in insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions. 
Movement-Related Grievances 
In contrast, I suggest that what really can unite or divide insiders and outsiders 
in anti-war coalitions are movement-related grievances.  What determines their effect 
is how the issue consensus or issue discord on these grievances in the movement and 
in the public is taken into account in the framing of grievances.  When movement-
related grievances with issue consensus are emphasized and lead to the adoption of 
transversal frames that many can agree with, they can elicit centripetal pulls on 
insiders and outsiders and facilitate insider-outsider cooperation.  Opposition to 
unilateral intervention in Iraq, a movement-related grievance that is opposed by much 
of the general public and is agreed on by many activists in the anti-war movement, 




Conversely, when movement-related grievances with issue discord are 
emphasized, they can exert centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders and unleash 
conflict in anti-war coalitions.  Opposition to military intervention in Iraq in many 
different scenarios, opposition to globalization, and support for Palestine, are 
movement-related grievances with more issue discord in movements and in the 
public, and may exert centrifugal influences making it impossible to agree on frames 
leading to conflicts in anti-war coalitions.  However, support for Palestine, on which 
there is agreement in certain contexts, may lead to a mixture of conflict and 
cooperation.  Several meso-level propositions are developed based on the influence 
that movement-related grievances with issue consensus and issue discord might have 
on insider-outsider conflict and cooperation in anti-war coalitions. 
4.4.   Movement-related grievances with issue consensus within protest coalitions, 
especially concerning opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without UN involvement, 
increase the odds of cooperation between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, 
and insiders and outsiders will be united via shared agreement over these grievances 
and over how they should be used in framing the movement.  Movement-related 
grievances with issue discord within protest coalitions, especially concerning whether 
opposition to the war in Iraq should be linked to opposition of all types of war, to 
opposition to globalization, and to support of Palestine, increase the odds of conflict 
between insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, with divisions between insiders 
and outsiders stemming from disagreements over these grievances and how they 
should be used in framing the movement.  Occasionally, in some contexts there is 




4.5.   Movement-related grievances about war and about globalization are more 
important than the presence of domestic and international targets in accounting for the 
dynamics in insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions.  
Grievances have the power to unite or to divide us, and whether they do depends on 
the issue consensus in the movement and in the public about them. 
4.6.   International grievances are more important than domestic grievances in 
accounting for dynamics in insider-outsider cooperation and conflict in anti-war 
coalitions.  Similarly, internationalist targets trump domestic targets, in exerting 
influence on insiders and outsiders. 
Party System and Electoral Context and Anti-War Protest Coalitions 
I now develop an alternative argument regarding insider-outsider cooperation, 
focusing on the party system and electoral context in which anti-war coalitions are 
organizing, which I suggest influences meso-level organizing due to the number of 
insider party allies that are available and the level of predictability regarding electoral 
outcomes.  I argue that insider-outsider cooperation is most likely in moderate multi-
partyism, which offers some possible party allies but also offers a certain level of 
predictability regarding electoral outcomes.  In contrast, insider-outsider conflict is 
most likely in moderate two-partyism, which offers few party allies.  Ironically, under 
polarized multi-partyism, in which there are the greatest number of parties that can be 
potential insider allies, a mixture of cooperation and conflict occurs, with the electoral 
context bringing in considerable uncertainty, especially in stages of coalition 
formation, that can drive periods of conflict, but with cooperation facilitated by the 




In this era in which political parties are less relevant and new values seem 
more important, other intermediaries like social movements may arise to better 
articulate these new values to the state.  Bale argues, “Certainly interest groups and 
protest movements may be better at expressing the direct material or identity needs of 
their participants. … But they cannot fulfill this competitive function” because once 
they start to focus on “standing candidates in elections, they begin to turn into 
parties” (2005, 128).  While social movements do not directly field candidates, they 
are often instrumental in mobilizing volunteers for campaigns, donations for 
candidates, and sometimes new constituents for political parties, as is exemplified by 
the success of Howard Dean in the early portions of the 2003 primary season in the 
United States.  However, all too often theories do not account for the mutualism of 
social movements, parties, and constituencies or the ways in which the party system 
context structures social movements’ activities but also influences their political 
implications.   
In fact, the symbiotic ties between social movements and political parties have 
more recently been highlighted by Goldstone (2003).  He argues that social 
movements, and not so much traditional cleavages, are increasingly important in 
structuring politics.  While focusing on how social movements matter to 
institutionalized politics, he also investigates how politics influence social 
movements.  He argues that “social movements constitute an essential element of 
normal politics in modern societies, and that there is only a fuzzy and permeable 
boundary between institutionalized and noninstitutionalized politics” (2).  Dynamics 




movements have become part of the environment and social structures that shape and 
give rise to parties, courts, legislatures, and elections” (2).  However, what is also 
important in Goldstone’s approach is that he acknowledges that the political structure 
also influences the development of social movements, describing the mutually 
dependent relationship between social movements and political parties (4).  Political 
dynamics can drive dynamics in social movements, which in turn have political 
implications.   
Goldstone definitely witnesses coupling of insider activism and outsider 
activism, but he focuses more on the impact of the structural context created by 
“ongoing symbiosis” between “the triangle of movements, parties, and 
constituencies” which can open up “with the advance of democratization” and which 
can influence movement outcomes as well as electoral outcomes (2003, 2, 10, 19, 23).  
Goldstone argues that protest and conventional participation are not dichotomous but 
lie along a “continuum of alignment and influence” with some groups more “in” or 
“aligned and integrated with the institutional authorities,” other groups more “out,” 
with very little institutionalized access, and many in-between (9).  Goldstone argues, 
Protest actions have certain advantages over and complementarities with 
conventional political action that make protest both an alternative and a 
valuable supplement to the latter.  Indeed, one would expect, and we generally 
find, that as societies gain and extend their institutionalized political 
participation through parties and voting, they also extend their 
institutionalized repertoires of, and participation in social movements and 
political protests (9-10). 
 
He suggests that  
political parties and social movements have become overlapping, mutually 
dependent actors in shaping politics, to the point where even long-established 
political parties welcome movement support and often rely specifically on 





He explains, “It is the role of the movement in the multisided strategic action of state 
leaders, parties, countermovements, and the public at large, each seeking to use or 
hinder the others to seek its own ends, that produces the final results” (24).   
Goldstone correctly argues that we need to try to understand the dynamics in 
movement-party coalitions, “social movements’ stance of alliance with, or opposition 
to, conventional political parties and officials,” and their impact on electoral change 
via dynamics in constituencies’ attitudes and behaviors (2003, 7, 16, 19).  Goldstone 
suggests that “the role of movements seems to be to raise issues that are potentially 
valuable to legislators in gaining the support of constituencies, even if the majority of 
the constituents are not active in the movement” (19).  In short, this paradigm would 
suggest that the party-movement linkages in the global anti-war movement helped 
parties capitalize on opportunities to promote the coupling of conventional and 
unconventional participation and of the work by movements to mobilize new 
constituencies for allied parties.  Goldstone accordingly argues that the “shifting 
orientations and relationships among the Mexican Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI), opposition electoral parties, moderate social movements, and 
radical guerrilla movements all combined to create a competitive democratic 
framework” helped lead to the first PRI electoral defeat in 70 years (16).   
Goldstone’s argument is an important contribution to the field, broadening our 
gaze to examine the political consequences of movements via their relations with 
parties and constituencies.  However, there are few aspects of his argument that need 
further development.  First, Goldstone himself acknowledges that “it apparently 




of state government as well” (2003, 20).  He bases these assertions on work by Van 
Dyke which found that Democratic control of the presidency or state governorships 
decreased the likelihood of student protest whereas Democratic control of the 
legislature increased the likelihood of student protests (2003).  Democrats have 
traditionally been more willing to forge alliances with leftist movements, and it seems 
that party-movement ties are facilitated when Democrats are part of the opposition in 
the legislature, but not when they are in control of the governing executive 
(Goldstone 2003, 9).   
I suggest that one way that Goldstone’s work needs to be developed further is 
by exploring differences across party systems, in the opportunity structure available 
for social movements.  Party systems differ in terms of the fragmentation and 
polarization of potential allies they provide in the opposition, with key implications 
for the type of coalition-formation that is possible.  However, as Goldstone suggests, 
we also need to consider who is in power and who is in the opposition at any point in 
time.  Thus, close to elections or stages of coalition formation, important dynamics in 
party-movement ties may occur, with implications for social movement organizing.   
I argue that when a higher number of ideological diverse potential allies are 
provided in the opposition, insider-oriented groups are able to forge direct, strong 
alliances with these political parties, to attract more people to engage in protest, to 
help constituencies draw connections between the aims linking protest behavior to 
conventional tactics, and to help parties capitalize on movement-party linkages and 
new constituencies brought to the ballot box by movements.  Conversely, when a 




indirect party-movement alliances are likely to form, making it more difficult to 
connect protesters’ demonstration activity to their electoral behavior, and resulting in 
few new voters for the allied parties.  Additionally, as possible allies enter the control 
of the governing executive, or are trying to enter the control of the governing 
executive, cooperation amongst different factions within the movement can face new 
obstacles.  Thus, I try to specify which aspects of political systems and political 
change constrain or empower social movements, and what political changes ensue.   
Additionally, Goldstone makes the important suggestion that some groups 
specialize in insider or outsider activism, although he argues that most groups fall in 
between and couple both types of tactics.  I suggest that he does not adequately 
account for participatory specialization in party system contexts where decoupling 
occurs more strongly, nor does he account for the insider-outsider cooperation and 
conflict between these groups.  In the more diverse political spectrum, I argue, 
insider-oriented groups have less political capital to lose by allying occasionally with 
outsiders, who lie on the political spectrum, and outsiders feel less excluded and are 
also more willing to cooperate occasionally with insiders.  Hence, insider-outsider 
cooperation is facilitated, more connections between conventional and 
unconventional participation are made, and protesters are more likely to turn into 
constituents combining protest with voting.  In contrast, when only a small number of 
ideologically similar potential allies are in the opposition, insider-outsider conflict is 
likely to increase, as insiders are moderated and outsiders are radicalized.   
Thus, I advance a new argument, building on Goldstone’s work, specifying 




influence insider-outsider conflict or cooperation.  At the crux of my structural 
argument is the notion that certain party systems better equip opportunistic parties of 
the opposition to strategically adapt to global social movements, and thus to benefit 
from a successful mobilization of protesters seeking to cast protest votes.  Pulzer 
(1987, 379) also suggests that parties’ adaptability in the face of change, is a key 
determinant of their survival, stating, 
There are all sorts of institutional reasons that enable political parties to 
survive the social cleavages and issue conflicts that gave rise to them:  
superior resources, organizational skill, … One other condition needs to be 
satisfied:  adaptability.  Adaptability in policy, in organizational structure, in 
social appeal … [Adaptability] will, in the end, determine whether a party 
founded to further the social and political emancipation of the proletariat can 
survive in a progressively post-industrial climate.”  
 
In particular, Pulzer argues that parties differ in their adaptability to “a changed 
relationship between the citizen and the State,” “a changed attitude toward collective 
action” or a “close relationship, in strategy and tactics, between trade unions and 
parties,” and adaptation to “new politics” (the changing social structure and their 
increasing focus on single issue lobbying and grass-roots activism brought by global 
social movements) (1987, 379-83).  Adaptable parties can take advantage of 
movements’ ability to mobilize new constituencies.  For instance, Blühdorn argues 
that inclusion of Green parties moderates policy-making in coalition governments and 
helps mobilize new electoral constituencies (2004).  Kitschelt also discusses the 
adaptability of political parties in the new values era: 
First, party leaders are not divorced from their members and voting 
constituencies, but become ever more sensitive to their preferences.  Second, 
inter-party cooperation generates a prisoner’s dilemma in the competitive 
arena that ultimately prevents the emergence of cartels.  Ideological 
convergence of rival parties has causes external to the competitive arena, not 




challengers, but must adjust to their demands and electoral appeals (2000, 
149). 
 
Kitschelt argues that public opinion and outside actors like social movements are 
increasingly important in influencing parties, suggesting,  
Instead of being increasingly anchored in the ‘state’, parties are more at the 
mercy of exogenous political preferences, whether emerging spontaneously in 
the electorate or manufactured by autonomous mass media and political 
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Table 4.1: Sartori Typology of Party Systems 
I argue that Sartori’s classification of party systems offers insight into the 
process by which the party system context can structure movements and can influence 
the political outcomes that movements are able to help bring about.  Sartori’s 
classification accounts for two dimensions that distinguish most party systems: 
fragmentation and polarization.  Table 4.1 summarizes Sartori’s typology. 
For Sartori (1976), fragmentation is the number of “relevant” political parties 
in a party system, with some systems characterized by a very high number of relevant 
parties and others by a very low number of relevant parties.  Laakso and Taagepera 
developed an indicator for fragmentation which accounts for both the number and the 
relative strength of parties, measuring the “effective number of parties” in the party 




the 1960s and 1990s, during the era when these new cleavages have arisen (Webb 
2002, 127-9).  The Green party has established itself in many countries, and new 
regionalist and extreme right parties have formed in some countries. 
One method used to assess polarization or parties’ ideological locations are 
expert-judgment scales, which ask experts to rank parties ideologically (Webb 2002, 
129).  However, another means of measuring polarization in individual parties, the 
Comparative Manifestos Project, has systematically analyzed official statements of 
party platforms using the same criteria, across several decades (Klingemann, 
Hofferbert, and Budge 1994).  The availability of such data permitted Caul and Grey 
to examine the ideological dispersion of parties in party systems over time, observing 
a general trend of ideological convergence during the era in which traditional 
cleavages have been in decline (2000).   
Polarized pluralism, Sartori’s highly fragmented, highly polarized party 
system, involves at least five or six relevant parties and at least one anti-system party.  
These systems tend to have governments involving coalitions between several parties 
in the center, and opposition parties are located ideologically to the right and to the 
left of the governing parties.  The ideological dispersion of the parties makes it 
difficult for other parties to reach agreement and thus coalitions tend not to change 
very much from government to government, limiting the alternation of power and the 
degree to which incumbent governments are held accountable.  These systems are 
also characterized by centrifugal pulls by anti-system parties on the extreme left and 
right which influence governing coalition parties to take more extreme positions, to 




parties tends to make governing coalitions unstable, Sartori has therefore argued 
(1976).  
Next, I discuss the two types of party systems that are moderately polarized 
but differ in their fragmentation.  Moderate pluralism, or moderately fragmented, 
moderately polarized systems, involve three to five relevant parties and usually lack 
anti-system parties.  The government tends to involve alternation in power between 
blocs of parties, with opposition to the left or to the right.  Further, these party 
systems are characterized by centripetal forces, meaning that there is more of a push 
to take moderate positions created by the more moderate positions of the included 
parties and the absence of extremist parties.   
Finally, moderate two-partyism, or a system with low fragmentation and 
moderate polarization, is similar to moderate pluralism.  However, it involves two 
relevant parties alternating in the government, even if a weak or almost irrelevant 
third party is present.  Sartori argued that such governments tend to be more stable 
(Sartori 1976; Webb 2002).  
I suggest that the party systems in Sartori’s typology might in fact provide the 
structuring influence on social movements to which Goldstone’s work has alluded.  
However, there are certain caveats regarding what happens when a party has an 
opportunity to control the executive, close to elections, as Goldstone also suggested.  
In the following paragraphs, I describe the typology I advance for each party system.   
First, polarized multi-partyism is a structural setting in which there are too 
many parties that can potentially form alliances with movements (and gain from these 




eight parties spread from left to right, and the formation of coalition governments, 
which often include 3 or 4 political parties.  The presence of allies that are 
uncoalitionable (unlikely capable of joining the coalition government), delegitimizes 
movements that appear too allied with the uncoalitionable extremes and leads to 
divides within movements when other factions feel it is a better strategy to focus on 
coalitionable parties (likely capable of joining the coalition government).  Factions 
focused on uncoalitionable parties that are more representative of the movement, 
appear more extreme in this context at the fringes of the centrifugal political 
spectrum, and thus fewer people may be drawn into movements.   
The political spectrum is more confusing to navigate, with uncertainty 
regarding coalition outcomes at the end of intense periods of negotiation during 
coalition formation.  Governments resulting from coalition formation processes are 
difficult for parties outside the center to enter into and do not usually involve much 
alternation of power for the most coalitionable parties.  There is an increased cost of 
appearing too extreme and uncoalitionable (the political capital lost by insiders for 
allying with outsiders) resulting in more conflict in the movement between insiders, 
who are oriented intra-institutionally, and outsiders, who are oriented extra-
institutionally.  Outsiders feel more excluded by coalitionable parties located largely 
at the center and less so by uncoalitionable parties.  Thus, outsiders are less willing to 
ally with insiders at times of government transition, unwilling to sacrifice 
representation for governmental inclusion.  As a result, insiders-outsider conflict can 
emerge, with outsiders less willing to focus on insider strategies, especially close to 




Hence, social movements in polarized multi-partyism may have a harder time 
convincing constituencies to link unconventional and outsider strategies with 
conventional and insider strategies.  They mobilize fewer people to protest, and the 
voters they mobilize to cast protest votes are divided in their voting, with moderates 
focusing on coalitionable parties that allied with the movement, but may be more 
distant from the ideals the movement cares about, and with radicals focusing on 
uncoalitionable party allies whose platforms are more representative of movement 
ideals.  Hence, opportunistic parties of the opposition which forge party-movement 
ties are moderately successful in turning these ties into electoral gains.   
Like Sartori, Lijphart (1999) also observed the short-term duration of 
governments and uncertainty regarding the outcomes of coalition formation in 
polarized pluralism party systems.  High levels of fragmentation and polarization can 
make a very confusing system in which to cast a protest vote, because it is unclear 
how the protest vote will relate to the eventual coalition which will form.  In coalition 
governments, winning an election does not necessarily explain which parties are 
coalitionable and enter the government, but avoiding the loss of seats is important, as 
a matter of course, according to Mattila and Raunio (2004).  Further, Ezrow (2005) 
suggests that moderate parties tend to be rewarded in multi-party systems, and thus in 
the face of extreme uncertainty in the most multi-party systems, we might expect 
moderate voters to cast protest votes for the most moderate parties allied with the 
anti-war movement, and not for the parties that are less proximate to the center of the 
voter distribution.  Luebbert explains that oversize coalitions which often form in 




(1986).   According to Webb, these “‘surplus’ or ‘oversize’ cabinets – that is, 
coalition governments which contact more parties than are strictly necessary in order 
to control a parliamentary majority” are exemplified by consociational democracies 
like Belgium and Switzerland (2002, 129).   
Hence, I suggest that contexts in which coalition formation consistently 
requires several or more parties to ally, such as in the Netherlands, lead voters to 
consider parties’ likelihood of entering the government during coalition formation, 
when casting their ballots.  I suggest that the electorate has come to expect 
uncertainty regarding coalitions between several parties resulting from coalition 
formation in highly fragmented, polarized political systems, and accordingly, they are 
more uncertain about how to cast protest votes.  Hence, I expect more disagreement 
about how to cast protest votes, with moderates selecting parties that are coalitionable 
and radicals selecting parties that will not sell-out their agendas by joining governing 
coalitions.  Overall, I expect a net electoral volatility that favors parties allied with 
movements that are more likely to be coalitionable and that hurts parties allied with 
movements which are less likely to be coalitionable.  Ironically, in systems designed 
to represent the greatest number of people in government, this structure may 
discourage mainstream voters from voting for parties that best represent them, and 
rather be forced to choose the most coalitionable parties.  
To summarize, polarized pluralism leads movements to face more challenges 
in using movement-party ties to create cooperative movements and to be less 
successful in getting new constituencies to combine protest with effective protest 




anarchical political spectrum and uncertainty lead moderates to ally with and vote for 
parties that do not necessarily represent them as well but are more coalitionable, 
resulting in moderate electoral changes favorable to the movement despite the fact 
that the electoral systems in these contexts are supposed to facilitate the accurate 
representation of societal interests.   
The polarized pluralism structural context is thus likely to have a mixture of 
cooperation and division between insiders and outsiders regarding strategy, leading to 
intermediate movement-party cooperation; intermediate insider-outsider conflict and 
cooperation; ineffective combining of unconventional and conventional tactics; and 
smaller electoral gains for parties allied with the movement.  However, I argue that 
movement-related grievances can interact with this structural influence:  as public 
opinion concerning these grievances changes, then this relation may be modified, 
with increasing public support of movement-related grievances increasing the 
likelihood of movement-party cooperation, insider-outsider cooperation, linkage of 
unconventional and conventional tactics, and electoral gains for allied parties where it 
was not possible earlier. 
Second, moderate multi-partyism is a structural setting in which there are also 
some parties that can potentially form alliances with movements (and gain from these 
alliances).  However, there is far less uncertainty about the outcomes of coalition 
formation because one party usually enters the government and the other parties 
usually take the role of the opposition.  The ideologically centripetal political 




movements, making them appear included within a not-too-extreme political 
spectrum, helping to draw new people into movements.   
The political spectrum is narrower but not too narrow (the ideological 
spectrum is moderately disperse) so the cost of appearing too left (the political capital 
lost by insiders for allying with outsiders) does not act so much as a barrier 
preventing cooperation in the movement.  The lack of parties at the extremes, but the 
availability of at least one representative party ally, leads outsiders and insiders alike 
to feel more included by a party ally at the centre.  Outsiders may still feel somewhat 
alienated by the system which lacks more extreme views, but they are more willing to 
ally with insiders because there is a clear alternative on which both groups can agree.  
This stands in stark contrast with both the polarized multi-partyism that offers many 
alternatives, as well as the moderate two-partyism I discuss next, which is 
characterized by the lack of alternatives for which protesters can cast protest ballots.   
There is less disagreement about coalitionability and the representativeness of 
party views in this system.  Cooperation results more often, as outsiders are more 
willing to include insider tactics.  Since greater insider-outsider cooperation ensues, 
movements appear less divided and less anti-systemic.  Movements are better able to 
forge a connection between unconventional or outsider strategies and conventional or 
insider strategies, mobilizing more people to protest and effectively mobilizing more 
voters for parties allied with the movements.  Opportunistic parties of the opposition 
that forge party-movement ties are highly successful in turning these ties into 




In moderate multi-partyism, we often see a single party forming the 
government, even if the government that results is a minority government and even 
though coalitions could potentially form.  Minority governments consist of 
“representatives of parties that collectively control fewer than half the seats in 
parliament (or the parliamentary chamber(s) endowed with the power to dismiss the 
cabinet)” (Strøm 1997, 54).  Minority governments form because other parties may 
decide not to join, considering difficulties in mobilizing their constituencies in future 
elections due to the kinds of compromises that coalition participation may require.   
Minority governments were not exceptional but accounted for more than one 
in three governments of 15 parliamentary democracies Strøm analyzed between 1945 
and 1987, and these governments are the norm in some cases, as 22 out of 25 
governments in Denmark were in fact minority governments (1997, 54).  Although 
conventionally regarded as being unstable and associated with “political crises, 
cabinet instability, fragmented party systems, polarization, and profound cleavage 
conflict,” Strøm disagrees and argues that “the formation of minority cabinets reflects 
the anticipation of electoral accountability” (54).  Strøm argues  
Compared to their natural alternative, majority coalitions of two or more 
parties, minority governments form in less fragmented and polarized party 
systems.  They do not seem to be solutions of last resort that emerge from 
particularly difficult and protracted bargaining episodes.  Finally, the great 
majority are not simply majority governments in disguise:  cabinets with an 
equally solid commitment from support parties that happen not to take 
portfolios in the cabinet.  Instead, the typical minority government is a single-
party government, like the Norwegian Labour cabinet, which may have to 
look for legislative support from issue to issue on an ad hoc basis.  Clearly, 





Strøm suggests that in coalition formation, “the broader the coalition, the more 
explicit compromises its participants have to make, and the more flagrantly they may 
have to renege on their promises to the voters” (57). 
Thus, in these settings, movements are better able to use movement-party ties 
to create cooperative movements and to convince new constituencies to combine 
protest with effective protest voting, resulting in high electoral change for certain 
parties allied with the social movement.  The moderate multi-party structural context 
is best suited to elicit insider-outsider cooperation, the combination of unconventional 
and conventional tactics, and therefore dramatic electoral gains for parties allied with 
the movement.  However, dynamics in support for movement-related grievances can 
also moderate this structural influence.   
Third, I argue that moderate two-partyism is a structural setting in which the 
connections between parties and movements, insiders and outsiders, unconventional 
and conventional behavior, and the political structure and electoral gains for parties 
allied with movements are weakest.  This context involves two effective parties 
competing for power, and thus there are far fewer parties that can potentially form 
alliances with movements (and gain from these alliances).  The lack of elite allies 
delegitimizes the movements, making them appear more extreme and outside of the 
political spectrum and drawing fewer people into movements.   
The political spectrum is narrower (more exclusive) so the cost of appearing 
too far left (the political capital lost by insiders for allying with outsiders) increases, 
resulting in more conflict in the movement as insiders form alliances with parties that 




spectrum.  Outsiders feel more excluded by parties located largely at the center which 
are not representative of their views and more alienated by the system which lacks 
parties at the extremes (more anti-systemic).  Hence, outsiders are less willing to ally 
with insiders or advocate insider tactics, leading to insider-outsider conflict.  
 Thus, in moderate two-partyism, movements appear more divided, and some 
factions are more anti-systemic.  Movements have a harder time forging a connection 
between unconventional or outsider tactics and conventional or insider tactics.  
Hence, they mobilize a lower percentage of protesters, as well as mobilizing fewer 
voters to cast protest votes for parties allied with the movements.  In these settings, 
movements face more challenges in using movement-party ties to create cooperative 
movements and are less successful in getting new constituencies to combine protest 
with different types of voting, resulting in less electoral change that favors parties 
linked to movements.  Therefore, opportunistic parties of the opposition that forge 
party-movement ties are largely unsuccessful in turning these ties into electoral gains.   
My argument hinges on the uncertainties of coalition formation, the high 
number of candidates for protest votes, and divergent representativeness of party 
allies of the ideologically disperse polarized pluralism.  Likewise, it emphasizes the 
lack of representative candidates for protest votes in the ideologically narrow 
moderate two-partyism.  Direct party-movement linkages, insider-outsider 
cooperation, linkages between conventional and unconventional participation, and 
electoral gains for parties allied with movements may be most possible in moderate 
multi-partyism.  Conversely, the most indirect party-movement linkages, insider-




electoral losses for parties allied with movements may be more likely in moderate 
two-partyism.   
Ironically, polarized multi-partyism seems to fall in between the other 
systems, despite its tendency to include more parties representative of disparate 
societal viewpoints.  In this context, conflict seems more likely close to elections and 
periods of government formation, but cooperation is also feasible at other times.  
Several meso-level propositions are developed concerning the influence that the party 
system and electoral context have on insider-outsider cooperation and conflict. 
4.7.   In moderate multi-party systems such as in the United Kingdom, much 
insider-outsider cooperation ensues. Coalitions are characterized by alliances with a 
moderate number of political insiders and by little fluctuation in insider-outsider ties 
close to elections. 
4.8.   In polarized multi-party systems such as in the Netherlands, an intermediate 
level of insider-outsider cooperation ensues.  Coalitions are characterized by alliances 
with several political parties of the left or in the opposition and consensus-seeking as 
actors seek to find a middle ground,  However, periods of conflict are unleashed, 
especially occurring during times of uncertainty related to government formation and 
elections due to concerns about entering the government. 
4.9.   In moderate two-party systems such as in the United States, much insider-
outsider conflict ensues.  Outsiders feel marginalized by the narrow political spectrum 
and are unwilling to focus on tactics involving coupling insider and outsider activism.  
Outsiders also prioritize selecting frames that reflect all movement-related grievances, 




about trying to effect intra-institutional changes, cultivating what insider alliances 
they can in the narrow political spectrum, and choosing their framing of grievances in 
such a way that they are not portrayed as too radical and costly in terms of insider 
alliances.  Thus, disagreements between insiders and outsiders are very common. 
Insider-Outsider Cooperation and Conflict 
Despite sharing domestic targets, the British, Dutch, and American anti-war 
movements varied considerably in the level of cooperation and conflict between 
insiders and outsiders.  Results from these cases are summarized in Table 4.2.  
Cooperation was the norm in the recent British anti-war movement, although in 
previous anti-war movements that was not always the case (Kate Hudson, personal 
communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, January 
5, 2006).  In the Netherlands, cooperation was possible during the time that the anti-
war movement was mobilized, but conflict emerged at the height of the anti-war 
movement due to a new period of government formation in which one of the parties 
allied with the anti-war movement was trying to join the governing coalition (Jan 
Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, 
personal communication, December 19, 2005).  Finally, in the United States, conflict 
has been the norm, with very few successful attempts at bringing together key 
insiders and outsiders in anti-war coalitions, and co-optation and conflict 
characterizing the few collaborative events that actually occurred (Brian Becker, 
personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, 
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the War in Iraq 







• Opposing U.S. unilateralism 
in Iraq 
• Opposing War in Iraq in 
Many Scenarios 
• Linking Opposition to War to 
Opposition to Globalization 
• Linking Opposition to War to 
Support of Palestine 
Moderate Multi-
partyism 
Netherlands Mixture Yes 
• Opposing U.S. unilateralism 
in Iraq 
• Opposing War in Iraq in 
Many Scenarios 
• Linking Opposition to War to 














• Opposing U.S. unilateralism 
in Iraq 
• Opposing War in Iraq in 
Many Scenarios 
• Linking Opposition to War to 
Opposition to Globalization 
• Linking Opposition to War to 
Support of Palestine 
Moderate Two-
partyism 
Table 4.2: Results of Elite Interviews of Anti-War Organizers 
 
Table 4.3 summarizes the findings pertinent to each of the propositions 
developed in the theoretical framework, which are discussed as the evidence is 
presented.  The presence of domestic targets do not account for the considerable 
conflicts in the American anti-war movement and the mixture of cooperation and 
conflict in the Dutch anti-war movement, as these countries, like the United 




Moreover, activists do not cite targets when discussing successful or failed 
cooperation.  Disconfirmatory evidence of proposition 4.1 is thus observed.   
Rather, movement-related grievances, and agreements or disagreements about 
framing those grievances, given issue consensus and issue discord, appear to be 
important in accounting for dynamics of cooperation and conflict in these cases, 
disconfirming proposition 4.2 and offering support of proposition 4.5.  Domestic 
targets seem to be at least equally important as international targets, but not in 
promoting cooperation per se, disconfirming proposition 4.3.  International 
grievances may be more important than particularistic domestic ones, as international 
grievances were frequently cited by activists in accounting for failed or successful 
cooperation.  Hence, some confirmatory evidence regarding proposition 4.6 is found. 
Proposition Causal Factor 
Expected Pattern in Outcomes 
Observed 
Confirmed? 
4.1 Domestic Target Insider-Outsider Cooperation N 
4.2 Movement-Related Grievances No Effect N 
4.3 
Primacy of Domestic over 
International Targets 
Insider-Outsider Cooperation N 
4.4 Movement-Related Grievances 
Insider-Outsider 
Cooperation and Conflict 
Y 
4.5 
Primacy of Grievances over 
Targets 
Insider-Outsider 
Cooperation and Conflict 
Y 
4.6 
Primacy of International over 
Domestic 
Insider-Outsider 
Cooperation and Conflict 
Y 
4.7 Moderate Multi-Party Systems Insider-Outsider Cooperation Y 
4.8 
Polarized Multi-Party Systems 
and Electoral Uncertainty 
During Government Formation 
Mixture of Cooperation and 
Conflict 
Y 
4.9 Moderate Two-Party Systems Insider-Outsider Conflict Y 





I briefly provide examples of how movement-related grievances and the party 
system and electoral context are related to conflict and cooperation in coalitions.  
First, I discuss several movement-related grievances that seem to be important in 
accounting for the dynamics in cooperation and conflict in anti-war coalitions in the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States.  The evidence that I present 
offers considerable support for proposition 4.4.  Next, I discuss the party system and 
electoral context in these three cases. 
In the United Kingdom, activists made a decision to select transversal frames 
linked to movement-related grievances on which there was more issue consensus, 
especially because many of the activists had worked together before and understood 
sources of issue discord and were committed to avoiding the conflict that discord can 
drive (Lindsey German, January 9, 2006; Kate Hudson, personal communication, 
January 4, 2006; Sarah Sachs-Eldridge, personal communication, January 10, 2006).  
Thus, they decided to select transversal frames focused on opposing unilateralism in 
Iraq, and agree to respect but not necessarily emphasize the diversity of perspectives 
in the movement related to all-encompassing opposition to war, tying opposition to 
war to opposition to globalization, and supporting Palestine (Kate Hudson, personal 
communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, January 
5, 2006).   
In the British anti-war movement, there was some measured issue consensus 
on opposing war in a variety of cases, and this was important in remobilizing activists 
from previous peace movements, especially the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 




preemptive intervention in Iraq (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 
2006).  Additionally, activists agreed to make linkages between the war in Iraq and 
globalization, which helped to bring on board activists involved in global justice, 
although they agreed not to focus on these linkages too much (Kate Hudson, personal 
communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, January 
5, 2006; Guy Taylor, personal communication, January 5, 2006).   
However, there were some initial disagreements when the Stop the War 
Coalition and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament tried to bring on board the 
Muslim Association of Britain (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 
2006).  Eventually this conflict was mitigated and consistent cooperation between 
these groups was secured, after there was an agreement to tie in the question of 
Palestine, to a limited degree, although some groups are unwilling to take an official 
stance on that issue (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006).   
In the Netherlands, a focus on opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq made it 
easy for a variety of groups to cooperate in the “Platform Against the War” (Platform 
Tegen de Oorlog), also known as the Platform Against the New War (Jan Schaake, 
personal communication, December 14, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, personal 
communication, December 19, 2005).  As many of these groups were also involved in 
global justice activism and had interacted at social forums, and because of the Dutch 
political context in which consensus-seeking is expected, it was not very hard to come 
to this agreement, nor was it difficult for the activists to acknowledge and respect a 
variety of perspectives (Sylvia Borren, personal communication, December 16, 2005; 




In the Netherlands, the movement-related grievance concerning all-
encompassing opposition to war was important in accounting for one element of 
conflict in the anti-war coalition, as some of the key groups and activists who were 
instrumental in the peace movement against nuclearization in the 1980s were 
unwilling to cooperate this time around (Mient Jan Faber, personal communication, 
December 20, 2005; Jan Gruiters, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Jan 
Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005).  Some of these groups were 
religious organizations that had ties to Kurds in Iraq and felt that the war could be 
important in ending the violent repression committed by the Hussein regime, and 
there was thus a limited mobilization of religious organizations (Mient Jan Faber, 
personal communication, December 20, 2005; Jan Gruiters, personal communication, 
December 14, 2005; Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005).  
The question of opposition to globalization played some role in derailing the 
movement altogether after the war started, because global justice activists felt it was 
important to return to their other activities (Rene Danen, personal communication, 
December 16, 2005; Wytze de Lange, personal communication, December 20, 2005; 
Tuur Elzinga, personal communication, December 15, 2005; Jan Schaake, personal 
communication, December 14, 2005).   
Further, the demobilization of the Dutch anti-war movement is also very much 
tied to the political crisis that started with the assassination of politician Pim Fortuyn 
and the center-right coalition that was selected soon after his death in May 2002.  In 
the aftermath of this crisis, many of the global justice activists that had been 




immigrants, xenophobic crimes such as fires set to Islamic schools, and the poor 
treatment of asylum-seekers after a fire at the Schiphol airport detention facility, and 
decided that they had to fill the vacuum on these issues and could not remain 
mobilized on a war that had already started and which their protest had not averted in 
the first place (Rene Danen, personal communication, December 16, 2005; Wytze de 
Lange, personal communication, December 20, 2005; Tuur Elzinga, personal 
communication, December 15, 2005).  The question of Palestine was not such an 
important issue in the Dutch context. 
The United States anti-war movement has successfully allied many disparate 
organizations, but cooperation between two of the most important coalitions, UFPJ 
and ANSWER, has remained elusive (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 
9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).  Repeatedly, on 
protest event after protest event, these coalitions have unsuccessfully tried to ally 
together, and what few collaborative events have occurred, have been characterized 
by conflict and efforts to coopt one another (Brian Becker, personal communication, 
March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).   
The conflicts have stemmed from framing disagreements because UFPJ is 
focused on mobilizing protesters using frames reflecting movement-related 
grievances on which there is issue consensus, while ANSWER is focused on 
mobilizing protesters using frames reflecting movement-related grievances on which 
there is issue discord (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005 
and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany 




member groups and the population agree on, such as opposing U.S. unilateralism and 
bringing the international community and United Nations back in to policy-making 
on Iraq (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).   
Linking opposition to the war in Iraq to an all-encompassing opposition of 
war has been one important source of conflict in the American anti-war coalition 
(Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal 
communication, March 11, 2005).  Namely, ANSWER uses an anti-imperialism 
frame to link together many different issues on which UFPJ and the general public 
disagree, as part of its all-encompassing opposition to war (Soren Ambrose, personal 
communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal 
communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 
2005).  As this includes supporting some regimes viewed as authoritarian or even 
supporting the insurgency against the U.S. troops, this has produced many 
disagreements (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, 
personal communication, March 11, 2005).   
Additionally, the linkage between opposing war and opposing globalization, 
which most of the groups agree is present, has also produced conflict in the American 
anti-war movement, because groups like ANSWER link it to imperialism and groups 
like UFPJ are concerned about avoiding a radical image that could alienate supporters 
(Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; 
Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal 
communication, March 11, 2005).  One of the debates that has arisen in global justice 




over activism on global justice, and also whether with the heightened protests of the 
war and new political climate after September 11, insider tactics should be used 
instead of outsider tactics (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, February 16, 
2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; 
Neil Watkins, personal communication, March 17, 2005).   
One of the most persistent sources of conflict in the American anti-war 
movement was the issue of Palestine, as was already mentioned.  ANSWER’s focus 
on bringing Palestine into the frames used for particular demonstrations prevented 
cooperation on numerous global protests (Soren Ambrose, personal communication, 
February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, 
March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).   
 Although movement-related grievances and their strategic framing account for 
much of the conflict and cooperation in the anti-war movements in these cases, I 
suggest that the party-system and electoral context is also important.  Moderate multi-
partyism in the United Kingdom may have facilitated cooperation.  Some 
confirmatory evidence of proposition 4.7 is presented regarding the United Kingdom.  
Further, polarized multi-partyism in the Netherlands provided many opportunities for 
cooperation, but the uncertainty surrounding elections and coalition negotiation 
resulted in conflicts.  Substantial confirmatory evidence of proposition 4.8 is offered 
in the Netherlands.  Finally, moderate two-partyism in the United States seems to 
account for insider-outsider conflict, and evidence regarding the American anti-war 




In the United Kingdom, the anti-war movement was characterized by a variety 
of groups, some more allied with the Labour Party, others with the Liberal 
Democrats, and yet others with regional parties or with the Respect Coalition that 
broke away from the Labour Party when it supported the war in Iraq (Kate Hudson, 
personal communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, 
January 5, 2006; John Rees, personal communication, January 9, 2006).  However, 
even close to election times, the cooperation between the different groups remained 
steadfast, and no conflicts tied to their insider allegiances cropped up (Kate Hudson, 
personal communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, personal communication, 
January 5, 2006).   
Although the Liberal Democrats took an anti-war stance, and had a presence 
at demonstrations, their relationship with the anti-war movement was quite limited 
(Bob Russell, personal communication, January 10, 2006).  Rather, the Respect 
Coalition and key representatives such as Jeremy Corbyn, from Labour, had very 
good relationships with the anti-war movement (Kate Hudson, personal 
communication, January 4, 2006; John Rees, personal communication, January 9, 
2006).  In the British context, with a number of insider allies, the anti-war movement 
was open to using a variety of insider and outsider tactics to try to influence a variety 
of allies, and the general sense that Labour would stay in control of the government 
helped facilitate an agreement to maximize insider connections and leverage all sorts 
of tactics (Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 2006; Andrew Murray, 




 The Dutch anti-war movement also found numerous party allies in the 
Socialist Party, Green Party, and Labor Party (Pepijn Brandon, personal 
communication, December 15, 2005; Jan Schaake, personal communication, 
December 14, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 
2005).  In fact, the linkages between the parties and the social movements were so 
strong that Hans van Heijningen, a key activist in the global justice movement who 
was an important organizer in the Platform against the War and who helped mobilize 
the February 15, 2003 protests, subsequently became the general secretary of the 
Socialist Party, and I interviewed him in parliament (Hans van Heijningen, personal 
communication, December 19, 2005).  In general, the breadth of the political 
spectrum in the Netherlands, and the variety of ties to the anti-war movement, led to a 
commitment to seek consensus and to cooperate in whatever way possible (Sylvia 
Borren, personal communication, December 16, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, personal 
communication, December 19, 2005).   
However, some conflict was unleashed in the Dutch anti-war movement due 
to coalition negotiations that occurred at the height of the anti-war movement in 
January, February, and March 2003 (Jan Schaake, personal communication, 
December 14, 2005; Hans van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 
2005).  After the May 2002 election which resulted in a coalition between the 
Christian Democrats and Pim Fortuyn’s populist and anti-immigrant party, it soon 
became clear that this coalition was untenable and in October 2002 Prime Minister 
Balkenende’s cabinet resigned.  New elections were held in January 2003, with 




Democrats in a coalition government.  During the run-up to the election, groups tied 
to the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid) were already being pressured to hold off on 
outsider tactics (Jan Schaake, personal communication, December 14, 2005; Hans 
van Heijningen, personal communication, December 19, 2005).   
Further, as the coalition negotiations started, the Labour party was being 
pressured to soften its opposition to the war so that it could enter into a coalition with 
the center-right party that supported the war.  As anti-war protests became more 
mobilized in the lead up to the war, conflicts occurred within the anti-war protest 
coalition because some groups were more reluctant to turn out and because there was 
much controversy over whether the leader of the Labour Party should be invited to 
speak at protests, given his softened anti-war stance (Jan Schaake, personal 
communication, December 14, 2005).   
 The American anti-war movement found few insider allies in the two main 
parties, certainly few who were willing to oppose the war in Iraq in its entirety.  
Exceptions include Dennis Kucinich and Howard Dean.  However, because of the 
narrow political spectrum, insider-oriented groups in the movement were still willing 
to ally with the Democrats and were very focused on mobilizing voters close to the 
2004 election (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).  This voter 
mobilization received much priority in the April 2004 March for Women’s Lives, 
where Hillary Clinton spoke, and the August 2004 protests at the Republican National 
Convention (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).  UFPJ was 




to pair insider tactics like lobbying with protesting, especially since the war started 
(Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).   
In contrast, outsider groups such as ANSWER feel so alienated by the 
political system that they see no difference between the Republican and Democratic 
Party and see no point to coupling protesting with lobbying or voting (Brian Becker, 
personal communication, March 9, 2005).  In fact, outsiders are trying to build 
support for a more revolutionary change to the political system (Nihar Bhatt, personal 
communication, March 6, 2005; Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 
2005).  ANSWER, thus, is not willing to alter its framing of movement-related 
grievances to fit the political context, and tactically is not interested in lobbying or 
voter mobilization (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005).   
These very different orientations have led to many conflicts between 
ANSWER and a host of groups, including UFPJ (Soren Ambrose, personal 
communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal 
communication, March 9, 2005; Kate Hudson, personal communication, January 4, 
2006; Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005).   These cooperative 
failures may have inhibited protest mobilization domestically, linkages between 
insider activism and outsider activism domestically, and cooperation with other 
activists transnationally.  However, a shift in public opinion on movement-related 
grievances, such as following Hurricane Katrina, can mitigate the difficulties of 
cooperating in the United States anti-war movement, and on September 24, 2005, 




Contrary to Tarrow’s expectations, several countries that shared strong 
domestic targets had anti-war movements that varied considerably in insider-outsider 
conflict and cooperation.  Rather, movement-related grievances and the party system 
and electoral context seem to account for the dynamics in cooperation and conflict of 
anti-war organizers across these cases.  Movement-related grievances and the issue 
consensus and issue discord on those grievances are important in accounting for the 
framing agreements and disagreements that arise.  Also, as the party system includes 
more parties that can be movement allies, possibilities for cooperation increase.  
However, when there are many possible allies and a period of uncertainty starts due 
to new elections or government formation, conflict can arise despite the presence of 
many allies.  It seems likely that movement-related grievances with issue consensus 
and a party-system context that affords potential insider allies may be important in 




Chapter 5: Macro-level: February 15, 2003 Protests in the 
European Union 
Are dynamics in transnational peace protests in an enlarging European Union 
accounted for by internationalist and domestic targets, movement-related grievances 
such as opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, dynamics in the emergence of civil 
society and its linkages to global civil society, or divergent paths of democratization?  
Transnational protests against war on February 15, 2003 are well-documented by 
Tarrow and della Porta (2005), but as yet unexplored are comparisons of protest 
events in the older EU member states and in the newly acceding CEE states.  Thus, in 
this chapter I explore how successful EU protest events were in mobilizing large 
numbers of demonstrators and in drawing out broad rainbow coalitions of insiders 
and outsiders, and which factors account for the variation across the protests.   
I argue that the relative success in mobilizing high numbers of protesters and 
in drawing out insiders and outsiders in rainbow coalitions, in the EU-15, compared 
to the CEE states, is indicative of the centripetal influences on insiders and outsiders 
of movement-related grievances and of a longer history of participation, protest, and 
civil society, while targets seem to lack explanatory power.  Successful protest events 
linking insiders and outsiders in the EU-15 catalyze possibilities for future 
cooperation, illustrate to protesters the parties that are movement allies, educate 
parties about protesters’ concerns, and educate protesters about coupling insider and 




Much of the research on transnational protests in the EU was conducted 
before the height of the anti-globalization and anti-war movements, in Western 
European contexts, and before the enlargement process was proceeding at full-
throttle. The bulk of this research on transnational protest events, including 
scholarship on a few events that became pan-European, has suggested the continued 
domestication of conflict as well as a limited transnationalism overall. The recent 
anti-war movement provides an interesting test of both the degree of transnationalism 
as well as the impact of both institutional targets and movement-related grievances, 
domestically and internationally, on transnational activism.  
Using content analysis of protest news coverage, I have developed a 
chronology of transnational anti-war protests in older EU member states and in newly 
acceding EU member states on the February 15, 2003 date of global protest.  My 
research reveals that transnational peace protest is indeed spreading to CEE states, but 
that some patterns of protest are rather different in these newer states.  I explore 
factors that may account for the similarities and differences in mobilization levels, 
agents, targets, and grievances in anti-war protests in the older versus newer EU 
states.  In addition to domestic and international targets, we must attend to the role of 
movement-related grievances, especially about U.S. unilateralism; divergent histories 
of participation, protest, and civil society; and divergent democratization pathways. 
Europeanization of Protest and EU Enlargement 
Though the transnationalism of anti-war protests on February 15, 2003 is well 
documented (Tarrow and della Porta 2005), as yet unmentioned and unexplored in the 




were truly globalized and occurred outside advanced industrialized democracies, 
especially in the newly democratized and transitioning post-communist states (CEE 
or Central and East European states) that have recently joined the European Union 
(EU).  Thus, in this chapter, I explore the dynamics of contention in an enlarging 
European Union, especially comparing the older EU states that acceded up to 1995 
with the CEE states that acceded in 2004 and 2007. 
Previous research on transnational European contention has found a limited 
transnationalism and continued domestication of protest, although transnational 
protest is spreading and some of it has spread from West to East.  Early research by 
Imig and Tarrow concluded that, through 1998, Europeans increasingly targeted the 
EU, but that such protests were still a minority of contentious events (2000, 84).  
Although many scholars continue to observe the domestication of protest in Europe, 
transnational protest has increased over time and has spread to some degree from 
Western Europe to Eastern Europe, reflecting changes in Europeanization with the 
recent enlargement process (Imig 2004).  In fact, the September 2000 transnational 
protests against fuel prices in Europe spanned both Western and Eastern Europe, 
including actions in France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark in the west as well as in the future EU member states of 
Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary in the east (Imig 2004, 217-20).    
Although transnational forms of protest have spread eastward, even in the 
CEE states, there appears to be a limited transnationalism.  Indeed, transnational 
protests for global justice have occurred in Eastern Europe, albeit to a lesser degree 




justice demonstrations that occurred in a future CEE member state are the protests 
that targeted the September 2000 IMF/WB meetings in Prague, in the aftermath of the 
Battle of Seattle demonstrations which had targeted the meeting of the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in November 1999 (Rootes 2002, 425).  There is tremendous 
variation in the degree to which transnationalism has manifested itself in CEE 
protests.  Szabó finds roughly 15 percent of Hungarian protest events targeting 
international organizations and 15 percent targeting “other actors in international 
politics,” whereas the internationalization of protest seems far lower in Slovakia and 
Slovenia (1996, 1176).   
Much transnational contention remains very domesticated.  Even the 
transnational protest events that have been pan-European and studied in detail, 
involved largely domestic political actors, following a “national pattern of 
organization,” taking “action in opposition to – rather than in accord with – protesters 
from other nations, demanding that their governments act to level the playing field 
with foreign counterparts,” allying with domestic rather than European targets (Imig 
2004, 217-20).  Hence, Imig finds a continued domestication of protest in Europe 
between 1984 and 1997, and most of the protests that target the EU directly are 
carried out by occupational interest groups organized domestically.   
In many European social movements, such as environmentalism, 
transnationalism has not been the dominant trend.  There is still limited evidence of 
the contentious impact of Europeanization on social movements, compared to its 
influence on “bigger, more organized lobby groups and ‘protest businesses’” (Bale 




been very successful in producing transnational contention.  Rootes has observed that 
“despite the development and increasing powers of EU institutions, especially with 
regard to environmental policy, their impact upon national environmental movements 
has been less substantial than we might have expected,” and “the transnationalization 
of environmentalism is at best limited, even within the EU” (2005, 22).  In fact, most 
environmental protests are not targeting the EU (Rootes 2002).   
This limited Europeanization of the environmental movement seems to be 
exacerbated with the recent enlargement.  Hallstrom argues that “the evolution of 
informal policymaking at the EU level, combined with the technical and 
informational preferences of actors in institutions such as the European Commission” 
creates constraints for new non-governmental actors seeking to influence 
environmental policy (2004, 176).  While the recent European enlargement has on the 
one hand increased EU “influence over environmental policy in CEE countries,” it 
has also occurred in a way such that “the influence and access of NGOs in CEE states 
is limited” (176).  
Similarly, Hicks suggests new asymmetries may be present in the EU, 
granting better channels of access to established Western interests than to newer 
Eastern interests, and with more emphasis on influencing the emergence of Eastern 
civil society than on being responsive to the interests it articulates (2004).  Hicks 
argues that environmentalists in CEE countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic are increasingly being influenced by the EU, especially via agenda-setting, 
pressure to improve democratic deficits and entrench democratic accountability, 




CEE environmental concerns and thus their transnational impact has varied 
considerably, there are asymmetric channels of access in the EU favoring non-CEE 
interests, and there has clearly been a focus within the EU on meeting conditionality 
and not so much on debating EU policy with CEE interest groups (229-30).  Thus, it 
is important that we begin to explore whether North-South asymmetries that have 
been much debated in global civil society are manifesting themselves as East-West 
asymmetries in EU transnationalism. 
Although most scholars witness limited Europeanization, issue areas vary in 
the degree to which Europeanization impacts transnational activism.  According to 
Hilson (2002), the EU is to some degree creating new political opportunities for new 
social movement actors to become part of the policy process, including opportunities 
and concessions for “those previously excluded such as the lesbian and gay and 
animal welfare movements.”  However, these international political opportunities 
have not increased uniformly across issue areas, and on certain areas like genetically 
modified crops, a constrained opportunity structure leads outsider tactics like protest 
to be more common (Hilson 2002).  Similarly, Geddes (2000) finds that for migrant 
inclusion issues, corporatist insider strategies like lobbying have been favored and 
outsider activism has been avoided. 
Indeed, there is certainly some Europeanization in the transnational 
composition of protesters at demonstrations.  Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave 
(2004) observe some transnationalism of protesters at an anti-globalization protest 
targeting the 2001 EU Summit in Brussels, with roughly 38% of the protesters non-




Europeanization:  their sense of European identity, views on EU membership, or trust 
of international institutions.  Rather, factors linked to their tactical repertoires and 
movement-related grievances (e.g., dissatisfaction with democracy) seem to account 
for their transnationalism (Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave 2004).   
Much research on protests targeting the EU was conducted before the height 
of the anti-globalization and anti-war movements, in Western European contexts, and 
before the enlargement process was proceeding at full-throttle, fostering further 
European integration (Imig and Tarrow 2001).  Hence, empirical work must be 
conducted using data collected in the time period following the Battle of Seattle 
protests, especially during the historic, highly transnational anti-war movement 
opposing U.S. military intervention in Iraq.  Additionally, data must be collected on 
transnational contention in both the older EU states and in the newly acceding EU 
states to examine in what fashion transnational contention is emerging in an era of 
European enlargement.  If protests have become more transnational, especially in 
response to European enlargement, then the post 9/11 era provides the time frame in 
which it should be observable.   
In this chapter, I explore rival factors that may account for the dynamics of 
transnational protest against the war in Iraq in this enlarging EU, focusing in 
particular on the success of transnational protest events in mobilizing protesters and 
in drawing out rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders.  I compare anti-war 
protests on February 15, 2003 in the member states up to the 1995 accessions with the 
anti-war protests that were mobilized in post-communist CEE states that acceded to 




First, I delve into Tarrow’s argument that “Coalition of the Willing” 
membership accounts for the dynamics in the mobilization of the global anti-war 
movement.  Then, I examine the presence of similar grievances about U.S. 
unilateralism in Iraq, the history of participation, protest, and civil society as well as 
the complex democratization experiences of these states to see how they might 
account for the dynamics of transnational anti-war protest.  After presenting the 
theoretical framework at the macro-level, I present an overview of February 15, 2003 
anti-war protests across the EU, based on archival research of media coverage of the 
protests available via Lexis Nexis and via the Internet, and discuss my observations in 
light of the propositions developed in the theoretical framework.  
Domestic and International Targets 
Tarrow focuses on targets presented by the domestic and international 
political opportunity structure in explaining the dynamics in the historic February 15, 
2003 global anti-war protests (2005, 15).  Though he acknowledges that targets in 
international institutions were lacking since the EU and the UN had taken 
oppositional stances on the war in Iraq, Tarrow argues that the common presence of 
domestic targets (executive and legislative branches of the domestic government 
responsible for official stances such as joining the “Coalition of the Willing” and 
responsible for policymaking relevant to the war in Iraq) was key in eliciting global 
collective action that was successful and mobilized rainbow coalitions of insiders and 
outsiders.  Additionally, Tarrow argues that the U.S. government was an important 
target shared by transnational protesters due its “resurgent militarism”as “a 




According to Tarrow, the pairing of such politically opportune domestic and 
international targets provide structured opportunities for relations between “social 
movement” outsiders and “NGO insiders” seeking to influence a common target.  
These relations spurn greater insider-outsider cooperation which is able to elicit 
successful, highly mobilized transnational protest events and draw out rainbow 
coalitions of insiders and outsiders at these events.  Thus, the dynamics across anti-
war protest events, especially in their mobilization levels and success in centripetally 
drawing out rainbow coalitions of insider and outsiders, may be accounted for by 
examining a country’s stance on the war in Iraq, especially whether a country joined 
the “Coalition of the Willing,” provided a strong domestic target.  Macro-level 
propositions based on this argument are listed below. 
5.1.   Demonstrators at successful transnational protest events are likely to perceive 
similar domestic and international targets. 
5.2.   The presence of politically opportune domestic targets, governments that 
supported the U.S.-led “Coalition of the Willing,” in addition to the presence of the 
internationalist target of a hegemonic United States government, increase the odds of 
highly mobilized transnational anti-war protest events which involve broad rainbow 
coalitions and are able to drawn in key insiders and remobilize key outsiders.  
Countries lacking such strong domestic institutional targets are likely to have protest 
events with less success in mobilization and in drawing in key insiders or outsiders.   
5.3.   Grievances about war and about globalization, representing different issues, 
interests, and ideals of activists, do not account for dynamics in the success of 




5.4.   Domestic targets are more important than international targets in accounting 
for dynamics in the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders. 
Taken at face value, in Western Europe, the targets presented by “Coalition of 
the Willing” membership may have exerted a centripetal force on insiders and 
outsiders by facilitating the mobilization of masses of protesters and drawing out 
broad rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders.  Indeed, protest mobilizations in 
“Coalition of the Willing” states like Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom contrast 
markedly with anti-war protests that occurred in West European states outside the 
“Coalition of the Willing.”   
However, even in Western Europe, there were some “Coalition of the 
Willing” states with very low protest mobilizations and some non-“Coalition of the 
Willing” states with relatively high turnouts of protesters.  The variance in 
mobilization levels in the older EU member states may be accounted for by exploring 
other factors.  Moreover, in post-Communist Europe, strong domestic targets were 
present across the board but transnational anti-war protest varied markedly.  I suggest 
that causal factors other than the presence of strong domestic targets may be more 
important in accounting for dynamics of transnational protests.   
Several divides have emerged within the broad EU, on the issue of the U.S. 
military intervention in Iraq.  On February 17, 2003, the 15 nations in the EU prior to 
the 2004 accessions met and issued a statement on Iraq “far closer to the German-
French position than the American, reflecting the antiwar nations’ economic clout as 
well as the response of some prowar political leaders to the massive antiwar 




(Kolko 2003, 297-8).  The East European states, in contrast, were much closer to 
Washington’s stance on Iraq, joining the United States as well as some West 
European states in the so-called “Coalition of the Willing,” supporting the U.S. 
military intervention in Iraq (297-8).  The refusal of France, Germany, and Russia to 
join this coalition prompted Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld to ridicule the 
“Old Europe” and herald the coming of the “New Europe” (297-8).12  Some West 
European states like Britain, Spain, and Italy indicated support for Washington, and 
most CEE states like Hungary, Czech Republic, “Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic 
Republics [e.g., Latvia, Lithuania] called military intervention a regrettable but 
inevitable measure in the best interests of international security.”13  These pre-
accession states were later ridiculed by French President Jacques Chirac, when he 
lashed out at “the Central Europeans as ‘infantile’ and insinuated that they had 
damaged their chances of joining the EU.”14  
To what degree were strong domestic targets present via “Coalition of the 
Willing” membership?  In fact, most of the CEE states formally joined the “Coalition 
of the Willing” at the onset.15  Condoleezza Rice, at the time President Bush’s 
National Security Adviser, describes the coalition as one of “nearly 50 nations” “from 
every continent on the globe,” some of whom “have only recently emerged from 
                                                 
12 Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2003. Reaction roundup: 'Old Europe' splits with 'new Europe' over Iraq 
war. March 20, Politics. 
13 Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2003. Reaction roundup: 'Old Europe' splits with 'new Europe' over Iraq 
war. March 20, Politics.; Secor, Laura. 2003. The anti-Americans: Central Europeans may be wary 
of the Bush administration's war plans, but they're not at all wary of the United States. The Boston 
Globe, Ideas, E1. 
14 Secor, Laura. 2003. The anti-Americans: Central Europeans may be wary of the Bush 
administration's war plans, but they're not at all wary of the United States. The Boston Globe, Ideas, 
E1. 
15 Dinmore, Guy, and David Gardner. 2003. US names 30 countries in 'coalition of the willing' 




tyrannies” which she claims could have been thwarted had the world appropriately 
addressed the threats their regimes posed.”16  However, some regions (like Eastern 
Europe) are disproportionately represented, and others (like Western Europe) were 
much more divided.  According to MacLeod, one motivation that led Central 
European states to support the coalition en masse, was their aspiration for acceptance 
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).17  Václav Havel and Adam 
Michnik, prominent dissidents, also supported the U.S (Krastev 2004, 9).   
In Table 5.1, I summarize the standpoints of the EU member states on the 
military intervention in Iraq, although I add the caveat in advance that these 
standpoints are very much in flux, with several countries having since withdrawn or 
planning to withdraw troops from Iraq.  Thus, it summarizes whether there is a strong 
domestic target based on a country’s standpoint on the military intervention in Iraq, at 
the height of the anti-war movement in February 2003.  A detailed chronology of 
each country’s evolving standpoint on the intervention is available in Appendix 2.   
 Six of the older EU states that acceded up to 1995 joined the “Coalition of the 
Willing” and provided strong domestic targets around which the anti-war movement 
could mobilize, while nine other states provided weaker domestic targets concerning 
the military intervention in Iraq.  Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom all provided strong domestic targets that could have exerted 
centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders.  Of the EU-15, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom are the only two states that joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” supporting 
                                                 
16 Rice, Condoleezza. 2003. Our coalition. Wall Street Journal, March 26, A12. 
17 MacLeod, Ian. 2003. The 'coalition of the willing:' 3 of 45 have sent combat troops to war; many of 







Country Joined the Coalition of 
the Willing? 
Older EU States (up to 1995 Accessions) 
 
1. Austria No 
2. Belgium No 
3. Denmark Yes 
4. Finland No 
5. France No 
6. Germany No 
7. Greece No 
8. Ireland No 
9. Italy Yes 
10. Luxembourg No 
11. Netherlands Yes 
12. Portugal Yes 
13. Spain Yes 
14. Sweden No 
15. United Kingdom Yes 
CEE States Acceding to the EU, 2004-2007 
1. Bulgaria Yes 
2. Czech Republic Yes 
3. Estonia Yes 
4. Hungary Yes 
5. Latvia Yes 
6. Lithuania Yes 
7. Poland Yes 
8. Romania Yes 
9. Slovakia Yes 
10. Slovenia Yes 
Mediterranean States Acceding to the EU, 2004 
1. Cyprus No 
2. Malta No 
Table 5.1: Presence of Domestic Targets (Stance on the Intervention in Iraq) 
 
the war in Iraq, which have maintained their troops in Iraq and thus have maintained 
the strongest domestic target for activists to organize against.  However, both 
Denmark and the United Kingdom are currently debating a timeline for the 
withdrawal of their troops from Iraq.  Four other older EU states originally joined the 
“Coalition of the Willing” and deployed troops to Iraq, but have since withdrawn 
troops:  Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.  The other EU-15 states did not 
join the “Coalition of the Willing:” Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Sweden.  Additionally, all of the EU-15 states 




Afghanistan, providing troops and other support; Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom all provided troops there.    
All ten of the CEE states acceding to the EU between 2004 and 2007 joined 
the “Coalition of the Willing” early on and thus all provided strong domestic targets 
around which anti-war movements could mobilize insiders and outsiders at 
transnational protest events.  Six CEE states that joined the “Coalition of the 
Willing,” supporting the war in Iraq, have maintained their troops in Iraq and thus 
have continued to provide strong domestic targets for anti-war activists:  the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania.  Slovenia is the only CEE 
state that joined the “Coalition of the Willing” but did not deploy troops in Iraq for 
military tasks, and rather deployed them for peace-building tasks.  The three other 
CEE States, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia, all originally joined the “Coalition of 
the Willing” and deployed troops to Iraq, but have since withdrawn troops, though 
they have not necessarily withdrawn non-military support of the intervention in Iraq.  
Furthermore, all ten of the CEE states acceding to the EU between 2004 and 2007 
have supported the intervention in Afghanistan, providing troops and other support; 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia have all contributed troops to the intervention in Afghanistan. 
 Neither Mediterranean state that acceded to the EU in 2004 provided a strong 
domestic target against which the anti-war movement could mobilize. Cyprus was 
clearly opposed to the intervention in Iraq, but neither Cyprus nor Malta joined the 




be used for purposes related to the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Moreover, 
Malta has helped some British troops train for the military roles in Afghanistan or 
Iraq.  Neither Cyprus nor Malta provided troops to the intervention in Afghanistan.   
 Of the three EU Candidate States, all eventually joined the “Coalition of the 
Willing” and provided a domestic target around which anti-war activists could 
mobilize, but their commitments to the war in Iraq (and accordingly, the degree to 
which they present a domestic target) have varied.  Croatia joined the “Coalition of 
the Willing” but did not deploy troops in Iraq for military tasks, and rather offered 
other assistance there.  Macedonia joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” supporting 
the war in Iraq, and maintained troops in Iraq.  Turkey joined the “Coalition of the 
Willing” but only after initially opposing the war in Iraq, and its’ military deployment 
in Iraq has not always taken action in accordance with Coalition-led approval.  
Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey have all supported the intervention in Afghanistan, 
providing troops and other support there. 
To conclude, strong domestic targets were present in some of the older EU 
states and all of the newly acceded CEE EU states, and weak domestic targets were 
present in some of the older EU states.  In particular, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, and Sweden did not 
join the “Coalition of the Willing” and thus provided weaker domestic targets to 
mobilize against.  The other old EU states, all the newly acceded CEE EU states, and 
the three candidate states all joined the “Coalition of the Willing” and thus provided 




and outsiders.  Additionally, most of the states sent troops to Afghanistan, with the 
exception of Austria, Cyprus, and Malta. 
Although dynamics in older European Union members states’ anti-war 
movement mobilization levels in 2003 somewhat correspond to the presence or 
absence of domestic targets in a country, there are also several cases that do not fit 
such generalizations.  Despite the presence of strong domestic targets, CEE states 
were far less mobilized against the war in Iraq than long-time EU member states, 
including states that opposed the war.  Despite sharing such strong domestic targets, 
there is considerable variance in CEE protests left to account for. 
Thus, I examine whether Tarrow’s domestic targets via “Coalition of the 
Willing” membership predict high mobilization levels and protest events that 
successfully mobilize rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders.  Perhaps Tarrow’s 
argument works better in the West European context, and East European protests 
were rather different and certainly far less mobilized for other reasons stemming from 
movement-related grievances and divergences in civil society and democratization.   
In the next sections, I explore several alternative factors that may impact the 
dynamics of transnational contention in an enlarging EU:  grievances concerning U.S. 
unilateralism in Iraq; divergent histories of participation, protest, and civil society; 
and divergent paths of democratization. Finally, I will explore the dynamics of 
transnational contention in these states on February 15, 2003, the most globalized 




Movement-Related Grievances Opposing U.S. Unilateralism in Iraq 
Across the older and newer member states of the EU, there were several 
grievances about the military intervention in Iraq that were shared by the general 
public that have the potential to catalyze transnational coalitions of insiders and 
outsiders and facilitate highly mobilized transnational protest events involving 
rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders.  As is evident in Table 5.2, a sizeable 
majority of Europeans oppose a military intervention in Iraq that is unilateral, 
occurring preemptively and without a previous UN decision authorizing the use of 
force.  This grievance about the military intervention is strongly perceived by 
Europeans in both the 15 states acceding to the EU up to 1995 (EU-15) as well as in 
the 12 states acceding in 2004 and 2007 and Turkey (CC-13).  Many in both regions 
also feel that the militarization in Iraq is motivated by oil interests.   
However, many Europeans in the EU-15 were more predisposed to permitting 
an intervention in Iraq under other scenarios, if weapons of mass destruction had been 
found by UN inspectors, if Iraq had threatened countries in the region, or if the UN 
Security Council had authorized an intervention.  In the CC-13, there was much less 
support for a military intervention under other scenarios than in the EU-15.  Thus, 
while there is a pan-European issue consensus on grievances concerning U.S. 
unilateralism in Iraq and the linkage of militarization and oil interests, there is also an 
issue divide on whether to oppose war in other circumstances.   
The European issue consensus on grievances opposing U.S. unilateralism (an 
intervention without a previous UN decision authorizing the use of force) is thus the 




mobilization of insiders and outsiders, cross-nationally.  It is also these shared 
grievances opposing U.S. unilateralism and linking militarization to corporate and oil 
interests that I expect transnational protesters to share.   
For each of the following propositions, 
tell me if you agree or not? 
Agreeing Disagreeing 
EU-15 CC-13 EU-15 CC-13 
Oil is the main motivation for which the United 
States wants to intervene militarily in Iraq (6c) 
73% 72% 23% 19% 
The United States should intervene militarily in 
Iraq even if the United Nations does not give 
its formal agreement (6g) 
17% 18% 80% 74% 
Do you consider it would be justified or not 
that our country participates in a military 
intervention in Iraq? 
Justified Unjustified 
EU-15 CC-13 EU-15 CC-13 
If the Iraqi regime does not cooperate with 
United Nations inspectors (7a) 
41% 32% 53% 60% 
If the United Nations inspectors discover 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (7b) 
59% 45% 37% 48% 
If Iraq threatens other countries in the region 
(7c) 
59% 48% 37% 45% 
If the United Nations Security Council decides 
on a military intervention in Iraq (7d) 
57% 42% 38% 49% 
If the United States intervenes militarily in Iraq 
without a preliminary decision of the 
United Nations (7e) 
15% 16% 82% 75% 
Table 5.2: Support of an Intervention in Iraq in the EU (Gallup Europe 2003)  
Note:  This table compares the 2003 percentages in the EU-15 (member states acceding through 1995) 
and in the CC-13 (Central and East European and Mediterranean member states acceding between 
2004 and 2007 as well as candidate state Turkey). 
 
Macro-level propositions based on this argument are listed below.   
5.5.   Demonstrators at successful transnational protest events are likely to perceive 
similar domestic and international grievances. 
5.6.   Issue consensus on movement-related grievances in public opinion, especially 




highly mobilized transnational anti-war protest events which involve broad rainbow 
coalitions and are able to draw in key insiders and remobilize key outsiders.  Issue 
discord on movement-related grievances in public opinion increases the odds of 
protest events with less success in mobilization and in drawing in key insiders or 
outsiders.   
5.7.   Movement-related grievances about war and about globalization are more 
important than the presence of domestic and international targets in accounting for the 
dynamics in the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and outsiders.  
Grievances have the power to unite or to divide us, and whether they do depends on 
the issue consensus in the movement and in the public about them. 
5.8.   International grievances are more important than domestic grievances in 
accounting for dynamics in the success of transnational protests uniting insiders and 
outsiders.  Similarly, internationalist targets trump domestic targets, in exerting 
influence on insiders and outsiders. 
Two other causal factors may be important in accounting for variance in 
protest events within and between older and newer EU member states.  States that 
have newly acceded to the EU are characterized by divergences in histories of 
participation, protest, and civil society and in paths of democratization.  These factors 
and their implications for the emergence of transnational protest are explored next. 
Divergent Histories of Participation, Protest, and Civil Society 
The dynamics of transnational protest might also be accounted for by 
divergent histories of participation, protest, and civil society within the CEE states as 




protest mobilizations in the transitions to democracy of the CEE states, is explored, 
especially focusing on the relative strength of civil society in East-Central Europe, or 
the Czech Republic, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, and Poland.  Next, the 
disparities in civil society and participation between the CEE states and the EU-15 are 
investigated.  Additionally, the discussion of the limited Europeanization of civil 
society in the CEE states, started earlier in this chapter, is reinvigorated by looking at 
limited CEE involvement in European Social Forums that facilitated anti-war 
organizing, especially for the global protests on February 15, 2003.   
These arguments are then used to develop several propositions about anti-war 
protests in the CEE states.  The relative newness of civil society in the CEE states and 
its asymmetric ties to European civil society would thus likely limit the mobilization 
potential of the anti-war protests in CEE states compared to the EU-15.  However, the 
strength of protest and of civil society, especially in the transitions to democracy of  
certain countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, might have 
facilitated the emergence of transnational protest against the war in Iraq, in these 
countries that is more mobilized, involves many civic associations, and brings 
together a rainbow coalition of insiders and outsiders of diverse interests and ideals 
that is more akin to protest events in the older EU member states. 
There is significant cross-national variation in the role that protests played in 
the transitions to democracy in CEE countries.  Protests in the fall of 1989 were met 
by some repression, but mobilization actually “increased dramatically” afterwards 
and was instrumental in creating pressure for negotiations (Karklins and Petersen 




reached between several hundred thousand and one million in early November 1989 
(Karklins and Petersen 1993, 608).  Similarly, on November 20, 1989, protest 
mobilization in Czechoslovakia had built up to 200,000 and by November 25 it had 
reached half a million demonstrators (Karklins and Petersen 1993, 606). In contrast to 
largely peaceful mobilization in the former states, violent repression at Romanian 
anti-regime protests against some demonstrators and against regime-insiders viewed 
as turncoats, resulted in about 1,100 deaths (Hall 2000, 1088).   
There may also have been some diffusion within Eastern Europe, a spillover 
or “demonstration effect.”  Kramer suggests this effect was particularly salient in the 
Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) where massively mobilized and 
nonviolent East German and Czechoslovak protests were viewed as prototypes for 
independence (2004, 46).  Similarly, Francisco argues “the ossified regimes of 
Eastern Europe toppled like so many dominoes in the autumn of 1989,” noting that 
“one of the best single predictors of Czechoslovak protest is the amount of East 
German protest four weeks earlier,” and thus he too suggests diffusion (1993, 678).   
Tismaneanu argues that Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the former 
GDR (East-Central Europe) soon got much further along “on the road to an open 
society” than countries like Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia, due to pre-
existing differences in civil society (1992, xii).  Tismaneanu finds that the more 
successful democratization experience in East-Central Europe compared to the rest of 
Eastern Europe is accounted for by pre-existing differences in civil society, especially 
evident in the role of “Poland’s Solidarity, Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77, and 




that though Poland’s democratization involved the round table agreement negotiated 
“between the ruling communists and the anticommunist opposition,” it had been 
foreshadowed by the strikes and mobilization of the Solidarity union under the 
leadership of Lech Walesa (2000, 83-4, 86-7).  According to Palouš, Charter 77 had 
already existed in Czechoslovakia for over a decade, and it was instrumental in the 
relatively smooth, peaceful, bottom-up velvet revolution (2000, 105, 107, 110).   
Tismaneanu therefore suggests that these pre-existing disparities in civil 
society have translated into post-communist democratization differences.  Within 
East-Central Europe, countries “changed not only names but also habits and appeared 
to have converted to the values of social democracy,” but elsewhere, countries like 
Romania, Serbia, and Bulgaria had a more difficult time breaking with the communist 
system and sometimes former communist parties governed (Tismaneanu 1992, 3).  
Tismaneanu argues, “Indeed, in countries like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, 
where the civil society had developed to a greater extent, the disintegration of the 
communist state proceeded in a smoother way than in Bulgaria and Romania, with 
their periodic flare-ups of violence …” (174).   
Tismaneanu argues that where civil society has blossomed, anti-politics was 
able to become a legitimate force, changing the polity and introducing the politics of 
the opposition.  He observes that in East-Central Europe, “the civil society was thus a 
first step in the reinvention of politics outside the existing matrix of power, that is, 
explicitly outside and implicitly against the communist party” (Tismaneanu 1992, 
xiv.z).  In contrast, in other parts of Eastern Europe “civil society was 




to say that a liberal society has always since flourished unchallenged in East-Central 
Europe, as “even there one can see the rise of anti-democratic and anti-Western 
forces” (Tismaneanu 1998, 5).   
Scholars like Saxonberg do not dispute the strength of civil society in East-
Central Europe, but suggests that in some of these countries, the impetus for change 
was elite-driven and not via popular mobilization, with elite-driven reforms preceding 
popular mobilization (2001). Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria are typically 
characterized as cases of “bargaining followed by mobilization” and Czechoslovakia 
and GDR as cases of “mobilization followed by bargaining” (Glenn 2003a, 105).  
Saxonberg contrasts Poland and Hungary’s “negotiated ‘institutional compromise’ 
with the opposition” to the GDR and Czechoslovakia’s “non-violent revolution” 
(2001, 4).  In Poland, Solidarity had a long history of mobilizing and organized 
strikes in 1988, which helped to pressure the interior minister into proposing round 
table talks to get Lech Wałesa, a Solidarity leader, to end the strikes, and these talks 
culminated in semi-free elections (Saxonberg 2001, 6).  Saxonberg argues that 
Solidarity “was much weaker” than it had been in 1980-1981 when it organized mass 
mobilizations and membership peaked at 10 million, and that “the leaders of the 
regime did not decide to meet with the opposition because a revolutionary, mass-
based social movement forced them to” but rather because “they actually wanted a 
negotiating partner” to help bear the accountability for necessary economic reforms 
(2001, 5-7).  Similarly, Saxonberg argues that “like their Polish counterparts, the 




compromise,” and not the “small opposition groups formed during the late 1980s” nor 
strikes or demonstrations which were notably absent in Hungary (2001, 8).   
Additionally, Saxonberg agrees with Tismaneanu that civil society played a 
primary role in initiating the revolutions in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.  In the 
GDR, the “turning point” came during October and November 1989, with tens of 
thousands of protesters mobilizing in ever more expansive demonstrations demanding 
glasnost and a “mass exodus” with large groups of East Germans crossing the border 
(Saxonberg 2001, 10).  In Czechoslovakia, the fall of the Berlin wall was met with a 
series of increasingly mobilized demonstrations and strikes, in part organized by 
dissidents in the Charter 77 network like Václav Havel, which played a key role in 
starting negotiations between Havel and Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, and which 
led to Adamec’s resignation (12-13).  Saxonberg argues that the impetus for change 
in these countries stemmed from popular mobilization.  For instance, “The general 
secretary of the Communist Party in each country resigned after hundreds of 
thousands of citizens had taken to the streets to protest against the regime” (13). 
How might the strength of civil society in East-Central Europe, especially in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, have affected anti-war organizing in the 
global protest movement focused on the war in Iraq?  Perhaps these countries are 
more likely to have successful protest events that involve many civic associations, 
and bring together a rainbow coalition of disparate interests and ideals more similar to 
the protests in the older EU states.  Further, in Germany as well as in these countries, 
were pro-democracy activists of this former era re-mobilized?  Perhaps protests in 




Next, the lower levels of civic engagement and political participation in CEE 
states and the limited Europeanization of civil society in CEE states, especially in 
European Social Forums used to organize anti-war protests transnationally, is 
discussed.  Perhaps, then, anti-war protest events in CEE states as a whole are likely 
to be less mobilized than in the EU-15, despite the strong targets present in CEE 
states that joined the “Coalition of the Willing”? 
In the post-communist era tremendous disparities in voter turnout and civic 
engagement exist between the original EU member states and the newer CEE member 
states, but also within the CEE countries.  In the new CEE member states of the EU, 
turnout in the European Parliamentary (EP) elections, for example, is “very low” 
(Bale 2005, 151).  Similarly, civic engagement, especially the willingness to join 
associations, is higher in most of Western Europe than it is in either Eastern Europe 
or Southern Europe (Bale 2005, 195-6).  In the post-communist era, protest events 
have been far more common in Poland and the GDR than in Hungary or Slovakia 
(Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 553).  Many of these protests were organized by “labor 
unions, political parties, interests groups, and social movements,” but, overall, social 
movements were much less active in organizing demonstrations in Eastern Europe 
than in Western Europe (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 559).  Perhaps these participatory 
disparities may also translate into CEE difficulties mobilizing anti-war protesters on 
the February 15, 2003 global protests against the Iraq war? 
Glenn argues that in post-communist states, the boundaries between social 
movements and institutionalized politics have in many cases been blurred, with some 




find themselves occupying positions of authority in the states that had excluded them 
until recently” (2003a, 116).  Though acknowledging the institutional successes of 
movement actors in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Kamenitsa counters that in cases like 
the former GDR, the East German citizens’ movements which played a central role in 
bringing down the wall were soon politically marginalized (1998, 329-30).   
Besides the pre- and post-democratization variance in the civil societies of 
CEE states, there are also important differences between the CEE states and the EU-
15 in terms of how successfully they have integrated into European civil society 
networks, as aforementioned.  Going further, the limited CEE involvement in 
European Social Forums is now discussed, with important implications for anti-war 
organizing.  In particular, there has been very little participation by Eastern 
Europeans in European Social Forums, including the 2002 forum in Florence which 
was essential in planning the February 15, 2003 cross-national protests in Europe.18  
A planning meeting of Eastern Europeans in the lead-up to the 2002 social forum 
brought just 40 campaigners to represent 12 countries.19  Apparently, it was the 2006 
European Social Forum in Athens that first drew a large Eastern European 
delegation.20  Just recently, plans for a regional Central and East European Social 
Forum (CEESF) were being crystallized, especially in response to the low attendance 
of European Social Forums by representatives of East European groups.21 
                                                 
18 Kennedy, Dominic. 2003. Protests will reach every continent. Times 5ewspapers Limited, February 
14, 13. 
19 European Social Forum. 2002. Report of the meeting of eastern European campaigners. 
http://www.fse-esf.org/spip.php?article38 (accessed April 7, 2007). 
20 Taylor, Guy. 2006. European social forum: Athens 2006. Globalise Resistance. 
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21 Benyik, Matyas. 2005. Central and eastern european social forum. Indymedia. 




To conclude, the nascent Europeanization of civil society in the CEE states 
and disparities in civil society and participation between the older and newer EU 
states, would suggest that transnational protest against the Iraq war throughout this 
region would likely be substantially less-mobilized than in the EU-15, despite the 
presence of strong domestic targets around which activists were organizing.  The 
stronger history of civil society in East-Central Europe, especially in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland, in particular, might have facilitated the emergence of 
transnational protest against the war in Iraq that involves many civic associations, and 
brings together a rainbow coalition of disparate interests and ideals more similar to 
the protests in the older EU states.  Further, in Germany as well as in these countries, 
pro-democracy activists may be re-mobilized.  Elsewhere in the CEE states, I expect 
to see lower mobilization and fewer associations in narrow rainbow coalitions.  
Macro-level propositions based on this argument are listed below.   
5.9.   Given the divergent history of participation, protest, and civil society in CEE 
states, CEE anti-war protests are likely to be less mobilized than those in the EU-15. 
5.10.   Given the stronger history of civil society in East-Central Europe, protests in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are more likely to be highly mobilized and 
to draw in broader rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders.  In these countries as 
well as Germany, noteworthy pro-democracy outsiders may be remobilized.  
                                                                                                                                           
2005. Preparatory assembly of the central and eastern European social forum (CEESF). 




Divergent Paths of Democratization 
The dynamics of transnational protest in an enlarging EU might also be 
accounted for by divergent democratization pathways taken by newly acceded states.  
States with more challenging democratization experiences may have mobilizational 
difficulties, and open the door to limited mobilization by groups who feel 
marginalized and use protests as a venue to build support for their own grievances, 
such as Russian-language minorities and Communists.  Central-Eastern Europe, with 
both civil society advantages and economic and political advantages in their 
democratic transitions, may have an easier time mobilizing anti-war protest, but 
economic concerns particular to all the CEE states may make anti-war protesters 
more likely to focus grievances on the economic ties to the call for war in Iraq.  
Economic and political difficulties in transitions to democracy, especially outside 
Central-Eastern Europe, may have limited the mobilization potential of the 
population, which has other basic needs taking primacy. 
A broad scope of post-socialist regimes have emerged which range 
tremendously in democratic quality (Bunce 2000, 124).  In some states, the 
consolidation of parliamentary democracy has indeed made progress due to the 
creation of democratic institutions, the establishment of a market economy, and the 
emergence of civil society (Rupnik 2001, 327-8).  Despite the relatively “smooth 
alternation in power—everywhere in Central Europe,” which involved the emergence 
of civil society and political and economic reforms, transitions elsewhere were quite 
different, with some even becoming “derailments” given rise to “illiberal 




Romania, and Slovakia are certainly in an intermediate position, compared to 
countries more successfully consolidating democracy (2000, 16).  Difficulties in the 
transition process may limit the emergence of global anti-war protests in such states. 
Linz and Stepan (1996) compare democratization experiences, emphasizing 
the qualitative and temporal lags in some post-communist transitions to democracy.  
Romania’s transition was delayed and violent, and “it was the only country where the 
successor regime committed the most egregious violations of human rights” and 
where “a former high Communist official was not only elected to the presidency in 
the first free election, but reelected” (344).  In Russia, economic reform was 
prioritized over political reform, and elsewhere in many new states of the former 
USSR, the lack of democratic institutions has endangered democratization.  Limited 
political reforms may limit the mobilization potential of anti-war organizing. 
Even in some states that made political reforms, they were sometimes 
accompanied by policies marginalizing Russian speaking minorities.  For instance, in 
the Baltic states, having “had the most substantial prior experience of democratic 
politics of any of the Soviet republics,” Estonian and Latvian Communist parties 
started splitting into competing factions, with reformists declaring sovereignty and 
loyalists opposing reform, and fielding competing candidates in new elections (402-3, 
407).  However, despite the pace of the transition, even here there were democratic 
problems when new exclusionary citizenship policies were applied to many Russian-
speakers who had been born in the Baltics (409-10).  Such exclusion might lead 
Russian nationalists to use anti-war protests as a forum to express their grievances 




Efforts by Communists to remobilize the masses and moderate support by the 
population for a reversion to authoritarianism may also have implications for anti-war 
organizing.  Although there was much optimism in the revolutions of 1989, many 
post-communist regimes (including Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
and Romania) were characterized by the “return of former communists to government 
positions” (Ishiyama 1995, 147; Tismaneanu 2000, 157).  Linz and Stepan accentuate 
Bulgaria’s Communist-controlled transition, emphasizing the qualitative lagging and 
Communist dominance in post-transition Bulgaria (1996, 295).  Bulgarians’ support 
for a reversion to authoritarianism has also remained relatively high, whereas it is 
markedly lower in countries like Hungary and the Czech Republic (Linz and Stepan 
1996, 343).  Thus, Communists may use anti-war protests as a forum to build support 
for their political agenda and to appeal to a public less committed to democracy and 
might limit protest mobilization. 
In some states, overlapping and persistent economic disadvantages may 
coincide with civil society disadvantages, making it difficult to mobilize the general 
population, which is pre-occupied with more basic material needs, and not so much 
broader ideals concerning the war in Iraq.  As aforementioned, in the pre-communist 
era, there were already important disparities in economic development and economic 
reform in CEE states, and these disparities have been exacerbated with the paths of 
economic liberalization pursued by these states (Rupnik 2000, 17).  There were huge 
gaps in the GDP per capita, with some economies highly agricultural (e.g., Albania) 
and others not (e.g., Slovenia) (Bunce 2000, 124).  Czechoslovakia was ahead 




while Bulgaria and Romania chose “gradualism or simply the postponement of 
market reforms and privatization” (Rupnik 2000, 17).  Accordingly, most of the 
foreign direct investment that has ensued has occurred in Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, and Poland, furthering the pre-existing economic disparities (Rupnik 2000, 
18).  Clearly, civil society and economic disparities tend to persist and overlap 
especially in East-Central Europe, and in states with persistent, overlapping economic 
and civil society disadvantages, the people may have more important basic needs that 
take priority and make it difficult to mobilize collective action about the war in Iraq. 
That is not to say that economic and political reforms occurred uniformly 
within the advantaged states, nor to deny the many problems that accompanied 
economic liberalization and privatization and may also be prioritized by the public 
instead of concerns about the war in Iraq (Poznanski 2000, 229).  Economic 
liberalization varied significantly, ranging from Poland’s “shock therapy” to the 
Czech Republic’s gradualist privatization (Glenn 2003b, 217).  Poznanski describes 
the token successful economic transition in the GDR:  “Of all the cases [of reform 
economies], East Germany is among the most radical—if not the most radical—with 
an instant opening of trade and a two-year complete privatization program that no 
other country has matched so far” (2000, 232).  In Hungary, privatization has 
occurred later than in East Germany, more in the 1996-1998 time frame, and although 
“privatization has not yet come to a close, nonetheless foreigners already control 
seventy percent of Hungary’s industry and banking” (Poznanski 2000, 235).  Poland, 
though having protectionist tendencies, had a “very bold and articulated reform 




and the implementation of confused reform measures” (Poznanski 2000, 217, 232).  
In the Czech Republic, “privatization has been much faster than in Poland” and 
involved a “voucher, free-of-charge distribution of assets to citizens” (Poznanski 
2000, 235).  It is noteworthy that Bulgaria and Romania have very high inflation, and 
the Czech Republic had a brief recession in 1998 (Kaminski 2000, 322-4).  However, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have all improved their exports 
tremendously (Kaminski 2000, 325).  The variation in economic reforms and 
problems may differentiate the mobilization potential of anti-war protest, and 
certainly may lead protesters to focus on the linkages between economic interests and 
the war in Iraq. 
 Economic problems as well as crime (e.g., cronyism, corruption, and 
international trafficking) persist throughout the region, but even concerning these 
issues disparities between East-Central Europe and the other regimes also remain, and 
may thus differentiate protests in these regions.  Even the token transition in what is 
now Eastern Germany, continues “to have a dramatically lower standard of living 
than West Germany,” “despite impressive economic assistance,” “a shared language 
and history” (Glenn 2003b, 217).  Likewise, Glenn acknowledges the problems of 
“corruption and cronyism that accompanied both the opportunities and the 
uncertainties of economic and political transformation” (217).  Economic and 
political problems may be more important to citizens in the CEE states, though 
perhaps less in East-Central Europe, and may account for mobilizational difficulties. 
Thus, difficulties in the pathways leading to democratization may have limited 




and Slovakia’s challenging democratization experiences may make it difficult to 
mobilize anti-war protest, especially for civic groups oriented to Western liberal 
values, but it may open the door for mobilization opportunities for groups who feel 
marginalized.  Exclusionary policies targeting Russian-language minorities, as in the 
Baltic region, may lead to protests being used as a venue to express nationalistic 
grievances, and it may limit protest mobilization.  Further, Communist efforts to 
regain support, especially in countries such as Bulgaria with less support of 
democracy, may lead Communists to use protests as a venue to build support for their 
own causes, and it may limit protest mobilization.  Overlapping civil society and 
economic advantages in East-Central Europe, may have facilitated mobilization in 
these states, and as a whole economic concerns in CEE states may have led 
grievances to draw out linkages between economic interests and the war in Iraq.  
Economic and political problems, especially outside East-Central Europe, may have 
made it difficult to mobilize citizens who have problems regarding basic needs that 
take priority.  Macro-level propositions based on these arguments are listed below.   
5.11.   Given the divergences in the quality of democracy, anti-war protests are likely 
to be less mobilized in countries with democratization difficulties such as Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Slovakia. 
5.12.   Exclusionary policies toward Russian-language minority groups may lead 
Russian nationalists to use anti-war protests as a venue for nationalist grievances, 
especially in the Baltic states, and may have limited protest mobilization.   
5.13.   Communist efforts to regain popular support, especially in states such as 




Communists to use these anti-war protests as an opportunity to build support for their 
causes, and may have limited protest mobilization. 
5.14.   Overlapping civil society and economic advantages in East-Central Europe 
(especially the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) may have facilitated higher 
mobilization at anti-war protests. 
5.15.   Economic concerns throughout the CEE states may lead protesters who are 
mobilized to emphasize grievances that link together economic interests, especially 
neoliberal interests dominating Western democracies, and the war in Iraq. 
5.16.   Economic and political problems in CEE states, especially outside East-
Central Europe, may have made it difficult to mobilize anti-war protesters when other 
unfulfilled basic needs take priority for the general population.   
Anti-War Protests on February 15, 2003 
The February 15, 2003 date of global protest was agreed on by European anti-
war activists at the European Social Forum in Florence, Italy in November 2002.22  
Protests occurred in all the EU member states, other than Estonia, which banned the 
protest due to security concerns relating to possibilities of nationalist violence, and 
Malta, which had no news coverage of protests.  It is very important to note that 
transnational anti-war protest has indeed spread throughout the European Union, and 
may be evidence that civil society on this issue has become more Europeanized. 
The detailed chronology of the protests in the European Union member states 
on February 15, 2003 is presented in Appendix 3, while in this chapter the focus is on 
                                                 





exploring the overall trends in the results in the EU-15 versus CEE states, in light of 
the propositions developed earlier.  It is noteworthy that several tables in Appendix 4 
summarize, in detail, cross-national trends in the protest chronology that are 
summarized more concisely by the tables in this chapter.  Notes are available in the 
appendix concerning the cases on which too little information was available to 
categorize actors, targets, or grievances.  
Table 5.3 condenses the trends in mobilization levels at the February 15, 2003 
protests across the EU member states as they vary in their domestic targets, and Table 
5.4 compares protest mobilization levels across EU member states, taking into 
account public opinion concerning key movement-related grievances about U.S. 
unilateralism in Iraq.  In Table 5.5, actors at the February 15, 2003 protests are 
summarized, including noteworthy insiders and outsiders.  Domestic targets and 
grievances at the February 15, 2003 protests are presented in Table 5.6, while 
international targets and grievances are presented in Table 5.7, and overall trends are 
recapped in Table 5.8.   
Indeed, February 15, 2003 anti-war protests occurred in all of EU-15 states.  
Although there are many commonalities in the agents, targets, and grievances seen 
across these protests, there are tremendous variations in the mobilization levels across 
these protests which are not accounted for solely by “Coalition of the Willing” 
membership, as is evident in Table 5.3.  Protesters turned out en masse in several 
countries that did not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” such as France (200,000) 
and Germany (500,000).  Additionally, a relatively low turnout occurred in some 




However, the three largest protest mobilizations occurred in EU states that did share 
Tarrow’s domestic targets:  Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, with roughly 2 
million, 1.5 million, and 1 million protesters mobilized at each country’s largest 
protest on February 15.   
 
Countries 
Strong domestic and 
international target? 
Estimate of Largest Protest 
Mobilization on  
February 15, 2003? 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia Yes Hundreds 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia 
Yes Thousands 
Denmark, Hungary, Netherlands, 
Portugal 
Yes 
Tens of Thousands 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Sweden 
No 
France, Germany No Hundreds of Thousands 
Italy, Spain, United Kingdom Yes Millions 
Table 5.3: Estimates of February 15 Protest Mobilizations 
 
Note:  An Estonian protest was banned by authorities, and there was no coverage of protest in Malta.   
 
Similarly, anti-war protests also occurred in all the CEE states, with the 
exception of Estonia.  Protest in the EU-15 included tens of thousands or hundreds of 
thousands of protesters, whereas in CEE states nearly all the protests were typically 
smaller.23  Nonetheless, small protests of several hundred or several thousand were 
mobilized everywhere, with the exception of Hungary, where a surprising 50,000 
turned out to demonstrate.  Despite the low level of mobilization, civic organizations 
                                                 
23 Barr, Robert. 2003. Mass marches in London, Rome, Berlin and Damascus, clashes in Athens on day 




participating in the protests of many CEE states of the EU increasingly represent the 
smorgasbord of interests and ideals seen in the EU-15.   
Protests also emerged in Cyprus and in all the candidate states to the EU, but 
no protest events emerged in Malta.  It is also noteworthy that Cypriot protest 
successfully brought together Greek and Turkish Cypriots, despite many historic 
conflicts, and involved a very transnational set of activists.  This protest targeted the 
government’s willingness to permit the usage of British bases on Cyprus for the war 
as well as the Bush administration in the United States, with grievances concerning 
Americans’ unilateralism and oil motivations.  The protests in the candidate countries 
mobilized 10,000 in Zagreb, Croatia; undisclosed numbers of participants in Skopje, 
Macedonia; and 5,000 or thousands in Istanbul, Turkey.  It is worth considering 
which factors might account for the emergence of transnational protest in these 
regions, but I have focused on the EU-15 and CEE member states in this chapter. 
As evident in Table 5.4, it is also interesting to examine public opinion 
concerning key movement-related grievances about U.S. unilateralism in Iraq in 
relation to protest mobilization in these states.  Although there may be some 
association between the level of public support of movement-related grievances and 
protest mobilization level, there are also other very important factors, especially being 
a CEE state, with a divergent history of civil society.  Clearly, some of the variation 
in the protest mobilization levels in the EU-15 and CEE states may be accounted for 
by the levels of support of movement-related grievances and being a CEE states, and 
not just by the presence of domestic targets.  Further, there may be an interaction 




grievances.  Eventually, if data is available across multiple dates of protests, for a 
larger sample of cases, and including other predictors, an ordered probit of protest 
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Estimate of Largest 
Protest Mobilization on 
February 15, 2003 
1 Austria No 85% 85% 78% Tens of Thousands 
2 Belgium No 84% 78% 72% Tens of Thousands 
3 Denmark Yes 83% 79% 66% Tens of Thousands 
4 Finland No 89% 78% 82% Tens of Thousands 
5 France No 84% 86% 82% Hundreds of Thousands 
6 Germany  No 89% 87% 72% Hundreds of Thousands 
7 Greece No 88% 86% 95% Tens of Thousands 
8 Ireland No 81% 77% 70% Tens of Thousands 
9 Italy Yes 81% 79% 73% Millions 
10 Luxembourg No 84% 81% 76% Tens of Thousands 
11 Netherlands Yes 84% 80% 74% Tens of Thousands 
12 Portugal Yes 77% 72% 76% Tens of Thousands 
13 Spain Yes 78% 77% 79% Millions 
14 Sweden No 85% 81% 63% Tens of Thousands 
15 United Kingdom Yes 68% 68% 60% Millions 
1 Bulgaria Yes 81% 75% 74% Thousands 
2 Czech Republic Yes 65% 61% 64% Thousands 
3 Estonia Yes 85% 80% 58% None 
4 Hungary Yes 76% 71% 61% Tens of Thousands 
5 Latvia Yes 85% 74% 61% Hundreds 
6 Lithuania Yes 73% 69% 60% Hundreds 
7 Poland Yes 72% 63% 65% Thousands 
8 Romania Yes 70% 70% 65% Thousands 
9 Slovakia Yes 59% 46% 72% Hundreds 
10 Slovenia Yes 86% 74% 68% Thousands 
1 Cyprus No 90% 83% 83% Hundreds 
2 Malta No 91% 68% 57% None 







































1 Austria*** No       
2 Belgium No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
3 Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
4 Finland No Yes  Yes Yes   
5 France No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
6 Germany No Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
7 Greece No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
8 Ireland No Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
9 Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
10 Luxembourg*** No       
11 Netherlands Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
12 Portugal*** Yes Yes      
13 Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes    
14 Sweden*** No Yes      
15 United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
1 Bulgaria Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
2 Czech Republic Yes Yes   Yes  Yes 
3 Estonia* Yes       
4 Hungary Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
5 Latvia Yes    Yes  Yes 
6 Lithuania Yes Yes      
7 Poland*** Yes       
8 Romania*** Yes       
9 Slovakia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
10 Slovenia Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
1 Cyprus No    Yes   
2 Malta** No       
Table 5.5: Key Actors, Insiders, and Outsiders at the February 15 Protests 
 
Note:  *=Protest banned by authorities. **=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information 
available in the coverage.  
 
Table 5.5 illustrates that protests across the older EU states were extremely 
similar, in terms of the successful mobilization of insiders and outsiders at protest 
events.  Protests in the EU-15 states typically involved platforms consisting of many 
different civic organizations, often including leftist parties, unions, church groups, 
human rights groups, environmental groups, peace groups, anti-globalization 




national citizenry.  Exiled Iraqis, Arabs, and Muslims were mobilized in many places, 
as were Americans in the diaspora, and transnational protesters turned up in many 
countries.  Actors involved in protests were remarkably similar across the EU-15.  
Also of interest is the noteworthy re-mobilization of veteran outsiders or activists 
from the anti-war demonstrations at the European Social Forum; from previous peace 
movements (Vietnam; anti-nuclearization; and pro-democracy); from protests 
targeting Europeanization; and from protests targeting Le Pen. Another commonality 
across the EU-15 is the frequency with which insiders (representatives of political 
parties on the left or in the opposition as well as organized labor) were willing to 
make linkages with the anti-war movement. 
Rainbow-like coalitions are beginning to emerge in the CEE states, although 
insiders seem to be less present in this region and less mention is made of the 
remobilization of outsider-oriented activists previously focused on peace, pro-
democracy, or anti-globalization issues.  Here again, targets do not distinguish the 
participation of insiders or outsiders, but the level of issue consensus on movement-
related grievances may account for some of the variation, as well as the newness and 
asymmetric emergence of civil society in the CEE states.  A noteworthy exception is 
the Hungarian protest that involved a variety of civic associations, mobilized by the 
Civilians for Peace.  Much like the original EU member states, these Hungarian 
organizations include church groups, human rights groups, environmental groups, 
peace groups, and anti-globalization activists, and Iraqis were also represented here.  




in a much more limited fashion, and there are certainly transnational protesters or 
protesters from domestic diaspora groups at these protests, much like the EU-15.   
Key insiders and outsiders seem to be less drawn to these CEE protests, and 
nationalist and Communist actors seem to dominate certain protests.  In the CEE 
states overall, there was less mention of insiders (of parties or politicians on the left or 
in the opposition or of organized labor) attending the demonstrations, unlike the 
protests in the EU-15.  Further, only protests in Hungary and Slovenia mentioned 
activists from previous peace, pro-democracy, and anti-globalization movements 
being remobilized.  Nationalist and Communist concerns seem to distinguish several 
protests, all with low level protest mobilization.  Noteworthy are the Communist 
overtones and nostalgia for Stalin at the Bulgarian demonstration and the isolated 
protest of the Communists in the Czech Republic.  Also, the Estonian protest was 
cancelled due to concerns about the possibility Russian nationalists would seize on an 
opportunity for violence, and nationalists protested the war in Latvia and Slovakia. 
As evident in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, protesters in the older EU member states 
usually had both domestic and international targets and grievances.  However, the 
protests often seemed to give primacy to the international grievances and targets, over 
the domestic ones.  First, the domestic targets and grievances which were similar 
cross-nationally, but which were not emphasized as much, are discussed.  Next, the 
international targets and grievances, which were similar cross-nationally and which 
seemed to be emphasized at protest events, are addressed. 
Table 5.6 illustrates that even the countries that did not join the “Coalition of 




branches) and domestic grievances (opposing the usage of transport networks or 
airspace for the war and supporting a different stance on the war).  However, in some 
such countries (especially Belgium, France, and Germany) protesters were clearly 


















































1 Austria *** No      
2 Belgium No No   Yes Yes 
3 Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes   
4 Finland No Yes Yes    
5 France No No   Yes  
6 Germany  No No   Yes  
7 Greece No Yes Yes    
8 Ireland No Yes Yes   Yes 
9 Italy Yes Yes  Yes   
10 Luxembourg No Yes Yes    
11 Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes   
12 Portugal *** Yes      
13 Spain Yes Yes Yes Yes   
14 Sweden No Yes Yes    
15 United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes Yes   
1 Bulgaria Yes Yes Yes    
2 Czech Republic *** Yes      
3 Estonia Yes Yes Yes Yes   
4 Hungary Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
5 Latvia Yes Yes Yes Yes   
6 Lithuania Yes Yes Yes Yes   
7 Poland Yes Yes Yes    
8 Romania *** Yes      
9 Slovakia Yes Yes Yes    
10 Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Yes   
1 Cyprus No Yes    Yes 
2 Malta ** No      
Table 5.6: Key Domestic Targets and Grievances at the February 15 Protests   
 
Note:  *=Protest banned by authorities. **=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information 





Conversely, other protest actions taken close to the global protest were more focused 
domestically on policymaking that supports the war in Iraq.  For instance, a protest in 
the Belgian port of Antwerp, a few days prior to February 15, 2003, concerned 
military transports passing through Belgium and the usage of Belgian transport 
networks and ports for those military transports. In general, the domestic targets were 
not emphasized at the February 15, 2003 protests, and rather international targets, 
especially President Bush and the U.S. government, were focused on. 
In the CEE member states of the EU it was clear that much like the EU-15, 
most protests also had strong domestic targets in the legislative or executive branch, 
and here too, domestic grievances often related to domestic policy-making 
concerning the war in Iraq.  In Bulgaria, protesters were concerned about potential 
economic impacts of the war and called for the government’s resignation.  The 
Hungarian organizers, who earlier had met with the Prime Minister to discuss ways to 
achieve peace, targeted all government representatives, calling for them to oppose the 
usage of Hungarian transport networks for the war and to have a public roll-call vote 
so citizens can hold legislators accountable for their decisions concerning the war.  In 
several states, protesters opposed the domestic government’s policies on the war. 
Table 5.7 shows tremendous similarities in international targets and 
grievances selected in the EU-15 and CEE states, which appear to have been 
prioritized.  Many of the EU-15 states have remarkably similar international targets 
(especially the U.S. government and President Bush, but also the United Kingdom 
government and Prime Minister Blair).  In CEE states, the U.S. government and Bush 











Targets at Protest? 







































1 Austria *** No       
2 Belgium No Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
3 Denmark Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
4 Finland No Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 France No Yes  Yes   Yes 
6 Germany  No Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
7 Greece No Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
8 Ireland No Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
9 Italy Yes Yes  Yes    
10 Luxembourg No   Yes  Yes  
11 Netherlands Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
12 Portugal *** Yes       
13 Spain Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
14 Sweden No Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
15 United Kingdom Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1 Bulgaria Yes Yes  Yes    
2 Czech Republic Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
3 Estonia Yes Yes  Yes    
4 Hungary Yes Yes  Yes   Yes 
5 Latvia Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  
6 Lithuania Yes Yes  Yes    
7 Poland Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
8 Romania *** Yes       
9 Slovakia Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
10 Slovenia Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
1 Cyprus No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
2 Malta ** No       
Table 5.7: Key International Targets and Grievances at the February 15 Protests   
 
Note:  *=Protest banned by authorities. **=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information 
available in the coverage. 
 
included opposing the war in Iraq; opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq without the 
United Nations and the disregard for the legitimacy-conferring power of the United 
Nations; opposing the linkage between the war and oil and corporate interests; and 




grievances that the protesters in the CEE states attended to were very similar to those 
of protesters in the older EU states:  calling on the United States to shift their 
standpoint on the war in Iraq; supporting a peaceful resolution to the conflict via the 
United Nations and in accordance with international law; opposing a war they 
perceive as being instigated for the benefit of oil interests and corporate interests; and 
opposing the linkage between the war and the U.S. pursuit of hegemony.   
Thus, transnational protest against the war in Iraq has indeed spread 
throughout the European Union during the era of enlargement, and the protests in 
many of the newly acceded CEE countries have remarkable similarities in the agents 
involved, domestic targets and grievances, and international targets and grievances, 
when compared to the protests in the EU-15.  However, there are important 
differences concerning mobilization levels, linkages to insiders and outsiders, and the 
central role of Communism and nationalism in some protest events.  Relatively high 
protest mobilization and success in uniting insiders and outsiders in rainbow 
coalitions at protest events in the EU-15, compared to the CEE states, seems to  
suggest the centripetal influences of movement-related grievances and of a longer 
history of participation, protest, and civil society in the EU-15 states and the reduced 
explanatory power of targets in accounting for these results.  Thus, in the EU-15, 
parties of the opposition and on the left have had more opportunities to learn about 
movement-related grievances in their interactions with protesters and with organizers 
and thus may shift their platforms to target more constituents, and protesters have 
learned about insider and outsider tactics they can leverage and what insider allies 





Proposition Causal Factor 




5.1 Domestic and International Targets 
Perceptions of Similar Domestic 
and International Targets at Protests 
Y 
5.2 Domestic and International Targets 
Successful Mobilization and 
Insiders and Outsiders at Protests 
Y 
5.3 Movement-Related Grievances No effect 
N 
5.4 
Primacy of Domestic over 
International Targets 
Successful Mobilization and 
Insiders and Outsiders at Protests 
N 
5.5 
Domestic and International 
Grievances 
Perceptions of Similar Domestic 
and International Grievances at 
Protests 
Y 
5.6 Movement-Related Grievances 
Successful Mobilization and 
Insiders and Outsiders at Protests 
Y 
5.7 Primacy of Grievances over Targets 
Successful Mobilization and 
Insiders and Outsiders at Protests 
Y 
5.8 
Primacy of International over 
Domestic (in Grievances and in 
Targets) 
Successful Mobilization and 
Insiders and Outsiders at Protests 
Y 
5.9 
Longer History of Participation, 
Protest, and Civil society and more 
Europeanized Civil Society in the 




Stronger Civil Society in East-
Central Europe (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland) over the rest of 
the CEE 
Successful Mobilization and 
Insiders and Outsiders at Protests 
Y 
5.11 
Democratization Difficulties in 




Exclusionary Policies Toward 
Russian Language Minorities, 
Especially in the Baltic States 
Russian Nationalists use Protests as 
a Venue and Difficult Mobilization 
Y 
5.13 
Communist Efforts to Regain 
Support, Especially in States with 
More Support for a Reversion to 
Authoritarianism, such as Bulgaria 
Communists use Protests as a 
Venue and Difficult Mobilization 
Y 
5.14 
East-Central European Overlap in 




5.15 Economic Concerns in the CEE 
Focus on Linking Economic 
Interests, Especially Neoliberal 
Interests of Western Democracies, 
and the War in Iraq 
Y 
5.16 
Economic and Political Problems in 
the CEE outside East-Central Europe 
Difficult Mobilization 
Y 





As is summarized in Table 5.8, the results confirm most of the propositions 
derived in the theoretical framework.  Rather, most of the propositions find 
supportive evidence or mixed supportive evidence.  Although Tarrow’s targets 
account for some variance in transnational anti-war protests in the EU-15, it is clear 
that other factors such as movement-related grievances and divergent histories of civil 
society and democratization may also account for variation between the EU-15 and 
the CEE states, disconfirming proposition 5.3.  The results call into question the 
primacy of domestic over international causal factors, offering some disconfirmation 
of proposition 5.4.   
The most striking similarities between the protests throughout the EU are in 
their shared targets and grievances, both domestically and internationally.  Certainly, 
similar perceptions of domestic and international targets as well as similar domestic 
and international grievances are evident at protest events across the EU, offering 
confirmatory evidence of propositions 5.1 and 5.5.  Both thus appear to be important 
factors in successful transnational protests.  However, grievances may outperform 
targets in accounting for variance between the CEE states and the EU-15. 
While the presence of domestic targets and the degree of movement-related 
grievances in public opinion both appear to account for some of the variation in 
protest mobilization, neither argument necessarily differentiates the presence of 
insiders and outsiders at protest events, which is generally far higher across the EU-
15 than it is in the CEE states, confirming propositions 5.2 and 5.6.  The presence of 
movement-related grievances seems to do a better job of accounting for protest 




only account for mobilization levels of some states within the EU-15, offering some 
confirmation of proposition 5.7.  Further, international targets such as the United 
States government and President Bush and international grievances such as the shared 
opposition to U.S. unilateralism in Iraq and to the linkages being made between the 
war in Iraq and oil and corporate interests, appear to have primacy, or certainly equal 
importance compared to domestic targets and grievances, confirming proposition 5.8.   
Although Tarrow correctly predicts the tremendous mobilizations in Italy, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom, which joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” he does 
not correctly predict the low turnout at the CEE protests and in Denmark nor the high 
turnouts in France and Germany, offering some disconfirmatory evidence of 
proposition 5.2.  Nor do protests lacking a domestic target in the EU-15 seem to vary 
in their ability to draw in insiders and outsiders, offering further disconfirmatory 
evidence of proposition 5.2.  Mobilization in the CEE states is far lower than 
mobilization in the older EU states, and even lower than Western European states that 
lacked a strong domestic target.  Thus, Tarrow’s domestic targets via “Coalition of 
the Willing” membership do not account for some of the key dynamics in 
transnational mobilization in CEE versus EU-15 states.   
Some of the variance in protest mobilization, including in the CEE states, 
appears to be captured by movement-related grievances and some of it seems to be 
captured by the longer history of participation, protest, and civil society and the more 
Europeanized civil society in the EU-15 compared to the CEE states, offering some 
confirmation of propositions 5.6 and 5.9.  Clearly, when there is more issue 




higher, and in the less-mobilized CEE states, there seems to be less support for these 
grievances, so this argument accounts for variation in the CEE relative to the EU-15, 
offering some support of proposition 5.6.  Overall, the newness of civil society and its 
asymmetric ties with civil society in Europe and the European Social Forum, may 
have limited mobilization in CEE states, supporting proposition 5.9.   
However, there are indications of changes in CEE states.  Hungary’s 50,000 
strong demonstration was far more mobilized than protests elsewhere in the newly 
acceded CEE states, although it is noteworthy that protest mobilization was relatively 
low elsewhere in East-Central Europe, in the Czech Republic and Poland, offering 
some confirmation of propositions 5.10 and 5.14.  These three countries shared a 
stronger history of participation, protest, and civil society.  One factor that may 
account for this difference are Gallup Europe (2003) poll results which suggest 
Hungarians were more opposed to the war than Czechs and Poles, offering additional 
support of proposition 5.6.   
The nascent rainbow coalitions of CEE protesters, especially in Hungary, 
affirm that a vibrant civil society, ironically one quite similar to the public sphere in 
the original EU states, is targeting the Iraq war, offering some support of propositions 
5.10 and 5.14.  However, the lack of linkages between CEE peace movements and 
politicians and parties of the opposition as well as organized labor, and difficulties re-
mobilizing outsiders involved in historic peace and global justice movements, suggest 
that historic disparities in civil society, protest, and participation in the CEE states 





Democratization difficulties, exclusionary practices toward Russian-language 
minorities, Communist efforts to appeal to anti-regime sentiments, economic 
concerns in CEE states, and economic and political difficulties outside of East-
Central Europe may play a role, as evident in the communist and nationalist overtones 
and low-level mobilization in countries like Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia; 
the lack of coverage of protest in Romania; and in the emphasis on the linkages 
between oil and the war in Iraq.  This evidence offers some confirmation of 
propositions 5.11, 5.12, 5.13, 5.15, and 5.16.   
Both Tarrow’s domestic and international targets as well as similarities in 
domestic and international grievances, especially grievances concerning U.S. 
unilateralism, seem to be factors that account for the similarities in the transnational 
anti-war protest that is clearly emerging in the European Union.  However, in 
accounting for the dynamics in mobilization of insiders and outsiders across the EU, 
Tarrow’s domestic and international political opportunities lack some explanatory 
power.  Rather, the issue consensus on movement-related grievances, especially 
opposing U.S. unilateralism, and the asymmetric development of civil society in the 
CEE states vis-à-vis the EU-15 seem to account for the lower protest mobilization 
and lower participation of insiders and outsiders in the CEE states compared to the 
EU-15.  Further, the strength of civil society in the East-Central European states and 
democratization difficulties elsewhere seem to distinguish some anti-war protests. 
To conclude, movement related grievances and a longer history of civil 
society, protest, and participation may exert centripetal forces on insiders and 




coalitions drawing in insiders and outsiders.  Targets are not as important in 
accounting for the differences in protest events between the CEE states and the EU-
15.  Highly mobilized protests joining rainbow coalitions of insiders and outsiders in 
the EU-15 teach parties of the opposition or the left about protesters’ grievances and 
teach protesters about the possibilities to couple their outsider activism with insider 
activism, helping remobilize activists as voters in subsequent elections.   
It should also not be overlooked that transnational protest has clearly emerged 
in the enlarging European Union, and that these CEE protests are in many ways very 
similar to the protests in older EU states, especially in their targets and grievances, 
both domestically and internationally.  These similarities challenge the assumptions 
of earlier research that suggested only very limited, domestically differentiated 
transnational protest and looked largely within Western Europe for such 
transnationalism, and therefore suggest the importance of exploring more data on 




Chapter 6: Micro-level: Demonstrators’ Coupling of 
Protesting and Voting 
Since the onset of Spain’s democratization, there have been two alternations 
of power, first in 1996 when the conservative Partido Popular (PP) took the reins 
from the long-ruling social-democratic Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), 
and more recently in 2004, when PSOE regained power via unprecedented electoral 
mobilization, following massive demonstrations. In the interim, PP electoral success 
in 2000 boosted government confidence, and the government joined the “Coalition of 
the Willing,” even though Spaniards were extremely opposed to unilateral military 
intervention in Iraq without formal United Nations agreement or Iraqi aggression 
violating international law. The issue consensus on this opposition to U.S. 
unilateralism may have exerted a centripetal force on insiders and outsiders in the 
anti-war movement, permitting successful collaboration in protest coalitions and at 
protest events and the coupling of insider activism and outsider activism. 
On February 15, 2003, 2-3 million people (5.0-7.5% of the Spanish 
population) demonstrated against the anticipated war in Iraq. Opposition parties in 
Spain had a very direct, cooperative relationship with this historic anti-war 
movement. Included amongst organizers of the Spanish demonstrations was PSOE, 
the leading opposition party, as well as the Communist-led Izquierda Unida (IU) 
coalition. Thus, insiders from opportunistic parties of the opposition and of the left 




grievances they could use to mobilize more constituents, and protesters learned about 
party allies they could reward if they decided to couple their protesting with voting.   
After the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, popular displeasure about the 
war grew into outrage when the government persisted in alleging Basque nationalist 
culpability despite evidence suggesting Al-Qaeda involvement. Ramoneda describes 
anti-war demonstrations’ evolution into record-breaking protest mobilizations and 
unprecedented voter turnout, culminating in PSOE’s victory.24  Electoral turnout 
increased dramatically, from 68.7% in the 2000 Congress of Deputies’ elections to 
75.7% in 2004. PSOE turnout increased exponentially, by about 3,107,000 votes, 
while PP and IU turnout decreased by 686,000 and 135,000 votes, respectively.  
Many global protesters were mobilized, and so too were many additional 
voters.  Ramoneda suggests Spaniards’ participatory choices were most strongly 
influenced by opposition to the war although other salient factors included the 
government’s response to the train bombings and a domestic oil spill.25 As a result of 
these competing influences, PSOE received a tremendous amount of non-traditional 
support and regained control of the government, changing the government’s policy on 
Iraq but maintaining involvement in Afghanistan. Perhaps then, the dramatic electoral 
outcome reveals that issue consensus in the public on opposing U.S. unilateralism in 
Iraq drove protesters in Spain’s massive demonstrations to couple or pair their 
participation in the global anti-war movement with voting in the record-breaking 
general election.  
                                                 
24 Ramoneda, Josep. 2004. Spain has changed politics for the better: Josep Ramoneda. Financial Times 





Although the Spanish election saw a huge change in pre- and post-war voter 
turnout which coincided with massive demonstrations that were a part of the global 
anti-war movement, neither protest mobilization nor voter mobilization changed as 
much in the United Kingdom or in the Netherlands, countries which also joined the 
“Coalition of the Willing.” In both countries, protests were less mobilized, and 
despite alliances with some parties of the opposition, the ties forged with the main 
opposition parties in both countries were either nonexistent or indirect and far less 
substantive electoral change occurred. Between 2001 and 2005 in the United 
Kingdom, the anti-war Liberal Democrats gained roughly 1,168,000 votes and the 
pro-war Conservative Party gained about 415,000 votes, while the governing pro-war 
Labour Party lost roughly 1,177,000 votes, but the overall results still enabled the 
Labour Party to govern. In the Netherlands, the biggest change in parties’ turnout 
between 2002 and 2003 was observed between the indirectly anti-war, social-
democratic, Partij van de Arbeid (P.v.d.A.) or Labor Party with a gain of roughly 
1,195,000 votes and the pro-intervention Lijst Pim Fortuyn, a right-wing populist 
party with a loss of about 1,065,000 votes, but P.v.d.A. was not invited to join the 
governing coalition, despite extensive negotiations in early 2003. 
In sum, protesting and voting do not seem to be paired together as strongly in 
either the Netherlands or the United Kingdom.  Like Spain, both these countries 
shared a common domestic target around which voters and protesters could mobilize.  
However, unlike in Spain, the public here was more supportive of a military 
intervention in Iraq in a variety of circumstances, especially in the United Kingdom.  




certainly higher than it was in the United Kingdom, and may have made coupling 
protesting and voting appear more likely to be efficacious as a tactic.   Further, in the 
Spanish party-system context, protesters may have expected the odds of PSOE 
electoral success, and thus the efficacy of insider activism in producing a change in 
the government, to be higher.  I return to this question at the end of the chapter. 
Are “Coalition of the Willing” member-states’ citizens who disagree with 
U.S. unilateralism turning toward voting as well as global protesting?  The dynamics 
in voting behavior or in protest behavior have previously been examined, but as yet 
unexplored is their interaction, the coupling and decoupling of protesting and voting.  
In this chapter, a multinomial logistic regression is used to analyze evidence from 
cross-national surveys collected at global protests against war and against 
globalization during 2003-2004. The methodology of these surveys was already 
presented in Chapter 3.  This chapter explores whether targets in the domestic and 
international political opportunity structure or support of movement-related 
grievances account for linkages between global protesting and voting.  
Various scholars have suggested that protesting and voting are increasingly 
being coupled.  Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst (2005) have theorized that the well-
being of liberal democracies has provided a context in which protest and voting are 
increasingly combined. Dahl details the stellar records of these polyarchical 
democracies in their provision of both procedural requirements of electoral 
democracy and social and political rights, providing a climate in which certain 
contentious activities may become coupled with more conventional participatory 




global protests and local votes, especially, Tarrow suggests, when domestic or 
international targets help insider and outsider activists cooperate tactically (2005). 
However, others have suggested that protesting and voting are increasingly 
being decoupled, with protest being used as a substitute for voting.  Some argue that 
such decoupling is occurring in advanced industrialized democracies because they 
face threats to state sovereignty or to civil society’s channels of access.  These 
obstacles are often linked to grievances about globalization and the hegemonic 
aspirations of the United States. Grievances concerning global democratic deficits in 
liberal democracies may lead individuals to express their aversion to the status quo by 
replacing voting with protest behavior. According to Brown’s (2003) critique of 
liberal democracies, their neoliberal governmentality and imperial quest for 
hegemony, especially after September 11, 2001, may drive decoupling. 
Another group of scholars has emphasized a new participatory trend in 
industrialized democracies, as engaging in multiple types of global protest is 
increasingly popular and global protest movements are tied together.  Tarrow (2005) 
discusses the linkages between global justice and anti-war activism, and the shift 
from anti-globalization protesting to anti-war protesting that occurred in some 
countries.  Globalized social movements often see the interconnectedness of their 
grievances and attempt to collaborate, mobilizing participants for protest events in 
other domains (Brian Becker, personal communication, March 9, 2005; Hany Khalil, 
personal communication, March 11, 2005).  Further, Goldstone acknowledges that 
some are specializing in outsider activity like protesting, although he also asserts that 




The dependent variable in this chapter thus gauges the interaction of two 
factors: whether protesters voted in a recent election and whether they attended 
multiple types of global protest (anti-war and anti-globalization), with four possible 
outcomes.  The four categories of the dependent variable are listed below: 
• Single protest voting:  A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has 
participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (voting and one type 
of global protest). 
• Multiple protest voting:  A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has 
participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (voting and two types 
of global protest). 
• Single protest non-voting:  A respondent who has not voted in a recent election 
but has participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (non-voting 
and one type of global protest). 
• Multiple protest non-voting:  A respondent who has not voted in a recent election 
but has participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (non-voting 
and two types of global protest). 
Comparing the predicted probabilities of voting outcomes (single protest 
voting and multiple protest voting) to non-voting outcomes (single protest non-voting 
and multiple protest non-voting) helps us assess the coupling and decoupling of 
protesting and voting, respectively. Protesters are not only faced with the choice to 
pair protesting and voting, but also with a choice to extend their involvement in 
global protest from one domain (just anti-war or just anti-globalization) to both 




probabilities of the multiple protest outcomes (multiple protest voting and multiple 
protest non-voting) to single protest outcomes (single protest voting and single protest 
non-voting) enables us to compare the degree to which protesters are extending 
involvement from single to multiple types of global protest.   
In this chapter, I first present key arguments about the coupling of protesting 
and voting.  Next, I explore arguments about the decoupling of protesting and voting 
and the extension of global protest involvement. Next, theoretical explanations 
accounting for individuals’ participatory choices in deciding whether or not to pair 
global protesting and voting and whether to extend global protest involvement are 
explored.  These explanations are used to derive rival hypotheses focused on 
domestic and international targets as well as support of movement-related values. The 
findings are presented in the results section and are interpreted in the conclusion.   
While the presence of domestic targets (“Coalition of the Willing” 
membership) that Tarrow points to are indeed important in accounting for the 
coupling of protesting and voting, several other factors are also important in 
accounting for protesters’ participatory choices.  The most important finding relates 
to how issue consensus on movement-related grievances exerts centripetal forces on 
insiders and outsiders and creates political opportunities for the coupling of protesting 
and voting. More specifically, opposing U.S. unilateral intervention in Iraq (on which 
much overlapping consensus has been reached in the public and in the anti-war 
movement) facilitates the coupling of protesting and voting.  Also, opposing U.S. 
unilateralism when a country has already taking a stance supporting the “Coalition of 




In contrast, opposition to military intervention in other scenarios and all-
encompassing opposition to globalization (on which there has been much more 
disagreement within movements and in the general population) seems to exert a 
centrifugal force on insider and outsider activism, increasing the likelihood of 
extending protest activity to multiple social movements, and not the pairing of 
protesting and voting. Supporting movement-related grievances, therefore, does not 
turn protesters away from voting per se.  Supporting the Palestinians more (on which 
there is a mix of consensus and discord within movements, the population, and the 
polity) and opposing U.S. unilateralism when an internationalist target is present, 
increase the likelihood of pairing voting with participation in multiple global protests.  
In sum, participatory opportunities for pairing global protesting and voting are 
created when issue consensus on movement-related grievances has been reached 
within movements and the general public, leading individuals to expect both 
protesting and voting to be effective tactics and to couple the two. Likewise, on 
movement-related grievances on which there is issue discord within movements and 
the public, support of these grievances can create participatory opportunities for 
increasing global protest activity, because it appears that only global protesting will 
be an effective tactic on these issues in such contexts. However, support of these 
grievances does not necessarily exact a cost in terms of voting engagement because 
other issues that participants support are issues on which voting is expected to be an 
effective tactic. Finally, on movement-related grievances on which there is a mixture 
of consensus or discord, both voting and global protesting are expected to be 




Coupling Protesting and Voting 
Is the influx of new PSOE voters in 2004 indicative of a trend in which people 
are increasingly pairing voting with protesting? In contentious politics, Meyer and 
Tarrow argue that the social movement may be “moving from the edges of political 
legitimacy” to “become something more akin to interest groups and political parties” 
occurring “within the realm of conventional politics” (1998, 4). As social movements 
become institutionalized and professionalized, movement activists often are equally 
adept at using both institutionalized repertoires of contention and noninstitutional 
tactics (Meyer and Tarrow 1998, 5).  
Similarly, Goldstone (2003) suggests that scholars attend to the dynamic, 
reciprocal relations between political parties and social movements and between 
protest behavior and routine political behavior like voting. He argues that “social 
movements constitute an essential element of normal politics in modern societies, and 
that there is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary between institutionalized and 
noninstitutionalized politics” (Goldstone 2003, 2). Goldstone focuses on the “ongoing 
symbiosis” between “the triangle of movements, parties, and constituencies” which 
can open up “with the advance of democratization” and which can influence 
movement outcomes as well as electoral outcomes (2003, 2, 10, 19, 23). He argues 
that protest and conventional participation are not dichotomous but lie along a 
“continuum of alignment and influence” (Goldstone 2003, 9). Goldstone argues 
protest is “both an alternative and a valuable supplement” to conventional political 
action (2003, 9-10). He suggests that like the PSOE, “long-established political 




with social movements in order to win elections” (Goldstone 2003, 4). Protest has 
thus become mainstreamed in our “social movement society,” and we should expect 
protesters' participation in conventional politics via voting to be linked to their 
engagement in global protest (Meyer and Tarrow 1998).  
In political behavior, Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst argue that the new 
popularity of protest and its conventionalized usage by mainstream citizens is an 
indicator of the quality of democracy, suggesting a “far healthier state of democracy” 
(2005, 203). Similarly, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady observe that protesters are 
highly engaged conventionally: “The vast majority of [protesters] (93 percent) engage 
in some other activity beyond voting” (1995, 66). Bean also argues that “conventional 
participation is quite closely related to low-level protest but only distantly related to 
radical protest” (1991, 272). Some social movement organizations are membership-
driven, and according to Rosenstone and Hansen, such associational involvement is 
key in driving political engagement (2003, 84).  
Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst (2005) find evidence suggesting that protest 
is indeed an increasingly mainstream political activity, used alongside many 
conventional tactics to effect political change, and argue that Belgian protesters are 
not radicals with militant, anti-systemic grievances. Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 
conclude that the level of global protest indicates the health of representative 
democracy in Belgium, as “a growing channel of political expression used for the 
legitimate articulation of demands in a democratic state and a form of activism that 




civic society” (203). The following proposition about the dependent variable is thus 
put forth: 
6.1.   Single protest voting and multiple protest voting are increasingly common, 
while single protest non-voting and multiple protest non-voting are on the decline. 
According to this approach, increases in the coupling or pairing of protesting and 
voting are a product of the well-being of democracy. Such social movement societies 
characterized by coupling are healthy and positive developments. 
Decoupling Protesting and Voting or Expansion to Multiple Global Protests 
Unlike Spaniards, British and Dutch citizens seemed more reluctant to couple 
global protesting with voting. Similar evidence has led other scholars to ask whether 
protest is instead replacing conventional forms of participation like voting, or even 
whether individuals are beginning to specialize in multiple forms of global protest. 
This line of research finds that much of the recent decline in voting participation and 
correspondent increase in activities such as protest is explained by changes in 
attitudes toward the state and toward political participation, such as reduced party 
identification and lowered perceptions of government responsiveness.  
Declining voter turnout in Western Europe and North America has been a 
concern to many scholars (Blais, Gidengil, Nevitte, and Nadeau 2004; Mackie 1995; 
Putnam 2000). Although some optimists (Inglehart 1997; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995) interpret concurrent increases in unconventional participation as 
reassuring or have questioned just how integral routine participation is to the well-
being of democracy, others are more pessimistic about the well-being of democracy 




such as voting by less conventional ones such as protesting. Dealignment theorists 
attribute the downturn of insider activism to the declining importance of traditional 
cleavages like class, religion, and region in structuring political behavior and their 
role in accounting for changes in voter apathy (Franklin, Mackie, and Valen 1992; 
Pulzer 1987, 378; Van Deth and Elff 2004, 491). Further, Dalton (2000) and Pulzer 
(1987) observed declines in partisanship with dealignment, as voters are less willing 
to identify or engage with parties.  
The decline of political parties may drive citizens to look to non-traditional 
actors in civil society and social movements, as alternate sources of information and 
providers of interest articulation. Kitschelt argues that in the era of post-industrial 
capitalism, parties are facing obstacles in representing old-time cleavages whose 
preferences have changed and this has led to difficulties in mobilizing their electoral 
constituencies (2000, 164). Political parties have a difficult time responding to the 
added complexities and difficulties of mobilizing voters now that traditional 
cleavages are less important, and their adaptive focus on appealing to the average 
voter has facilitated a depolarization of the party system. As voters turn away from 
parties and traditional interest groups, they may turn toward social movements and 
the media to articulate their interests and provide them with information (Ezrow 
2005). Dalton (2000) argues that voters’ education, free time, and information access 
has increased, so that dealigning voters are more likely to look for independent, non-
party sources of political information. 
Some scholars of political behavior have argued that the reduced popularity of 




substitution of conventional participation by unconventional participation, as citizens 
rely on certain types of civil society and social movements instead of political parties 
and traditional interest groups. Inglehart observes decreased respect for political 
authority in postmodern societies, as well as increases in individuals' interest in 
politics and their participation in “more active and issue-specific forms of mass 
participation” (e.g., signing of petitions; boycotting; demonstrating) (1997, 10, 14, 43, 
308). Likewise, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady notice an increase in “public cynicism 
toward the major institutions of American life, especially government,” accompanied 
by declining voter turnout and an intensification in other forms of voluntary political 
participation (1995, 25, 26).  
Along similar lines, Tarrow (2005) observes the linkages between anti-
globalization protest and anti-war protest and Goldstone (2003) observes that some 
are becoming specialized in outsider activism.  Likewise, Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and 
Walgrave observe unconventional specialization amongst radicals (2004). In their 
research, prior unconventional participation (attending previous demonstrations 
abroad and supporting radical movement strategies such as not opposing violence and 
taking action besides talking) predicts being a more transnational protester (Bédoyan, 
Van Aelst, and Walgrave 2004). These findings suggest that protest might supplant 
conventional participation in liberal democracies. The following propositions about 
the dependent variable are thus put forth: 
6.2.   Single protest non-voting and multiple protest non-voting are increasingly 
common, while single protest voting and multiple protest voting are on the decline. 




of dealignment, as dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy, depolarization, 
increased distrust of authority increase the popularity of action in the streets.  
Decoupling is leading us toward protest in lieu of conventional participation, and is 
taken by some as a sign of malignance in today’s industrialized democracies. 
6.3.   Multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting are increasingly 
common, while single protest voting and single protest non-voting are on the decline.  
Trends toward the expansion of multiple global protests are a product of the linkages 
between global protest movements and the increased appeal of global protesting. 
Domestic and International Targets 
Sidney Tarrow (2005) suggests that the targets presented in the domestic and 
international political opportunity structure account for dynamics in the pairing of 
insider activism such as lobbying and voting with outsider activism such as 
transnational protesting, more than movement-related grievances do.  According to 
Tarrow (2005), targets in the international and domestic political opportunity space 
provide structured opportunities for relations between outsiders and insiders seeking 
to influence a common target, leading to insider-outsider cooperation and connections 
between insider activism and outsider activism. In turning to global and 
internationalist targets, Tarrow does not forego the explanatory power of domestic 
and local influences on contention. Rather, he suggests the continued primacy of 
targets in the domestic political opportunity structure in accounting for the dynamics 





According to Tarrow, the presence of domestic and international targets exerts 
centripetal forces on the participatory versus oppositional roles of NGO insiders and 
social movement outsiders, and facilitate the coupling of insider activism and outsider 
activism (2005, 29). Tarrow suggests that the line between insider and outsider 
activism is blurring, and that insider-outsider relations are increasingly cooperative 
(29, 47, 48, 211). Since much of Tarrow’s evidence centers on transnational activism 
of the social movement variety, Tarrow may be very likely to join many on the 
outside in observing such coupling of insider and outsider tactics.  Conversely, there 
is also noteworthy fragmentation, tactical specialization, and conflict in both the anti-
globalization and anti-war movements, which needs to be accounted for.  Although 
Tarrow expects domestic and internationalist targets to lead to the generalized 
coupling of insider and outsider activism, he also suggests that in the long run, this 
interaction may drive insiders to become outsiders, supplanting insider activism with 
outsider activism or even specializing in global protest (45).  
Indeed, the most important meetings of international institutions are 
periodically targeted for transnational protest as well as insider activities like 
lobbying. Similarly, in Western Europe, high anti-war protest mobilization 
characterized countries with both domestic and internationalist targets by joining the 
“Coalition of the Willing.” Moreover, the aforementioned Spanish case, which 
coupled massive demonstrations and voter mobilization, also offers confirmatory 
evidence that coupling may have occurred.  
On the other hand, disconfirmatory evidence of Tarrow’s internationalism is 




“Coalition of the Willing” countries like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, 
which shared similar targets but had a public more supportive of intervention in Iraq 
in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, the key exception is the United States, which 
had an anti-war movement rife with conflict, a small proportion of the population 
mobilized into protest, and relatively low-level post-war electoral change, despite 
having an important domestic target.  
As aforementioned, two of the most important U.S. coalitions against the war, 
UFPJ and ANSWER, had a divisive relationship. While ANSWER is more “radical,” 
grouping many grievances together under an anti-imperialism frame opposing U.S. 
hegemony and taking an approach that is not as tenable for groups such as organized 
labor or mainstream clergy, the more “mainstream” UFPJ, in contrast, tries to draw in 
such moderate bases of popular support which can also easily be mobilized in 
elections. Issue consensus or discord concerning movement-related grievances about 
global democratic deficits concerning the war in Iraq and concerning globalization 
may account for the coupling or decoupling of protesting and voting within the U.S. 
anti-war movement. 
In explaining the historic February 15, 2003 global anti-war protests which 
mobilized 16 million demonstrators, Tarrow focuses on domestic targets created by 
countries joining the “Coalition of the Willing” in addition to the internationalist 
target of a hegemonic United States government (2005, 15). Though he acknowledges 
that targets in international institutions were lacking since the European Union and 
United Nations had taken oppositional stances on the war in Iraq, Tarrow argues that 




the war and policymaking relevant to the war) were key in eliciting global collective 
action and insider-outsider cooperation (17). Moreover, Tarrow argues that “the 
resurgent militarism of a hegemonic state” was an important “internationalist” target 
shared by demonstrators transnationally during the February 15, 2003 protests (16).  
I suggest that Tarrow is in fact hinting to movement-related grievances 
concerning global democratic deficits and U.S. hegemony (i.e., not international 
institutions or targets) which sometimes are characterized by issue discord between 
insiders and outsiders in the global anti-war movement: whether military intervention 
should be opposed in all cases or just without a mandate from the United Nations and 
whether military intervention by a hegemon should be framed as imperialism. 
Tarrow’s story is focused on the success of this global collective action, the linkages 
between insiders and outsiders, and the coupling of insider and outsider tactics, via 
shared domestic targets. He downplays the role of movement-related grievances and 
of outcomes like insider-outsider conflict and decoupling of protesting and voting. 
Understanding movement-related grievances about the war in Iraq and about 
globalization may help account for dynamics in the linkages between protesting and 
voting.  In other words, issue consensus or issue discord on movement-related 
grievances can either create centripetal forces that unite insider and outsider activism 
or centrifugal forces that divide insider and outsider activism.  Namely, movement-
related grievances with issue consensus are perhaps more palatable to insiders and to 
outsiders, and are more likely to create political opportunities for effectively coupling 




be viewed as issues that can more effectively be pursued through global protesting 
and create opportunities for decoupling protesting and voting.   
Next, several propositions based on the structuring influence of Tarrow’s 
domestic and international targets on linkages between insider activism and outsider 
activism, are presented. 
6.4.   Politically opportune domestic targets increase the probability of single 
protest voting and multiple protest voting (coupling of protesting and voting), and 
decrease the likelihood of single protest non-voting and multiple protest non-voting. 
This mechanism works because such targets exert centripetal forces on insiders and 
outsiders and opportunities to increasingly adopt one another’s tactics. In the long 
run, Tarrow suggests these targets may increase the probability of decoupling 
outcomes or of multiple protest outcomes, if insiders are resocialized to become 
outsiders because they are radicalized by their shared activism experiences.   
6.5.   Using a similar causal mechanism, politically opportune international targets 
increase the probability of single protest voting and multiple protest voting (coupling 
of protesting and voting), and decrease the likelihood of single protest non-voting and 
multiple protest non-voting. Such targets again provide opportunities for insider-
outsider cooperation and tactical interchange.  Again, Tarrow suggests that in the long 
run, these targets may increase the probability of decoupling outcomes or of multiple 





6.6.   Globalization and related grievances do not increase or decrease the likelihood 
of these four participatory choices. What really drives these tactical choices is the 
presence of targets in the domestic and international opportunity space. 
6.7.   Domestic targets remain equally, if not more, important than international 
targets in accounting for the coupling of protesting and voting. 
The following propositions are based on my critiques of Tarrow’s internationalism.  
6.8.   Domestic targets may not be as important as internationalist targets in 
affecting participatory choices. 
6.9.   Targets are important in affecting participatory choices, but individuals’ 
support of movement-related grievances is equally if not more important. 
6.10.   Supporting movement-related grievances when domestic and international 
targets are present (an interaction effect already alluded to in Chapter 5), may lead to 
tactical choices running counter to Tarrow’s model (the decoupling of protesting and 
voting). 
6.11.    Having a politically opportune strong domestic target increases the 
probability of multiple protest voting and single protest voting (coupling outcomes), 
and decreases that of multiple protest non-voting and single protest non-voting. 
Having a strong domestic target (a government which has been actively supporting 
the U.S. stance on the War on Iraq), is likely to have provided an incentive to change 
state policy using electoral means. 
6.12.   Having a politically opportune strong internationalist target increases the 
probability of multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting (expansion to 




non-voting. Counter to Tarrow’s expectations, I suggest that the likelihood of 
multiple protest outcomes (not voting outcomes) will increase when strong 
internationalist targets are present. This effect occurs because an entire social 
movement (global justice/anti-globalization/alternate Europeanization) has emerged 
which is specialized in searching for internationalist targets such as MEI meetings, 
which they repeatedly target. In the immediate aftermath of the Battle of Seattle, 
international institutions whose meetings have been targeted by protesters include the 
ADB; EU; FTAA; G8; IMF; UN; WB; WEF; and WTO (Ayres 2004, 23; Buttel and 
Gould 2004, 49). Such targets draw a crowd of protesters who attend multiple 
protests and see multiple types of protest as interrelated. However, despite their 
identification of strong internationalist targets that lack electoral channels of 
accountability and thus merit protest, these individuals may have important domestic 
grievances and domestic targets which they address using conventional means, and 
thus the likelihood of voting (which is domestically focused) is not altered. 
Support of Movement-Related Grievances 
Several theories suggest that movement-related grievances are likely to be 
influential in individuals’ decision-making to pair protesting and voting or to combine 
multiple types of global protest.  U.S. hegemony or imperialism theories suggest that 
participatory choices may be distinguished by opposing military intervention in Iraq 
for its unilateralism as opposed to other scenarios that an intervention could have 
occurred (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2003; Lake 2006). Economic and world systems 
theories suggest the importance of linking opposition to war to opposition to 




democratic deficit arguments suggest that participatory patterns are strongly 
influenced by movement-related grievances concerning global democratic deficits, 
especially those linked to neoliberalism, because of the constrictions it places on 
political space, civil society space, and democracy, or those linked to U.S. hegemony, 
because of the constrictions it places on sovereignty, international law, and 
democratic principles (Brown 2003; Rodrik 2001; Ruggie 1982, 1991). The issue of 
Palestine, and its linkage to U.S. foreign policy, is also likely to be perceived as a 
pertinent global democratic deficit. 
Hence, I suggest that protesters’ support of movement-related grievances 
linked to the justification for the war in Iraq, globalization, U.S. hegemony, and 
perceptions of global democratic deficits are also likely to have robust explanatory 
value in accounting for the linkages between protesting and voting, and that their 
interaction with domestic and international targets should also be explored. Indeed, 
supporting a particular movement-related grievance seems, at times, to predict protest 
activity, tactical choices, and transnationalism (Bean 1991, 270, 271; Bédoyan, Van 
Aelst, and Walgrave 2004; Norris, Walgrave, and Van Aelst 2005).  The issue 
consensus on the movement-related grievance, the degree to which the issue has been 
agreed on by the movement and by the general public, also plays a role in 
determining the effect of having a grievance.  Bédoyan, Van Aelst, and Walgrave 
(2004, 48) find that foreign (transnational) demonstrators at protests targeting 
European Union Summits in Belgium differed in their support of movement-related 




I thus argue that the participatory effect of individual level support of 
movement-related grievances depends on the level of issue consensus reached within 
the social movement, the general population, and the polity on these issues. 
Opposition to unilateral intervention in Iraq, on which there is more issue consensus, 
can facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting.  Opposition to military 
intervention in Iraq in many different scenarios and all-encompassing opposition to 
globalization are grievances with more issue discord and can lead to extensive global 
protesting. Finally, supporting Palestine, on which there is a mixture of consensus and 
discord, can facilitate involvement in multiple protests and voting.  
An influential debate about the justification for war has emerged between 
insiders who feel that opposition to the war should just focus on its empire-seeking 
unilateralism and outsiders who feel a broader opposition to war in many different 
scenarios should be adopted. Many countries politicized the unilateral intervention in 
Iraq and actively opposed it, but would have supported intervention under a variety of 
other scenarios. Additionally, much of the global public did not feel that the global 
democratic system was functioning properly when President Bush proceeded with 
military intervention in Iraq without the support of the UN, but would have supported 
military intervention in a host of other scenarios. The issue consensus on opposing 
U.S. unilateralism in Iraq may have exerted centripetal forces on insiders and 
outsiders, facilitating the coupling of protesting and voting. 
There was much disagreement within the peace movement about the other 
cases in which intervention could be justified. All-encompassing opposition to 




whereas moderate insiders seem to adopt a particularistic opposition to war, and 
viewpoints on the justification for war account for dynamics in insider-outsider 
coalition-making and behavior. The more outsider ANSWER links an array of 
scenarios in which intervention is unjustified to U.S. imperialism and globalization, 
targeting the U.S. policy toward North Korea, Cuba, Haiti, Palestine, and Iraq. In 
contrast, the more insider UFPJ is also multi-issue oriented but maintains more focus 
on opposing and “ending the occupation” of Iraq, “to the exclusion of making some 
of these links” (Hany Khalil, personal communication, March 11, 2005). Moreover, 
UFPJ differs from ANSWER because it is not willing to make statements supporting 
authoritarian regimes that the U.S. government considers to be threats. According to 
Hany Khalil, Organizing Coordinator of UFPJ, one reason that UFPJ has not been 
willing to collaborate with ANSWER, is ANSWER’s framing of the Iraqi insurgency 
as another type of resistance to U.S. imperialism, part of its all-encompassing 
opposition to war.  
Thus, like the public and many governments, insiders and outsiders can agree 
on opposing war in cases of U.S. unilateralism without the UN, leading support for 
this movement standpoint to facilitate the pairing of protesting and voting. In contrast, 
opposition to war given other justifications for military intervention facilitates the 
extension of global protest, because of the issue discord on these grievances. Thus, 
several propositions follow: 
6.13.   Opposing a unilateral military intervention in Iraq without the UN, on which 
there is more issue consensus, increases the probability of multiple protest voting and 




protest non-voting and single protest non-voting. This effect occurs because the issue 
consensus on this movement-related grievance creates a political opportunity to 
effectively pair insider and outsider activism.  Hence, this issue leads people to see 
linkages between effecting social change via protesting and via mainstream political 
behavior such as voting. However, it does not necessarily turn protesters away from 
demonstrating either, because other movement-related grievances are only pursued on 
the streets. Hence, the likelihood of voting outcomes increases. 
6.14.   Opposing movement-related grievances such as military intervention in Iraq 
under other circumstances, on which there is more issue discord,  increases the 
probability of multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting (expansion to 
multiple global protests), and decreases that of single protest voting and single protest 
non-voting. This effect occurs because the issue discord on such grievances creates 
political opportunities for effecting change via global protesting, as the level of issue 
discord makes it unlikely that insider activism will be effective.  However, such 
grievances do not necessarily turn protesters away from insider activism, because 
there are other issues that movements support which have more issue consensus and 
do make their way through conventional channels of access and thus merit political 
engagement. Thus, the likelihood of multiple protest outcomes increases. 
The degree to which opposition to globalization is all-encompassing or 
particularistic may also account for the coupling or decoupling of protest and voting. 
Most advanced industrialized democracies have adopted neoliberal models of 
globalization. Additionally, the general public tends to see many aspects of 




employment are quite salient in some countries, and many acknowledge that countries 
in the core benefit from it disproportionately compared to the periphery.  Likewise, 
competing visions of the globalization problematique characterize competing frames 
used to mobilize the anti-globalization movement. Activists disagree about whether 
economic or political targets should be selected; whether a personal, domestic, or 
global focus should be applied; and whether economic, political, cultural, or multiple 
frames should be applied (Rosenkrands 2004, 64-5, 70). Many seem to take a broad 
view of grievances concerning globalization, though economic and political 
detriments of globalization are prioritized, and cultural issues of homogenization are 
not (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 110-1). Competing explanations of the 
globalization problematique, therefore, range from those that are focused on a single 
sphere of globalization-related problems (e.g., economic, cultural, or political; 
individual, domestic, or global) to those that are more paradigmatic and all-
encompassing.  
All-encompassing opposition to globalization seems to be characterized by an 
issue discord which splits outsiders from insiders and predicts the decoupling of 
protesting and voting. In contrast, opposing a limited number of aspects of 
globalization is likely to facilitate cooperation between outsiders and insiders who are 
thus able to agree on broad transversal frames. Reforms to the new international 
economic order are sought by both camps, with some outsiders favoring the abolition 
of all international institutions and some insiders reorienting (and retreating) to 
become more reformist (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 102). Thus, since the Battle 




globalization and others have tried to reframe the movement, promoting reforms and 
a vision of an alternate globalization, resulting in prognostic versus diagnostic 
framing divides, and certainly a good share of conflict (Ayres 2004; Buttel and Gould 
2004, 50; Van Aelst and Walgrave 2004, 113). 
6.15.   Opposing many facets of globalization, a movement-related grievance on 
which there is issue discord, increases the probability of multiple protest voting and 
multiple protest non-voting (expansion to multiple global protests), and decreases that 
of single protest voting and single protest non-voting. This effect occurs because the 
issue discord on such grievances creates political opportunities for effecting change 
via global protesting, as the level of issue discord makes it unlikely that insider 
activism will be effective.  However, such grievances do not necessarily turn 
protesters away from insider activism, because there are other issues that movements 
support which have more issue consensus and do make their way through 
conventional channels of access, and thus merit political engagement. Thus, the 
likelihood of multiple protest outcomes increases. 
Support for Palestine may also touch on perceptions of a global democratic 
deficit and distinguish participatory choices of protesters. Given the historic ties 
between Israel and the United States, the issue of Palestine is highly politicized in the 
United States.  In terms of public opinion, Americans are much more supportive of 
the Israelis than the Palestinians, whereas Europeans tend to be more supportive of 
the Palestinians than the Israelis.   
Within the global anti-war and anti-globalization movements, the issue of 




globalization movement that continued to protest in the aftermath of September 11 
also held a demonstration during the protests targeting the Spring 2002 WB/IMF 
meetings, in which they tried to highlight the plight of Palestinians and not the 
problems of globalization. There was little collaboration between the organizers 
trying to refocus the protests on the Israeli incursions into Palestine and the 
organizers focused on Third World debt reduction (Soren Ambrose, personal 
communication, February 16, 2005 and March 11, 2005; Brian Becker, personal 
communication, March 9, 2005).  
Palestine also became a key issue of contention in the anti-war movement. 
ANSWER was engaged in an ongoing debate with insider factions in the anti-war 
movement about whether Palestine should be prioritized as much as the military 
intervention in Iraq. According to Brian Becker, the National Coordinator of the 
ANSWER coalition, Palestine prevented American protest coalitions from 
successfully collaborating on protests on several occasions (although attempts were 
continuously made to cooperate). Becker asserts that ANSWER was “demonized for 
being with the Palestinians.” In the United States, insiders were reluctant to prioritize 
Palestine as much as Iraq, whereas outsiders wanted to attend to both issues equally 
and view them as interrelated democratic deficits. 
6.16.   Supporting Palestine, on which there is much discord but on which in some 
contexts there is more consensus, increases the probability of multiple protest voting. 
The issue of Palestine is a bit different than the other movement-related grievances 
mentioned earlier. It is very strongly politicized in the United States, where the Israeli 




more support for the Palestinian side.  Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 4, political 
contexts vary in terms of how divisive the issue of Palestine has been in the anti-war 
movement.  Hence, in both Europe and the United States, there is a mix of consensus 
and discord and a varied politicization of the issue of Palestine.  Supporting Palestine 
may thus increase the likelihood of multiple protest voting. 
Additionally, I suggest the following interaction effects between opposing 
U.S. unilateralism and the presence of domestic and international targets. 
6.17.   Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq in “Coalition of the Willing” states that 
have clearly endorsed such unilateralism, increases the probability of multiple protest 
non-voting and single protest non-voting (decoupling of protesting and voting), and 
decreases that of multiple protest voting and single protest voting, since protest 
appears more likely than voting to yield substantive policy change and policy change 
abroad is perceived as a more feasible goal. 
6.18.   Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq in places where additional internationalist 
targets are provided by MEI meetings, increases the probability of multiple protest 
voting, heightening the effect of each factor alone. 
Results 
A multinomial logistic regression model was applied in analyzing the 
interaction of voting and global protesting.  The dependent variable is the product of 
the interaction of two dummy variables:  recent voting and participation in multiple 
types of global protests.  Recent voting indicates respondents who voted in the most 
recent parliamentary or presidential election.  Multiple global protesting indicates 




one of these types of global protests.  Hence, there are four categories of the 
dependent variable, which are not ordered: 
• Single protest voting:  A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has 
participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (voting and one type 
of global protest). 
• Multiple protest voting:  A respondent who has voted in a recent election and has 
participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (voting and two types 
of global protest). 
• Single protest non-voting:  A respondent who has not voted in a recent election 
but has participated in either anti-globalization or anti-war protests (non-voting 
and one type of global protest). 
• Multiple protest non-voting:  A respondent who has not voted in a recent election 
but has participated in both anti-globalization and anti-war protests (non-voting 
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Table 6.1 shows that the distribution of the respondents across the four 
participatory outcomes assessed by the dependent variable, from most to least 
popular, is: multiple protest voting (46%), single protest voting (25%), multiple 
protest non-voting (16%), and single protest non-voting (13%). It is noteworthy that 
the majority of protesters are indeed coupling protesting and voting (multiple protest 
voting and single protest voting).  Far fewer are decoupling protesting and voting 
(multiple protest non-voting and single protest non-voting).  It is also striking that 
many are involved in multiple types of global protesting (multiple protest voting and 
multiple protest non-voting).   
A multinomial model is appropriate as the categories are unordered for this 
dependent variable.  Likelihood Ratio and Wald Tests conducted after the 
multinomial logistic regression reveal that the four outcome categories are indeed 
distinguishable and should not be combined.  Further, the Hausman test of the 
interdependence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) suggests that the IIA assumption is 
not violated.  Thus, the multinomial logistic regression model is preferable to 
multinomial probit.  Likelihood Ratio and Wald Tests were conducted to test whether 
each variable has a significant effect on the participatory outcomes, and only 
variables with statistically significant or marginally significant effects were included 
in the final analysis.  
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the multinomial logit 
model of the interaction of voting and global protesting are presented in Table 6.2.  
Because I estimate a multinomial logit model, I can consider only three of the four 




base category because I am more concerned with why people couple protesting and 
voting and why people expand their involvement to multiple types of global protests.  
Using multinomial logit, equations are estimated for three of the four participatory 
outcomes, using a common set of explanatory factors.  Comparisons of the 
coefficients and effects of the regressors are indicative of differences between one of 
the participatory outcomes and the base category (single protest non-voting).  One-
tailed tests of significance are used because directional hypotheses about the 
interaction of global protesting and voting are being tested.    
 
 Dependent Variable  







Independent Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 




0.690 1.233** 0.701 0.831 0.889 
M.E.I. Meeting Protest Location 1.629** 0.784 1.948*** 0.785 2.731*** 0.921 
Opposing U.S. Unilateralism 
(Military Intervention without the 
UN) 
2.824**** 0.811 2.441**** 0.801 1.736** 1.032 
Number of Scenarios Military 
Intervention is Unjustified 
0.110 0.147 0.314*** 0.144 0.604**** 0.158 
Number of Aspects of Globalization 
that are Bad 
0.328*** 0.144 0.531**** 0.143 0.548**** 0.158 
Supporting the Palestinians More 0.416 0.372 0.862*** 0.371 0.394 0.411 
Interaction of Opposing U.S. 
Unilateralism and Coalition of the 
Willing 
-1.839** 0.859 -1.769** 0.861 -0.497 1.035 
Interaction of Opposing U.S. 
Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting 
-1.002 0.989 0.235 0.973 -2.048** 1.114 
Being born 1979 or Later (Youth 
During Battle of Seattle and Anti-
War Movement) 
-0.574* 0.359 -0.225 0.358  1.493**** 0.407 
Some University Education or 
Completed University Education 
 1.343**** 0.354  1.708**** 0.361  0.336 0.398 
Constant -2.806**** 0.652 -3.482**** 0.677 -4.368**** 0.914 
n = 586 
-2 * Log Likelihood = 1136.168 
Model χ2 =  342.90**** 
Table 6.2: Multinomial Logistic Regression Coefficients (and Standard Errors) 
Note:  Coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates.  Base category for the analysis is single protest 




Since multinomial logit coefficients cannot be directly interpreted, Table 6.3 
presents additional results concerning the discrete changes in predicted probabilities 
that are easier to interpret.  The discrete changes in the predicted probabilities of the 
four participatory outcomes are reported, as each independent variable changes from 
its minimum to its maximum and other variables are held constant at their means.  
The results of Likelihood Ratio and Wald Tests of the effects of each variable are also 
presented, most of which were marginally or statistically significant. 
 
 Tests of the effects of each 
variable, which test the 
hypothesis that all 
coefficients associated with 
a particular variable are 
simultaneously equal to 0. 
Discrete Changes in the Predicted 
Probability as each Regressor 
Changes from its Minimum to Its 
Maximum, Holding Other Variables 
Constant at their Means. 



















Coalition of the Willing Protest 
Location 
6.797* 6.165 0.118 0.022 -0.048 -0.093 
M.E.I. Meeting Protest Location 11.904*** 9.875** -0.062 0.043 0.124 -0.104 
Opposing U.S. Unilateralism 
(Military Intervention without the 
UN) 
15.375*** 13.735*** 0.166 0.171 -0.043 -0.294 
Number of Scenarios Military 
Intervention is Unjustified 
27.321**** 25.411**** -0.180 0.063 0.184 -0.067 
Number of Aspects of 
Globalization that are Bad 
18.751**** 17.405**** -0.123 0.182 0.053 -0.112 
Supporting the Palestinians More 7.668* 7.545* -0.057 0.126 -0.029 -0.040 
Interaction of Opposing U.S. 
Unilateralism and Coalition of the 
Willing 
6.931* 6.555* -0.091 -0.132 0.126 0.097 
Interaction of Opposing U.S. 
Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting 
8.421** 8.119** -0.161 0.311 -0.171 0.021 
Being born 1979 or Later (Youth 
During Battle of Seattle and Anti-
War Movement) 
48.322**** 42.555**** -0.142 -0.098 0.239 0.001 
Some University Education or 
Completed University Education 
37.046**** 35.469**** 0.021 0.212 -0.134 -0.099 
Table 6.3: Discrete Changes in Predicted Probabilities Over Range of a Variable 





In the following subsections, I present the findings for each of the independent 
variables.  Variables assessing targets and grievances are explored first, followed by 
variables assessing the interaction of targets and grievances.  After briefly reviewing 
the operationalization of explanatory factors, I explain their strength as predictors 
across the three equations in the multinomial logistic regression.  Next, I explain how 
they are associated with trends in the predicted probabilities of the four participatory 
outcomes.  Each section concludes with graphs that plot changes in the predicted 
probabilities of each of the regressand’s outcomes, for the key regressors.  
The results confirm the importance of both strong domestic targets (“Coalition 
of the Willing” states) and opposing U.S. unilateralism in accounting for an increase 
in the predicted probabilities of both “coupling” outcomes pairing protesting and 
voting.  However, opposing U.S. unilateralism in countries that joined the “Coalition 
of the Willing” seems to facilitate an increase in the predicted probabilities of both 
“decoupling” outcomes.  These results suggest that Spanish success in getting 
protesters to couple their protesting and voting is the exception and not the rule in 
“Coalition of the Willing” countries.  In the conclusion, I will discuss the results in 
light of the divergent post-war electoral changes presented at the beginning of the 
chapter.  I also suggest that more research exploring demonstrators’ prospective 
voting and protesting is needed to test the impact of targets and grievances. 
Domestic and International Targets 
First, the impact of domestic versus international targets is explored.  
“Coalition of the Willing Protest Location” is a dummy variable that indicates 




countries all had a strong domestic target due to their pro-war stance.  In contrast, 
protesters surveyed in Belgium, Germany, and France lacked such a strong domestic 
target.  In the multinomial logistic regression, being surveyed at a “Coalition of the 
Willing” protest location is a strong predictor in the equations for single protest 
voting and multiple protest voting.  It is associated with increases in the predicted 
probabilities of both of the coupling outcomes that pair protesting and voting.  The 
predicted probability of single protest voting is 0.118 higher and the predicted 
probability of multiple protest voting is 0.022 higher, for protesters surveyed at a 
“Coalition of the Willing” protest location.    
“M.E.I. Meeting Protest Location” is a dummy variable created to indicate 
respondents who were surveyed at a protest during an international institutional 
meeting.  These meetings include the Spring 2004 WB/IMF Meeting in Washington, 
DC and the 2003 Munich Conference on Security Policy involving N.A.T.O. member 
states.  Protesters surveyed at a M.E.I. meeting had an additional international target 
available. Protesting at a M.E.I. Meeting was a strong predictor across all three 
equations and is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of both of the 
multiple protest outcomes.  Protesting at a M.E.I. Meeting, the predicted probability 
of multiple protest voting increases by 0.043 and the predicted probability of multiple 
protest non-voting increases by 0.124.    
Figure 6.1 summarizes these trends in the predicted probabilities of domestic 
and international targets.  Having a politically opportune domestic target (“Coalition 
of the Willing” membership) increases the probability of multiple protest voting and 




politically opportune international target (a M.E.I. meeting) increases the probability 
of multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting (extending global protest 
involvement). While domestic targets indeed appear to facilitate the coupling of 
protesting and voting, internationalist targets facilitate the expansion to multiple 
forms of global protest.  
 
Figure 6.1: Targets 
Movement-Related Grievances 
Next, the impact of movement-related grievances is investigated.  “Opposing 
U.S. Unilateralism (Military Intervention without the UN)” is a dummy variable 
created to indicate respondents who classify intervention in Iraq without the UN as 
“absolutely unjustified.”  In the multinomial logistic regression, opposing U.S. 
unilateralism is a strong predictor across all three equations and is associated with 
increases in the predicted probabilities of coupling outcomes (pairing protesting and 
voting).  Opposing U.S.unilateralism, the predicted probability of single protest 
voting increases by 0.166 and the predicted probability of multiple protest voting 




“Number of Scenarios Military Intervention is Unjustified” is a count of the 
number of other scenarios in which a respondent classifies intervention in Iraq as 
“absolutely unjustified.”  The alternate four scenarios represent other possible cases 
for intervention: the Iraqi regime does not cooperate with UN inspectors; the UN 
discovers weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; Iraq threatens other countries in the 
region; and the UN Security Council decides on a military intervention.  The number 
of scenarios in which respondents classify intervention as absolutely unjustified, is a 
strong predictor in the equations for multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-
voting.  All-encompassing opposition to war is associated with increases in the 
predicted probabilities of multiple protest outcomes (extending global protest 
involvement).  The predicted probability of multiple protest voting is 0.063 higher 
and the predicted probability of multiple protest non-voting is 0.184 higher, for 
protesters who classified military intervention in all four other scenarios as absolutely 
unjustified than for those who classify none as absolutely unjustified.   
“Number of aspects of globalization that are bad” is a count variable summing 
the number of spheres a respondent deems globalization to have a “bad” impact.  
Four areas impacted by globalization are assessed:  their country's economy; 
providing jobs and strengthening the economy in poor countries; maintaining cultural 
diversity in the world; and their own standard of living.  The number of aspects of 
globalization that respondents classify as bad was a strong predictor across all three 
equations in the multinomial logistic regression.  All-encompassing opposition to 
globalization is associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of multiple 




of multiple protest voting is 0.182 higher and the predicted probability of multiple 
protest non-voting is 0.053 higher, for protesters who classify all four aspects of 
globalization as bad than for those who classify none as bad. 
“Supporting the Palestinians more” is a dummy variable which indicates 
sympathizing more with the Palestinians than with the Israelis, with neither group, or 
with both groups.  In the multinomial logistic regression, supporting the Palestinians 
more is a strong predictor in the equation for multiple protest voting and is associated 
with increases in the predicted probability of the multiple protest voting outcome.  
The predicted probability of multiple protest voting is 0.126 higher for protesters who 
support the Palestinians more. 
Figure 6.2 sums up these trends.  Opposing unilateral military intervention in 
Iraq without the UN, on which there is more issue consensus, increases the 
probability of multiple protest voting and single protest voting (the coupling of 
protesting and voting). In contrast, movement-related grievances with more issue 
discord seem to be associated with an expansion to multiple global protest 
involvement.  Opposing military intervention in Iraq under other circumstances 
increases the probability of multiple protest voting and multiple protest non-voting 
(extending global protest involvement). Likewise, opposing many facets of 
globalization increases the probability of multiple protest voting and multiple protest 
non-voting (extending global protest involvement). Finally, supporting the 
Palestinians, a grievance with mixed consensus and discord, increases the probability 
of multiple protest voting. Supporting movement-related grievances clearly seems 






Figure 6.2: Support for Movement-Related Grievances 
Interactions of Targets and Grievances 
Next, the impact of interactions between targets and grievances are explored.  
Only the interaction effects between opposing U.S. unilateral intervention and the 
presence of domestic and international targets were statistically or marginally 
significant and included in the final analysis. Interaction effects including other 




“Interaction of opposing U.S. unilateralism and Coalition of the Willing” is a 
dummy variable indicating a respondent deems U.S. unilateralism in Iraq “absolutely 
unjustified” and was also surveyed in a “Coalition of the Willing” country.  In other 
words, it assesses having grievances about U.S. unilateralism while facing a domestic 
government that is already endorsing such unilateralism.  In the multinomial logistic 
regression, opposing U.S. unilateralism in “Coalition of the Willing” states is a strong 
predictor in the equations for single protest voting and multiple protest voting.  It is 
associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of decoupling outcomes (not 
pairing protesting with voting).  Classifying U.S. unilateralism as absolutely 
unjustified in a “Coalition of the Willing” protest venue, the predicted probability of 
multiple protest non-voting increases by 0.126 and the predicted probability of single 
protest non-voting increases by 0.097.  
“Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting” is a dummy 
variable indicating a respondent deems U.S. unilateralism in Iraq “absolutely 
unjustified” and was surveyed at a protest where a M.E.I. Meeting was being held.  In 
other words, it assesses having grievances about U.S. unilateralism while facing an 
additional institutional target that is often perceived as tied to such unilateralism.  
Opposing U.S. unilateralism at M.E.I. Meeting protest locations was a strong 
predictor in the equation for multiple protest non-voting.  It is associated with 
increases in the predicted probabilities of multiple protest voting and to a lesser 
degree, of single protest non-voting.  Classifying U.S. unilateralism as absolutely 
unjustified at a M.E.I. Meeting protest location, the predicted probability of multiple 




voting increases by 0.021.  The relatively small increase in the discrete change of 
single protest non-voting is unexpected. 
Figure 6.3 illustrates these trends.  Opposing U.S. unilateralism in countries 
that joined the “Coalition of the Willing” may lead to tactical choices that run counter 
to Tarrow’s model, increasing the probability of multiple protest non-voting and 
single protest non-voting (decoupling protest and voting). Opposing U.S. 
unilateralism, paired with the presence of a MEI meeting, increases the probability of 
multiple protest voting and to a small degree the probability of single protest non-
voting. 
  
Figure 6.3: Interaction of Opposing U.S. Unilateralism and Targets 
Demographics 
The country location and type of protest at which respondents were surveyed 
were not significant, and thus were not included in the final analysis.  Factors such as 
class and income that are often important participatory predictors were omitted from 




However, being born in 1979 or later (being 24 or younger during the 2003 
anti-war movement and 20 or younger during the Battle of Seattle protests against the 
W.T.O. in 1999) was a significant predictor and was included in the final analysis.  In 
the multinomial logistic regression, being born in 1979 or later is a strong predictor in 
the equation for multiple protest non-voting.  It is associated with increases in the 
predicted probabilities of decoupling outcomes (not pairing protesting with voting).  
Being born 1979 or later, the predicted probability of multiple protest non-voting 
increases by 0.239 and the predicted probability of single protest non-voting increases 
by 0.001. 
Likewise, having attended some university or completed university with a 
degree was a statistically significant predictor of participatory choices and was 
controlled for in the final analysis.  In the multinomial logistic regression, having 
some university education or having completed university education is a strong 
predictor in the equations for single protest voting and multiple protest voting.  It is 
associated with increases in the predicted probabilities of coupling outcomes (pairing 
protesting and voting).  The predicted probability of single protest voting is 0.021 
higher and the predicted probability of multiple protest voting is 0.212 higher, for 
protesters who had some university education or completed university education. 
Table 6.4 summarizes the results obtained regarding each of the propositions.  Most 
protesters are indeed coupling protesting and voting, confirming proposition 6.1.  
Very few are in fact decoupling protesting and voting, disconfirming proposition 6.2.  
Additionally, many protesters are expanding their involvement in global protests to 




targets and movement-related grievances concerning U.S. unilateralism seem to drive 
the coupling of protesting and voting.  Conversely, the interaction of these factors is 
what appears to elicit the decoupling of protesting and voting. 
Proposition Independent Variable 













Expansion to Multiple 
Global Protests 
Y 
6.4 Coalition of the Willing 
Coupling of Protesting and 
Voting 
Y 
6.5 M.E.I. Meeting 
Coupling of Protesting and 
Voting 
N 
6.6 Globalization and related grievances No effect N 
6.7 
Primacy of Coalition of the Willing over 
M.E.I. Meeting 




Primacy of M.E.I. Meeting over 
Coalition of the Willing 
Participatory choices N 
6.9 Support of movement-related grievances Participatory choices Y 
6.10 
Interaction of support of movement-
related grievances the presence of a 
target 
Tactical Choices Counter 
to Tarrow’s Model (i.e., 
Decoupling of Protesting 
and Voting) 
Y 
6.11 Coalition of the Willing 
Coupling of Protesting and 
Voting 
Y 
6.12 M.E.I. Meeting 




Opposing U.S. Unilateralism (Military 
Intervention in Iraq without UN) 




Number of Scenarios Military 
Intervention is Unjustified 




Number of Aspects of Globalization that 
are Bad 
Expansion to Multiple 
Global Protests 
Y 
6.16 Supporting the Palestinians more Multiple Protest Voting Y 
6.17 
Interaction of Opposing U.S. 
Unilateralism and Coalition of the 
Willing 




Interaction of Opposing U.S. 
Unilateralism and M.E.I. Meeting 
Multiple Protest Voting Y 





Domestic and international targets seem to exert distinct participatory effects.  
The presence of domestic targets in “Coalition of the Willing” states does indeed 
appear to elicit the coupling of protesting and voting, confirming propositions 6.4 and 
6.11.  However, international targets such as a M.E.I. Meeting do not appear to 
facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting, disconfirming proposition 6.5.  
Rather, the evidence suggests that international targets elicit involvement in multiple 
types of global protests, confirming proposition 6.12.  Domestic targets appear to be 
more important than international targets in accounting for the coupling of protesting 
and voting, but both factors are important in accounting for participatory choices, 
confirming proposition 6.7 but disconfirming proposition 6.8.   
Moreover, the results confirm that movement-related grievances also are 
important in accounting for participatory choices, disconfirming proposition 6.6 and 
confirming proposition 6.9.  Opposing U.S. unilateralism, a grievance on which there 
is more issue consensus, appears to facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting, 
confirming proposition 6.13.  Grievances with more issue discord, such as opposing 
military intervention in many scenarios and opposing many aspects of globalization, 
appear to elicit involvement in multiple types of global protest, confirming 
propositions 6.14 and 6.15.  Finally, supporting the Palestinians more, on which there 
is a mixture of consensus and discord in different contexts, appears to facilitate 
multiple protest voting, confirming proposition 6.16. 
The interactions between targets and movement-related grievances exert 
distinct effects.  The only key variable that appears to facilitate the decoupling of 




are protesting in a country that has already supported the “Coalition of the Willing,” 
confirming propositions 6.10 and 6.17.  Opposing U.S. unilateralism at protest venues 
where M.E.I. Meetings were occurring has mixed results.  There is a slight increase in 
the predicted probability of single protest non-voting.  However, the biggest effect 
seen is on the increased predicted probability of multiple protest voting, offering 
some confirmation of proposition 6.18.   
Which factors account for the coupling and decoupling of protesting and 
voting?  Both domestic targets and support of movement-related grievances with 
issue consensus seem to have the power to unite insider activism and outsider 
activism.  The domestic targets in “Coalition of the Willing” states indeed facilitate 
linkages between voting and global protesting.  Likewise, opposing U.S. military 
intervention in Iraq without the UN, on which there is issue consensus, seems to 
facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting.   However, opposing U.S. 
unilateralism in “Coalition of the Willing” states that have already taken a stance 
supporting such unilateralism may in fact lead to the decoupling of protesting and 
voting.  Demographically, we also see that education is associated with coupling and 
youth is associated with decoupling. 
Further, several factors appear to bring about an expansion to multiple types 
of global protest.  The presence of international targets via international institution 
meetings may elicit involvement in multiple types of global protests.  Opposition to 
war in many scenarios and all-encompassing opposition to globalization, on which 




Two key factors appear to be associated with multiple protest voting.  
Supporting Palestine, which has a mixture of issue consensus and discord in different 
contexts, facilitates multiple protest voting.  Also, opposing U.S. unilateralism in 
protests at M.E.I. Meetings especially facilitates multiple protest voting.  
What do these findings tell us about the coupling of voting and protesting, and 
the extension of global protest today?  Overall, they suggest some optimism is 
warranted about changes in participatory democracy. Most global protesters are 
pairing global protests with voting, and many are active in multiple forms of global 
protests.  Both domestic targets and movement-related grievances with issue 
consensus appear to facilitate the coupling of protesting and voting, while their 
interaction appears tied to the decoupling of protesting and voting.  The effect of 
supporting movement-related grievances depends on the issue consensus or discord 
on the issue.  Issue consensus may create an opportunity structure in which protesters 
expect insider activism to be efficacious and choose to couple protesting with voting.  
Issue discord may create an opportunity structure in which protesters expect multiple 
types of global protesting to be more efficacious. 
However, there may be limitations to the generalizability of these findings 
because respondents were asked retrospectively about their voting and their 
protesting.  Additional research is needed about demonstrators’ prospective voting 
and protesting.  It is important that this research is sensitive to domestic targets and 
movement-related grievances, as well as to dynamics in these factors.  Further, it is 
worthwhile investigating whether states in the “Coalition of the Willing” vary in how 




At the beginning of this chapter, post-war electoral changes in the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Spain were compared.  Domestic targets are 
present in all three cases, with the domestic government indicating its support of U.S. 
unilateralism.  As this chapter indicated, opposing U.S. unilateralism in “Coalition of 
the Willing” states can in fact lead to the decoupling of protesting and voting.   
Of these cases, Spain is the outlier, as protesters there decided to couple their 
protesting and voting, with tremendous success.  What distinguishes Spain is the 
tremendous issue consensus in the public and in the anti-war movement on opposing 
unilateralism in Iraq.  Also, in Spain, there was a leftist opposition party allied with 
the anti-war movement.  The PSOE was responsive to grievances about the 
intervention, and stood a chance of mobilizing enough electoral support to result in a 
change in the government.  Thus, issue consensus and expectations regarding the 
feasibility of electoral change may have created an opportunity structure in which 
protesters expected insider activism to be efficacious.  Opposing U.S. unilateralism in 
this context may have encouraged them to couple protesting and voting successfully. 
In contrast, in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, there was more 
public support for a military intervention in Iraq across a host of scenarios.  Thus, 
there was more issue discord between the movement and the public.  There were 
some parties with movement-ties that were responsive to movement-related 
grievances. However, these parties did not stand much of a chance of mobilizing 
enough support to result in a change of government and a shift in policy-making.  
Opposing U.S. unilateralism in a country that has already joined the “Coalition of the 






Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I contrast the impact of domestic and international targets 
and of movement-related grievances on insiders and outsiders and on insider activism 
and outsider activism in the transnational protest movement opposing the war in Iraq.  
Tarrow’s domestic and international targets seem to exert some centripetal forces on 
insiders and outsiders.  Further, I suggest movement-related grievances exert both 
centripetal and centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders.  Whether there is issue 
consensus or discord on these grievances in the movement and in the public, 
determines the type of impact they have on insiders and outsiders. 
Opposing U.S. unilateralism in Iraq in defiance of the United Nations, on 
which there is issue consensus, exerts a centripetal force on insiders and outsiders, 
facilitating insider-outsider cooperation in anti-war coalitions, successful 
transnational protest events drawing in both insiders and outsiders, and the coupling 
of insider tactics such as voting and outsider tactics such as protesting.  By uniting 
insiders and outsiders, opportunistic parties of the opposition and of the left can learn 
how to appeal to shared grievances, and protesters are given opportunities to learn 
about the possibilities to pair insider and outsider activism and which parties to 
reward if they do decide to couple protesting and voting.  In contrast, opposing war in 
all cases, opposition to globalization, and support of Palestine are movement-related 
grievances with more issue discord, and thus these grievances facilitate insider-
outsider conflict and participatory choices favoring an expansion to multiple forms of 
global protest.  After exploring the meso-, macro-, and micro-level results, and how 




the implications for the remobilization of transnational protesters as voters in post-
war elections. 
 At the meso-organizing level, insider-outsider cooperation varied 
tremendously across the three cases, which all shared strong domestic targets but 
varied in the party-system and electoral context.  Cooperation was strongest in the 
United Kingdom, and conflict was the strongest in the United States, while the 
Netherlands fluctuated between conflict and cooperation.  The dynamics in 
cooperation and conflict were not accounted for by the presence of domestic targets, 
which were held constant across the cases and which organizers did not indicate was 
a source of the variation.  Hence, this evidence disconfirms proposition 2.1, 
suggesting targets are not as important in accounting for insider-outsider cooperation.   
Rather, what seems to have been important in accounting for instances of 
cooperation and conflict were movement-related grievances and debates about how to 
frame them, given issue consensus or discord.  The evidence confirms proposition 
2.7, suggesting that movement-related grievances are important in accounting for 
insider-outsider cooperation and conflict.  Additionally, the party-system and 
electoral context may also play some role in accounting for insider-outsider conflict 
and cooperation, with cooperation characterizing moderate multi-partyism and 
conflict differentiating moderate two-partyism.  A mixture of conflict and cooperation 
seems to be facilitated by polarized multi-partyism, with conflict particularly likely 
close to elections and coalition negotiations, and cooperation assisted by the large 




 At the macro-event level, transnational protest events occurred throughout the 
European Union, but the most mobilized protests and the protests involving rainbow 
coalitions that drew in important insiders and outsiders, seem to have been more 
common in the EU-15 than in the CEE states.  However, there were many 
commonalities in the protests across the EU, especially in the perceptions of similar 
domestic and international targets as well as in the perceptions of similar domestic 
and international grievances, confirming propositions 2.2 and 2.8.   
Although protest mobilization in the EU-15 is somewhat accounted for by the 
presence of domestic targets, there are many exceptions.  The high mobilization and 
success in mobilizing insiders and outsiders in the EU-15 vis-à-vis CEE protests are 
certainly not accounted for by targets, which were present throughout the CEE states 
but not in many EU-15 states.  However, the most mobilized protests in the EU-15 
had strong domestic targets.  Mixed evidence is thus found regarding proposition 2.3, 
suggesting that targets may have limited influence on the successful mobilization of 
transnational protesters into broad rainbow coalitions.   
Movement-related grievances may do a better job in accounting for some of 
the mobilization differences between the EU-15 and the CEE states.  Some weak 
supportive evidence is found concerning proposition 2.9, that issue consensus on 
movement-related grievances is tied to movement success in mobilizing transnational 
protesters into broad rainbow coalitions.  Additionally, divergences in the history of 
participation, protest, and civil society and in the Europeanization of civil society in 
the CEE states relative to the EU-15; historic advantages in the emergence of civil 




pathways of CEE states outside East-Central Europe, appear to be very important in 
accounting for the variation within and between the CEE states and the EU-15. 
 At the micro-individual level, the coupling of protesting and voting is the 
norm, but participation in multiple types of global protesting is also very popular.  
Hence, more exploration is warranted concerning the factors that exert centripetal and 
centrifugal forces on insiders and outsiders as well as concerning the implications of 
linkages between insider and outsider activism for remobilizing activists in 
subsequent elections.  Having a politically opportune domestic target indeed increases 
the probability of coupling protesting and voting, confirming proposition 2.4.  
However, opposing U.S. unilateralism, a movement-related grievance with issue 
consensus, also increases the probability of coupling protesting and voting, 
confirming proposition 2.10.  However, opposing U.S. unilateralism in a country that 
joined the “Coalition of the Willing” increases the probability of decoupling 
protesting and voting.  Also noteworthy are the centrifugal impacts that movement-
related grievances with issue discord, all-encompassing opposition to war and to 
globalization, can exert on insider and outsider activism, increasing the probability of 
expansion to multiple global protests, confirming proposition 2.10.   
 Thus, overall, targets found no support at the meso-organizing level, some 
support at the macro-event level, and strong support at the micro-individual level.  
However, movement-related grievances found considerable support at the meso-
organizing level, weak support at the macro-event level, and substantial support at the 
micro-individual level.  This evidence suggests that movement-related grievances are 




Hence, it disconfirms proposition 2.5 which suggests that grievances are not 
important in accounting for ties between insider and outsider activism.  Rather, the 
results offer some support for proposition 2.11, suggesting that movement-related 
grievances are more important than the presence of domestic and international targets 
in accounting for the dynamics between insiders and outsiders.   
Additionally, domestic targets do not appear to trump international targets, but 
rather may yield different participatory effects, as was seen very clearly at the micro-
individual level.  However, in accounting for coupling of protesting and voting, 
domestic targets are indeed more important.  Mixed evidence is thus found 
concerning proposition 2.6, which suggests the primacy of domestic over 
international targets.  International grievances and targets appear to be equally if not 
more important than domestic grievances and targets, in accounting for dynamics 
between insiders and outsiders at the meso-organizing level and macro-event level.  
However, at the micro-level, domestic targets and international grievances are both 
important in accounting for the coupling of insider activism and outsider activism.  
Hence, there is some limited confirmation concerning proposition 2.12 which 
suggests that international targets and grievances have primacy over domestic ones.   
These findings suggest that transnational anti-war protest is becoming more 
globalized and is no longer as domesticated.  Movement-related grievances with issue 
consensus thus have the potential to remobilize protesters who are partaking in 
increasingly globalized collective action as voters in national elections, a question to 
which I now turn.  How well do transnational social movements provide inroads for 




coupling these tactics, and providing electoral dividends to parties of the opposition 















































































































Table 7.1: Protest Mobilization and Post-War Electoral Outcomes  
 
Note:  This table compiles information from two dozen sources.26  
                                                 
26 ABC web site, British Broadcasting Corporation. 2003. Spanish daily says four million attended 
anti-war marches in Spain. February 16.; Associated Press. 2003. San Francisco adds 100,000 
voices to weekend anti-war demonstrations: Chinese new year's parade pushed protest to yesterday. 
February 17, News, A7.; Associated Press-Canadian Press. 2003. Millions march for peace; from 
Montreal to Madrid, huge crowds take to the street in global outpouring of feeling against U.S. 
push for war on Iraq. February 17, Front, A5.; Birmingham Post. 2003. Comment:  Marchers seek 
better way than Iraq war; the peace process:  Millions send a message to Blair and Bush.  February 
17, News,1.; Chrisafis, Angelique, David Fickling, Jon Henley, John Hooper, Giles Tremlett, 
Sophie Arie, and Chris McGreal. 2003. Threat of war: Millions worldwide rally for peace: Protests: 




Countries vary significantly in the extent to which opposition parties linked to 
the anti-war movement succeeded in achieving turnout increases. Table 7.1 
summarizes post-movement electoral effects for parties allied to the anti-war 
movement in six countries.  How well these parties are able to appeal to voters 
seeking to cast protest votes, may perhaps be tied to factors such as the party-system 
and electoral context.  I next discuss electoral results in Spain, Canada, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States, and Belgium. 
Opposition parties in Spain had a very direct, cooperative relationship with the 
global social movement opposing the war, and the PSOE may have benefitted 
tremendously in subsequent elections.  Indeed, the PSOE may have hoped to make 
                                                                                                                                           
The world factbook – Belgium. April 1. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040401102410/www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/be.html  
(accessed October 28, 2005).; CIA. 2004. CIA - The world factbook – Canada.  Febuary 1.  
http://web.archive.org/web/20040201221847/http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.
html  (accessed October 28, 2005).; CIA. 2004. CIA - The world factbook – Netherlands. April 1. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040401155058/www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/nl.html  
(accessed October 28, 2005).; CIA. 2004. CIA - The world factbook – Spain. CIA, February 2.  
http://web.archive.org/web/20040202095013/www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sp.html  
(accessed October 28, 2005).; CIA. 2004. CIA - The world factbook -- United Kingdom. April 2. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040402113802/http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uk
.html (accessed October 28,  2005).; CIA. 2004. CIA - The world factbook -- United States. April 2. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20040402120645/www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html 
(accessed October 28, 2005).; Connelly, Kate, et al. 2003. Wave of protest ripples around the 
world. The Daily Telegraph (London), February 17, 4.; Cowell, Alan. 2003. Threats and responses: 
protests; 1.5 million demonstrators in cities across Europe oppose a war against Iraq. The 5ew York 
Times, February 16, Section 1, 20.; Dabrowski, Wojtek. 2003. Canadians for peace take to streets: 
Thousands in communities across Canada hold protests opposing U.S.-led war against the Iraqi 
regime of Saddam Hussein. The Canadian Press, February 17,  Canada, A5.; Hamilton, Sheila. 
2003.  All 80,000 came in peace. Evening Times (Glasgow), February 17, 8.; Hennink, Susanna 
Contini. 2003. Dutch cabinet now says: ‘give inspectors time.’ Het Financieele Dagblad, February 
17.; IPS-Inter Press Service. 2003. Politics-Europe:  Millions March for Peace.  IPS-Inter Press 
Service, February 15.; James, Barry, 2003. Millions join rallies against a war; in cities worldwide, 
marchers demand peaceful solution. International Herald Tribune, News, 1.; Parkes, Debbie. 2003. 
March draws 150,000: Massive protest against war with Iraq. 'Paix, pace, salam, shalom,' activists 
chant in two-kilometre long procession. The Gazette, February 16, News, A1.; Rotella, Sebastian. 
2003. World shows disdain for war:  Millions march to protest action against Iraq. Los Angeles 
Times, February 16, News, A4.; Scott, Neil. 2003. Anti-war protesters march here, worldwide. The 
Leader-Post and The Leader-Post Wire Services, February 17, News, A2.; Staunton, Denis. 2003. 




electoral gains via its opposition to U.S. unilateralism and ties to the anti-war 
movement, which resonated well in Spain.27  In a press interview, Jose Luis 
Rodriguez Zapatero, the secretary-general of the PSOE, links his party’s standpoint to 
the high domestic opposition to the war.28 The main opposition party, PSOE, and the 
Communist-led IU were direct allies of the global anti-war movement in Spain.  As 
aforementioned, the first Spanish post-war election saw a huge change in pre- and 
post-war voter turnout which led to PSOE electoral success. 
In Canada, the main governing party, the Liberal Party (LPC), opposed the 
war, but it did not form alliances with the anti-war movement.  The main opposition 
party, the Conservative Party (CPC), also did not form alliances with the anti-war 
movement.  However, several other smaller opposition parties did form direct 
alliances with the anti-war movement and saw increases in electoral turnout in 
subsequent elections.  Jack Layton, leader of the New Democratic Party (NDP), 
attended and spoke at the Toronto protest on February 15, 2003.29  Similarly, the Bloc 
Québécois (BQ) leader, Gilles Duceppe, attended and spoke at the Montreal protest 
on February 15, 2003.30  The Green Party of Canada (GPC) was also “prominent in 
the popular mobilization to the U.S. war against Afghanistan and Iraq.”31  Thus, 
although the government took a stance on which the activists agreed, the LPC and 
                                                 
27 The Daily Telegraph (London). 2003. Our Iberian allies. March 18, 19. 
28 Financial Times Information. 2003. Spanish socialist leader interviewed on Iraq, relations with USA, 
UK. April 20. 
29 Dabrowski, Wojtek. 2003. Protesters in cities across Canada take to the streets against war in Iraq. 
Sun Media Corporation Portage Daily Graphic, February 17. 
30 Dabrowski, Wojtek. 2003. Protesters in cities across Canada take to the streets against war in Iraq. 
Canadian Press Canadian Press 5ewswire, February 15. 





CPC were not allied with the global anti-war movement, and the NDP, BQ, and GPC 
were direct allies of the anti-war movement in Canada and saw some electoral gains.   
In the United Kingdom, several opposition parties formed direct alliances with 
the anti-war movement, although the main opposition party, the Conservative Party 
(Cons), joined the governing party, the social-democratic Labour Party (Lab), in 
supporting the war, and only small factions in Labour were indirectly tied to the anti-
war movement.  Charles Kennedy, the leader of the other key opposition party, the 
social-liberal Liberal Democrats (LibDem) which saw post-war electoral gains, was a 
speaker at the February 15, 2003 protest in London.32  Included amongst the United 
Kingdom’s opposition political parties opposed to the war, according to the Stop the 
War Coalition website, are the LibDem, the ecologist Green Party (Greens), 
RESPECT – The Unity Coalition (an anti-war coalition formed in 2004), the Socialist 
Alliance (SA), the separatist Scottish National Party (SNP), Welsh regionalist Plaid 
Cymru (PC), and the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP).33  Some members of the Labour 
Party were indirectly linked to the anti-war movement, including former Labor Party 
leader Michael Foot and former Labor stalwart Tony Benn, who spoke at the 
February 15, 2003 protest in London.34  The LibDem secondary opposition party as 
well as the Greens saw increases in electoral turnout in post-war elections that may 
have been linked to their opposition to the war. 
In the Netherlands, several opposition parties formed direct alliances with the 
anti-war movement, but the main opposition party, the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) or 
                                                 
32 IPS-Inter Press Service. 2003. Politics Europe:  Millions March for Peace. February 15. 
33 Stop the War Coalition. 2005. Stop the war coalition links. http://www.stopwar.org.uk/links.asp 
(accessed October 20, 2005). 




Labour Party, switched from having more direct to more indirect ties with the anti-
war movement in the run-up to the Dutch election in January 2003, at the height of 
the anti-war movement.  Given the unexpected gains of Fortuyn’s populist party in 
the May 2002 elections which had resulted from a decline in support for parties like 
the PvdA, the public was interested in electoral results guaranteeing a coalition that 
did not include a right-wing populist party.  The electoral results favored the PvdA 
and not the parties more directly tied to the anti-war movement.  In the aftermath of 
the election, the PvdA continued to maintain indirect ties with the anti-war movement 
in January, February, and March, as it negotiated to join the governing coalition with 
other parties that were previously committed to joining the “Coalition of the Willing” 
in Iraq.  In contrast, several other opposition parties and factions of the PvdA forged 
direct movement alliances.  The Socialistische Partij (SP) or Socialist Party, the 
ecologist and socialist GroenLinks (GL) or Green Left, the Young Socialists in the 
PvdA, and particular departments of the PvdA were all included among the 
organizers of the “Platform Tegen de ‘Nieuwe Oorlog’” (Platform Against the New 
War) which organized the February 15, 2003 protests in Amsterdam.35  Wouter Bos 
(leader of the PvdA) failed to show at the February 15, 2003 protests where he had 
been invited to speak, and although he was originally invited to participate in March 
2003 protests and spoke favorably of them, the PvdA was later disinvited from the 
March 2003 protests because of their participation in negotiations with the pro-war 
                                                 
35 De Vredessite. 2003. Anti-oorlogsdemonstratie onderdeel wereldwijd protest. February 12. 
http://vredessite.nl/nieuweoorlog/2003/platform1202.html (accessed October 13, 2005).; 
Socialistische Partij. 2001. Manifest tegen de nieuwe oorlog. September 25. 




Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA) party or Christian Democratic Appeal.36  Since 
the negotiations were ultimately blocked by the Iraq issue, the PvdA ended up 
banding with SP and GL in the platform “Keer het tij” to advocate for “a different 
Netherlands” and serve as the opposition against the new coalition parties.37  In the 
Netherlands, the SP and GL were direct allies and the main opposition party, the 
PvdA, was an indirect ally of the global anti-war movement.  However, electoral 
gains favored the PvdA, and not the more direct party allies which were viewed as 
less coalitionable but more representative of anti-war movement grievances.   
The main American opposition party, the Democratic Party (Dem), supported 
the pro-war governing party, the Republican Party (Rep), in policy on the Iraq war.  
Any direct connections with the Democratic Party have involved particular candidates 
such as Dennis Kucinich and Howard Dean, or were indirect.38  Small gains in voter 
turnout for the Democrats in 2004 were part of broader gains in turnout that actually 
disproportionately favored the Republicans in the Presidential election.  Compared to 
the Democrats’ indirect alliances with the anti-war movement, the Green Party 
(GPUS) has clearly opposed the U.S. war in Iraq since the height of the anti-war 
                                                 
36 De Vredessite. 2003. Platform keurt steun PvdA leider Bos aan de oorlog af. March 25. 
http://vredessite.nl/nieuweoorlog/2003/platform2503.html (accessed October 13, 2005).; De 
Vredessite. 2003. Reactie platform tegen de ‘nieuwe oorlog’ op begin oorlog. March 20. 
http://vredessite.nl/nieuweoorlog/2003/platform2003b.html (accessed October 13, 2005).; 
Solidariteit.nl. 2003. Persbericht-van het platform tegen de nieuwe oorlog:  Grootste 
vredesdemonstratie sinds jaren. February 15. 
http://www.solidariteit.nl/Documenten/2003/tdno_persbericht_15-02-2003.html (accessed October 
13, 2005).; Wynia, Syp. 2003. We gaan vooruitkijken. Reed Business Information B.V. Elsevier, 
March 29, Politiek en Binnenland. 
37 Een Ander Nederland. 2005. Een Ander Nederland. March 12. 
http://www.eenandernederland.nl/oproep.shtml (accessed October 13, 2005). 
38 Nichols, John. 2003. Kucinich’s antiwar bid. The 5ation, February 20. 




movement.39  Further, the Green Party is a member group of the United for Peace and 
Justice anti-war coalition, which organized the February 15, 2003 protest in New 
York.40  Many progressives who were involved in anti-war organizing focused on 
linking insider activism to outsider activism and are said to have focused on 
supporting the Democratic Party in the 2004 election, even though the final candidate 
selected to represent the party was, in their view, not adequately opposed to the war.41  
To sum, U.S. party connections between the leading opposition party and the anti-war 
movement were indirect and narrow and post-war electoral changes limited.  Rather, 
the main opposition party linked with the American anti-war movement does not 
ordinarily gain representation in the national government.  Moreover, the Democratic 
Party was not very successful in mobilizing voters in this party system context 
lacking relevant parties allied to the anti-war movement.   
In Belgium, although several leftist governing parties and several opposition 
parties are signatories to the Platform Against War on Iraq which organized the 
February 15, 2003 protests, electoral gains for these parties were mixed.42  Included 
amongst parties that allied to the anti-war movement were parties that were part of the 
government at the time, the Socialist Partij Anders and Spirit (SP.A-SPIRIT), the 
                                                 
39 Green Party of the United States. 2003. Green Party of the United States. February 14. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20030214171321/www.greenpartyus.org/ (accessed October 20, 2005. 
40 Barron, James. 2003. Critical of judge’s ruling, antiwar protesters brace for rally. The 5ew York 
Times, February 15.; United for Peace and Justice. 2005. Member Groups of United for Peace and 
Justice. http://www.unitedforpeace.org/article.php?id=1879 (accessed October 20, 2005. 
41 Benjamin, Medea. 2004. Looking back, looking forward:  A forum. The 5ation, December 20. 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20041220/forum/14 (accessed October 20, 2005).; Schulte, 
Elizabeth. 2005. Backing democrats has pulled the anti-war movement to the right: Why ‘inside-
out’ is a dead end. Counterpunch, April 23/24. http://www.counterpunch.org/schulte04232005.html 
(accessed October 20, 2005). 
42 Mother Earth. 2005. Platform against war on Iraq: Together for another Europe: Social - egalitarian 




Flemish social-democratic Socialist Party Differently and the Flemish progressive 
Spirit, and the Parti Socialiste (PS), the Francophone social-democratic Socialist 
Party.43  Other parties that were allies included two parties that were a part of the 
governing coalition during the beginning of the war, but which were removed and 
became part of the opposition as a result of the May 2003 elections:  the Francophone 
ecologist party, Ecolo, and the Flemish ecologist party, Agalev.44  Finally, two 
opposition parties were also included in the list of signatories, the Nieuw-Vlaams 
Alliantie (N-VA), separatist New Flemish Alliance, and Flemish liberal Vivant.45  
The governing parties’ acquiescence to weapons transports was controversial, and 
thus on February 15, 2003, when the PS and Ecolo (at the time members of the 
governing coalition) participated in the protest under their own names, their 
representatives were targeted by protesters who threw eggs.46  In Belgium, party-
movement alliances thus included ties with several governing parties (SP.A-Spirit and 
PS), several governing parties that subsequently lost their inclusion in the governing 
coalition due to electoral shifts (Ecolo and Agalev), and two opposition parties (N-
VA and Vivant).  Mixed results were obtained by different parties allied to the 
movement, perhaps also a reflection of the complicated party system context in which 
Belgian protesters can couple their protesting and voting.   
It appears that in certain contexts, when parties of the opposition ally with 
social movements in tune to the issue consensus on grievances of the bulk of the 
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population, social movement mobilization can feed into voter mobilization and 
electoral winnings, even in elections in industrialized democracies that have recently 
been plagued by voter apathy.  Although support for movement-related grievances or 
common targets may account for some coupling, it seems that the party system and 
electoral context serves as a lens through which the impact of targets and grievances 
is refracted.  As mentioned in Chapter 4, the number of party allies to choose from 
and the certainty with which a vote for a party translates into a party entering a 
governing coalition, may influence voters interested in casting a protest vote.   
Ironically, both the United States, with the limited electoral choices its 
moderate two-party system provides for activists seeking to cast protest votes, and  
consociational democracies like the Netherlands and Belgium, with the high number 
of electoral choices and high uncertainty regarding the formation of governing 
coalitions that their polarized multi-party system provides for activists seeking to cast 
protest votes, appear to be the contexts within which casting protest votes is most 
difficult.  Dutch and Belgian voters may disagree over which parties to vote for 
because some are interested in seeing gains for parties that are coalitionable and 
others care more about seeing gains for parties best articulating their grievances.  
Further, in the United States, voters considering casting protest votes may disagree 
over whether it is important to vote at all or whether they should settle for voting for a 
party that is electable but in many ways unresponsive to movement-related 
grievances.  In contrast, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom, which provided 




uncertainty regarding government formation, appear to be contexts in which it is 
easier to cast protest votes. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the issue consensus concerning 
movement-related grievances in “Coalition of the Willing” countries may also play a 
role in determining how successfully protest votes are cast and result in electoral 
change.  Opposing U.S. unilateralism in a country that has already taken a stance 
supporting such unilateralism creates an opportunity structure in which protesters 
may not feel that their protest vote is likely to be efficacious.  Perhaps it even leads 
them to decouple their protesting and voting.  However, when there is an issue 
consensus on movement-related grievances creating a different opportunity structure, 
in which voting appears more likely to be efficacious, coupling can occur.  This 
possibility for coupling may be even more likely when the party system and electoral 
context also make protest voting appear likely to be efficacious.  While the Spanish 
success in coupling in the 2004 election may be exceptional, it is certainly replicable 
and thus the possibilities for coupling are worth exploring further. 
Therefore, issue consensus concerning movement-related grievances such as 
opposing U.S. unilateralism, may exert centripetal forces on insiders and outsiders, 
facilitating the coupling of protesting and voting.  However, the mobilizational 
potential for parties allied with the anti-war movement who are using these 
grievances to try to recruit potential voters, may be refracted through the lens of the 
party system and electoral context.  Linkages between global social movements and 
voter mobilization are not merely possible because of the well-being of democracy in 




movement-related grievances concerning global democratic deficits.  In the case of 
the anti-war movement, rising opposition to U.S. unilateralism and its denial of the 
legitimacy-conferring authority of the United Nations may drive ties between insiders 
and outsiders and between insider activism and outsider activism.  
To conclude, there are several directions in which I would like to develop my 
research.  It is clear that insider and outsider activism fall along a spectrum of 
activism, a continuum which in and of itself needs more exploration.  In examining 
this spectrum and exploring the grey areas in between insider and outsider activism, a 
broader range of tactics should be measured and analyzed.  Further, there are 
important variations in the relations between insiders and outsiders and in the pairing 
of insider and outsider activism, which need to be accounted for.  I intend to conduct 
additional interviews with activists to investigate insider-outsider cooperation and 
conflict in the anti-war movement and in the global justice movement, cross-
nationally.  Likewise, the dynamic linkages between insiders in political parties and 
labor unions and outsiders in global social movements need a lot more attention, 
especially because of their implications in terms of high protest mobilization and 
success in getting politicians to attend to protest actions.   
Since most are indeed coupling protesting and voting and many are engaging 
in multiple forms of global protests, the interaction between global protesting and 
voting needs additional exploration as well.  Hence, as the war in Iraq progresses and 
the fifth anniversary of the war arrives just prior to the 2008 Presidential election, I 
intend to conduct new protester surveys.  To improve the operationalization, I will 




As aforementioned, it would also be very beneficial to expand the macro-level 
analysis of February 15, 2003 protests in the European Union to multiple dates of 
global protests.  To improve the coding of protest mobilization level and of insiders 
and outsiders’ participation in these protests, I hope to supplement the content 
analysis of news coverage of the protests with elite interviews of activists.  I am thus 
currently in the process of developing panel data of transnational anti-war protests in 
the EU on the dates of global protest mentioned in Chapter 3.  In doing this additional 
research, I plan to focus especially on comparing transnational protests in the CEE 
states with transnational protests in the EU-15. 
The impact of targets on transnational activism needs to be examined further.  
First, as Tarrow suggests, international institutions that are more clearly affiliated 
with the Washington consensus on neoliberalism may provide activists with stronger 
targets.  Likewise, domestic governments that provided more troops to the “Coalition 
of the Willing” may also pose stronger targets.  It is essential to gather time series 
data on protests targeting different types of domestic and international institutions, in 
order to piece out these types of effects particular to the opportunity structure.   
Further, activists in other issue areas have encountered different domestic 
opportunity structures, and thus other issue areas provide new opportunities to see 
whether strong domestic targets elicit insider-outsider cooperation and a blurring of 
the divides between insider and outsider activism.  For instance, in Canada, the 
Netherlands, the United States, and France, very different opportunity structures have 
emerged concerning same-sex marriage.  I aim to explore how these divergent 




As I conduct additional research on the anti-war and anti-globalization 
movements, as well as on other forms of activism, I will also examine the impact of 
movement-related grievances in more detail.  The level of issue consensus and issue 
discord on these grievances within movements and in public opinion needs more 
exploration empirically, to account for variation cross-nationally and temporally.  As 
I examine other forms of activism, key movement-related grievances and the issue 
consensus and issue discord on these grievances need investigation, to see how well 
the arguments developed in this dissertation generalize to other movements.   
Finally, several additional factors were raised in the dissertation, which merit 
further exploration.  The party system and electoral context needs additional 
investigation at the meso-level, in accounting for insider-outsider cooperation and 
conflict.  Divergent histories of civil society, protest and participation and divergent 
democratization pathways also merit further exploration, especially in accounting for 









Appendix 1: Structured Interview Questions for Activists 
Note:  Questions are supplemented with unstructured, largely open-ended questions. 
o Introduction:   
o Can you begin by briefly introducing your group? 
o Grievances and targets: 
o What are issues that your group focuses on? Please rank them in 
importance.  If these issues have changed over time, why so? 
o Insider-Outsider Relations:   
o What are the most important organizations that you work with on a 
regular basis, and which organizations is it difficult to partner with? 
For each organization discussed: 
 Is this organization more focused on influencing the 
government via lobbying, voting, or campaign connections or 
via protest, strikes, public pressure, etc.? 
 Why is it easy to cooperate with these groups, or why is it 
difficult to collaborate? 
 On which protest events, have you collaborated or failed to 
collaborate?  Why? 
o Party-Movement Ties:   
o Which political parties have you worked with? 
o How and why have those ties changed?  
o Insider or Outsider Focus: 
o Which types of tactics does your organization use to advance the 
issues that you care about? (Use prompts if necessary.) 
 lobby for or against legislation 
 volunteering for a political party 
 voter registration 
 voter education or public education 
 organize conferences 
 endorse political candidates 
 sponsor petitions 
 participate in government hearings 
 sponsor letter-writing campaigns 
 contacting elected officials 
 organize boycotts 
 organize demonstrations, marches, or rallies 
 organize sit-ins 
 organize the occupation of buildings or factories 
 organize civil disobedience 
o How has your tactical focus changed?  Why? 
o Ties with the State:  Inclusion/Exclusion, Repression/Accommodation 
o Do you feel that in your activities you are included and represented in 
the government?  Has your group had hostile relationships with the 




Appendix 2: Chronology of Domestic Targets in the European Union 
Country Targets in Older EU Member States, Through the 1995 Accessions 
1 Austria Austria did not commit troops to the interventions in Iraq or in Afghanistan, 
and it did not permit Iraq-related over-flights.47  According to Chancellor Wolfgang 
Schuessel, Austria was unwilling to join the “Coalition of the Willing” without a 
preliminary decision by the United Nations.48  The Austrian position stems in part 
from its commitment to neutrality, “by the 1955 State Treaty and its constitution, 
which prohibits membership of military alliances and the establishment of foreign 
military bases on its territory.”49  However, Austria did commit to finance 
reconstruction efforts in Iraq.50 
2 Belgium Belgium was unwilling to join the “Coalition of the Willing” intervention in 
Iraq, but has provided military support in Afghanistan.  In an interview during the 
run up to the war in Iraq, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt stated that “If 
the war is conducted within the framework of the United Nations, we will examine 
how we might contribute.”51  After U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented 
the U.S. case for a military intervention in Iraq to the United Nations, Belgium 
maintained its opposition to an intervention.52  Although U.S. forces began to 
transit via Belgian ports and airspace, Belgium declared that these transit rights 
would no longer be given, if the U.S. intervened in Iraq without UN backing.53 
According to MacLeod, Belgium has allowed over-flights.54  Belgium has 
committed troops to Afghanistan and Kosovo, but continued its reluctance to send 
troops to Iraq, as the war progressed.55  However, Belgium did contribute 
significant funding for humanitarian aid in post-war Iraq.56   
3 Denmark Denmark officially joined the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq and also 
supported the intervention in Afghanistan militarily.  Early on, it officially 
supported the U.S. war plans, but decided against deploying “an elite ground 
force.”57  Danish Prime Minster, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, was a signatory to the 
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“letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S. 58  Despite its early reluctance to contribute a 
ground force, Denmark contributed a “submarine, warship and a medical team” and 
assisted in intelligence gathering and “providing early warning.”59  Additionally, 
since then, several hundred Danish soldiers have been deployed to the Southwest of 
Iraq, under British command.60  The mandate for Danish troops to be in Iraq has 
been extended several times since 2003, most recently via a May 2006 
parliamentary vote that extended the mandate to July 1, 2007.61  Although “two 
opposition parties, the Radicals and Social Democrats, have withdrawn their 
support for a Danish presence in Iraq,” the centre-right government of Prime 
Minister Rasmussen has maintained some support for Danish involvement.62  
However, Denmark is currently considering at least partial troop withdrawal in the 
spring of 2007.63  Denmark also has deployed troops to Afghanistan, under British 
command, and the government has been criticized for Danish troops’ role in turning 
over prisoners to U.S. forces who were then allegedly beaten and mistreated.64 
4 Finland Finland did not join the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq, but did deploy 
some troops in Afghanistan.  Finland opposed a military intervention in Iraq 
without a preliminary UN decision.65  Finland took this standpoint, in part, due to a 
historical neutrality that started via “a non-aggression pact it signed with the Soviet 
Union in 1948,” a stance it has since moderated by entering into EU (but not 
NATO) military structures. 66  Finland's prime minister Paavo Lipponen joined in 
calls to permit UN Weapons inspectors to continue their work in Iraq.67  In an 
election that occurred just as the war in Iraq started in March 2003, the opposition 
party won enough votes to put a new Prime Minister, Anneli Jäätteenmäki, into 
office, but she submitted her resignation within months over allegations that secret 
documents were illicitly leaked during the electoral campaign, which had suggested 
Lipponen supported the U.S. intervention in Iraq, in defiance of Finnish neutrality 
and which had proven costly in the election.68  Although Finland has not 
contributed troops to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, it has provided financial 
backing for humanitarian relief efforts there.69  In contrast, Finland did back “the 
sending of Finnish peacekeeper forces to Afghanistan for crisis management 
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operations in the UK-commanded International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF).”70 
5 France Similarly, France did not join the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq, but has 
supported the intervention in Afghanistan.  As President Jacques Chirac stated as 
the U.S. was making the case for the war in Iraq, “war is always the proof of failure 
and the worst of solutions, so everything must be done to avoid it;” “Our aim is to 
put the power of Europe at the service of peace. That underlines our actions in 
Afghanistan and in the Iraq crisis.”71  France argued in favor of more time for UN 
Weapons Inspectors and opposed unilateral U.S. action in Iraq in defiance of 
international law.72  After the military intervention in Iraq started, U.S. Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld persisted in asking France as well as Germany to 
provide financial and military support, but Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin 
made clear that France would not participate without a preliminary UN decision 
and a UN-based peacekeeping force.73  Although France did send troops to 
Afghanistan, it has withdrawn elite Special Forces there that are not so well-
equipped for the continued fighting on the ground, in response to an increasingly 
violent insurgency there.74 
6 Germany
  
Germany joined the French opposition to the War in Iraq, but has supported 
the intervention in Afghanistan.  At the onset to the war in Iraq, Chancellor 
Gerhardt Schroeder stated, “In the crises involving terrorism, Iraq and North Korea, 
our peoples can count on the governments of Germany and France to join forces to 
preserve peace, avoid war and ensure people's security;” “Don't expect Germany to 
approve a resolution legitimizing war …”75  After German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, from the opposition, came to power, Germany’s stance changed somewhat, 
although fundamentally Germany has continued its policy of not deploying troops 
in Iraq.76  Germany has, however, assisted in the reconstruction effort in Iraq, as 
recognized by Merkel:  “In spite of the fact that we don't have troops on the ground 
there, stability there is in our very own vested interest, and we've shown that 
through commitments that we've entered on in other areas.”77  Although Germany 
has sent troops to Afghanistan, especially in the more peaceful northern region, 
focused on security and reconstruction, Germany has also been reluctant to provide 
troop deployments in the South where combat with resurgent Taliban fighters has 
been more dangerous.78 
7 Greece Greece opposed the military intervention in Iraq, but has provided some 
troops in Afghanistan.  Prime Minister Costas Simitis stated that Greece was 
“against this war, which could have been avoided,” and that “there should have 
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been clear instructions from the United Nations on military intervention, and only 
once all other possibilities had been exhausted.”79  However, Greece also worked 
with the U.S., prolonging U.S. rights to military bases in Greece.80  According to 
MacLeod, the “U.S. naval base in Crete serves U.S. 6th Fleet and supports navy 
and air force intelligence-gathering planes.”81  While Greece has also allowed “use 
of airspace under NATO and bilateral defense agreements,” it has continued to 
oppose sending troops to Iraq.82  Its reluctance on Iraq notwithstanding, Greece has 
indeed deployed troops to Afghanistan, though it has been reluctant to increase 
deployments.83 
8 Ireland Ireland did not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” opposing the military 
intervention in Iraq, but it did offer some support in Afghanistan.  In fact, Prime 
Minister Bertie Ahern offered words of support to the anti-war demonstrators on 
February 15, 2003, and stated that the Irish government would “stick with the 
Security Council:  “If they (Iraq) do not comply with the Security Council it will 
have to face up to its responsibility and then the situation will have to be 
discussed.”84  Ireland ruled out sending troops to Iraq.85  However, despite not 
being “supportive” of the war, Ireland did support “the humanitarian relief effort” 
and provided overflight facilities.86  Additionally, Ireland has sent some troops to 
Afghanistan.87 
9 Italy Italy joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and has sent troops to both Iraq 
and Afghanistan, but it has pulled its ground troops out of Iraq after the 2006 
electoral outcome which led to a power shift in the government.  Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi had rather quickly indicated support of the military intervention 
in Iraq, as “The Italian government signed the famous ‘letter of Eight’ at the end of 
January, along with Spain, with the United Kingdom, and with a number of central 
and East European countries, in order to voice support for the U.S. position.”88  In 
fact, he “had already and quite explicitly made a commitment to granting the use of 
bases in Italy and of overflight permission to the U.S. armed forces in the event of a 
war.”89  However, facing the opposition parties, massive anti-war movement, and 
the Pope’s outcry at home, he began to “loosen up his stance and to make his first 
‘pacifist’ remarks, even going as far as to define unilateral action on the United 
States’ part as ‘wrong.’”90  Less than a month after the war started, he announced 
that Italy was sending peacekeepers to Iraq.91  When it was clear that his 
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conservative stance could stand to hurt him during upcoming April 2006 elections, 
especially with popular center-left opposition candidate Romano Prodi making the 
campaign promise to “bring Italian troops home and replace the contingent with a 
civilian force,” Berlusconi announced that troop withdrawals would begin in June.92  
After Prime Minister Berlusconi faced electoral defeat, the new Prime Minister, 
Romano Prodi, made good on his campaign promise to withdraw Italian troops in 
Iraq, and as of December 2006, the last troops were set to return to Italy.93  Italy 
also has sent troops to Afghanistan and recently reaffirmed its commitment there as 
part of the ISAF.94 
10 Luxembourg Luxembourg did not join the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq, but has 
supported the intervention in Afghanistan. Luxembourg opposed the war in Iraq, 
and Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker has called for a prominent UN role in 
reconstruction efforts.95 Luxembourg also has contributed troops to the ISAF in 
Afghanistan.96 
11 Netherlands The Netherlands supported the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq as well as 
the intervention in Afghanistan, but withdrew Dutch troops from Iraq during 
2005.97  The Netherlands quickly authorized the U.S. to use “Amsterdam's Schiphol 
airport, Rotterdam port and the railways” for “the transport of U.S. military 
materials and personnel.”98  According to MacLeod, the Dutch also “contributed 
three Patriot missile batteries and 360 soldiers to help defend Turkey against any 
Iraqi counterattack.” 99  A new coalition government that was installed just as the 
war in Iraq was starting, quickly authorized deployment of Dutch troops to Iraq, 
expanding its support of the war from political and back-up support to material 
support.100  The new Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, stated, “The Dutch 
government feels it is of utmost importance to help secure the safety, stability and 
recovery of Iraq.”101  The Netherlands decided to withdraw their troops in Iraq by 
March 2005, at the end of Dutch troops’ mandate, turning down requests for an 
extension.102  However, the Dutch have maintained troops as part of the ISAF in 
Afghanistan, expanding deployment in 2006.103 
12 Portugal Portugal joined the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq and also sent troops to 
Afghanistan, but has since withdrawn its troops from Iraq, following the Iraqi 
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elections.  Conservative Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao Barroso 
was a signatory to the “letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S.104  He stated that 
Portugal must “side with the U.S.,” their ally, in the case of a conflict with Iraq, 
even without a preliminary UN decision, and argued, “It would be a great mistake if 
the U.S. were ignored while building the future EU. It would be a mistake if the 
importance of the Euro-Atlantic partnership were overlooked.” 105  Portugal quickly 
permitted the U.S. to refuel on an airbase in their territory, and signed a “letter 
supporting U.S. policy.”106  In May 2003, it deployed 120 military policemen to 
Iraq, to “carry out tasks on ensuring law and order in the country.”107  In February 
2005, after the Iraqi elections occurred on January 31, Portugal began to withdrew 
its troops from Iraq.108  Portugal has maintained a small contingent of troops in 
Afghanistan.109 
13 Spain Spain quickly joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and has sent troops to 
both Iraq and Afghanistan, but after an electoral defeat in March 2004, it withdrew 
its troops from Iraq.  Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar (of the conservative 
Popular Party) was a signatory to the “letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S.110  
According to MacLeod, Spain “committed about 900 military personnel to man a 
medical support vessel equipped with nuclear, biological and chemical treatment 
facilities” and “opened NATO bases to use.”111  After the Madrid train bombings 
and resounding public protest in opposition to the Spanish involvement in the war 
in Iraq, the government faced a stunning electoral defeat in March 2004.112  The 
new Spanish Prime Minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, of the center-left 
Socialist party ordered Spanish troops to be withdrawn from Iraq, the day after he 
was sworn in, alleging “they should have never been sent there,” a withdrawal that 
was quickly completed during the spring of 2004.113  He critiqued the war in Iraq 
for its unilateralism, disregard for international law, and preemptive rationale, 
stating, “The mission in Iraq, which is showing itself every day to be a failure, 
should serve as a lesson to the international community: preemptive wars, never 
again; violations of international law, never again.”114  Although Spain has 
deployed several hundred troops to Afghanistan, it is resolute not to increase its 
deployment there.115 
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14 Sweden Sweden did not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” and opposed the war in 
Iraq, but it has provided support to the intervention in Afghanistan.  Sweden 
opposed military intervention in Iraq without a preliminary UN decision, and this 
decision stems in part from its formal historical neutrality, since 1834.116  However, 
it is noteworthy that after September 11, the center-left government of Prime 
Minister Goeran Persson did decide to modify this neutral standpoint, and support 
the American-led “war on terror.”117  In fact, Sweden sent troops to Afghanistan in 
2002, a presence which it has increased and maintained for several years.118  
However, when it came to the Swedish standpoint on the subsequent intervention in 
Iraq, Sweden was opposed to an intervention without UN support, in accordance 
with international law, and thus did not back the war in Iraq.119   
15 United 
Kingdom 
The United Kingdom joined the “Coalition of the Willing” in Iraq and also 
has supported the intervention in Afghanistan.  British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
was a signatory to the “letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S.120  According to 
MacLeod, the United Kingdom early on made available “45,000 troops, tanks, 
aircraft, and crucial political support for U.S.” 121  From early on, the British troops 
played a key roll in the southeastern provinces and also in “securing the southern 
oil field and the vital port city of Umm Qasr.”122  In October 2006, as public and 
political support for the war in Iraq was shifting, Prime Minister Blair advanced a 
nuanced position concerning a withdrawal:  “I don't have a date, but I can see over 
the next 12 to 18 months the Iraqi security forces progressing to a point where they 
can take on the security responsibilities for the country,” but he added the caveat 
that “the maintenance of democracy is absolutely essential for us, in Iraq and in 
Afghanistan ... I don't want to dismay our allies or hearten our enemies by 
suggesting we will do anything else other than stay until the job is done.”123  In 
January 2007, the House of Commons (much like the U.S. legislature following the 
midterm elections) began a debate concerning the British involvement in Iraq, with 
the Liberal Democrats calling for a withdrawal of 7,000 troops by October 2007, 
calls by the Conservatives for an inquiry into the war itself, and with Prime 
Minister Blair notably absent.124  The United Kingdom has deployed several 
thousand troops to Afghanistan, a commitment it has continued.125 
Country Targets in CEE States Acceding to the EU, 2004-2007 
1 Bulgaria Bulgaria joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” sending troops to Iraq, and 
also has provided military support in Afghanistan, but it has withdrawn combat 
troops from Iraq in 2005, maintaining a small number of other personnel there 
since.  Early on, in March 2003, Bulgaria, whose NATO membership was pending, 
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“offered use of airspace, bases and refueling for U.S. warplanes and use of its Black 
Sea port;” planned to send “up to 150 biological, chemical, nuclear warfare 
specialists to Kuwait;” and signed a “letter supporting U.S. policy in Iraq.”126  
According to MacLeod, “Bulgaria is reportedly owed $1.7 billion U.S. by Iraq and 
Mr. Bush has promised that a post-war Iraq will repay its debts. Bulgarian 
companies also are hoping to land some of the engineering and construction 
contracts for rebuilding Iraq.”127  Bulgaria maintained troops in Iraq for more than 
two years, but withdrew its military troops from Iraq by the end of December 2005, 
maintaining only a limited number of other personnel for non-military tasks.128  
Bulgaria has also contributed troops to the intervention in Afghanistan.129 
2 Czech 
Republic 
The Czech Republic joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” supporting the 
intervention in Iraq, as well as supporting the intervention in Afghanistan.  Czech 
President Vaclav Havel was a signatory to the “letter of Eight,” supporting the 
U.S.130  As of March 2003, the Czech Republic allowed “overflights of coalition 
warplanes,” planned to send a “small team of biological, chemical, nuclear 
decontamination experts to the Persian Gulf,” and also signed a letter supporting 
U.S. policy.131 According to Rice, Czech “special chemical-and biological-weapon 
response forces” were already “in Kuwait, ready to act to a potential Iraqi WMD 
attack anywhere in the theater.”132  Since 2003, the Czech republic provided 
staffing for a military hospital, assisted in training of the police, and as of 
December 2006 deployed troops to “an international base in Basra in southern 
Iraq.”133  The Czech Republic has also contributed troops to the intervention in 
Afghanistan.134 
3 Estonia Estonia joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and it has sent troops to the 
interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  In March 2003, Estonia, another 
country trying to get NATO membership, had also signed a letter supporting U.S. 
policy and was “considering post-war mine clearing and refugee aid.”135  In fact, 
according to Rice, “months ago, the prime minister of Estonia told President Bush 
that he did not need an explanation of the need to confront Iraq.  Because the great 
democracies failed to act in the 1930s, his people lived in slavery for 50 years.”136  
As part of Estonia’s support of the “Coalition of the Willing,” several dozen 
Estonian troops have been deployed in Iraq since 2003.137  Although a majority of 
Estonians oppose maintaining troops in Iraq, the parliament recently extended the 
deployment to the end of 2007.138  Additionally, Estonia has also contributed troops 
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to the intervention in Afghanistan since 2003, with a mandate through December 
2007.139 
4 Hungary Like Bulgaria, Hungary joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” sent troops to 
the interventions in Iraq and in Afghanistan, but has since withdrawn its troops 
from Iraq.  Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy was a signatory to the 
“letter of Eight,” supporting the U.S.140  As of March 2003, Hungary was hosting “a 
U.S. base where Iraqi exiles have been trained for possible post-war administrative 
roles,” allowed “coalition overflights,” and signed a letter supporting U.S. policy, 
allegedly “hoping for U.S. arms deals.”141  Hungary contributed several hundred 
troops to Iraq.142  After a change in power following elections, and in the face of 
high public opposition to Hungarian involvement in Iraq, the new Prime Minister, 
Ferenc Gyurcsany, announced that Hungarian troops would be withdrawn by 
March 2005, after the Iraqi elections.143  Additionally, Prime Minister Gyurcsany 
stated that he did not agree with the justification for war, “Personally, as the father 
of four children, as a young man, as a working Hungarian who trusts in the future, 
and as head of government, I believe not in preventive war but in policies which 
prevent conflicts.”144  Hungary has also contributed troops to the intervention in 
Afghanistan since 2003.145 
5 Latvia Like the Czech Republic and Estonia, Latvia joined the “Coalition of the 
Willing,” and has sent troops to the interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Latvia, in March 2003, also aspired to join NATO.146  It also has been very 
supportive of the United States, since it broke away from the former Soviet 
Union.147  These factors may have played a role in its decision to support the U.S.-
led military intervention.  From 2003 to the present, just over a hundred troops have 
been deployed by Latvia to Iraq, where they are under the Polish command.148  
Latvia has also deployed troops to Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.149 
6 Lithuania Lithuania also joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” sending troops to Iraq 
as well as Afghanistan. As of March 2003, Lithuania, another state trying to join 
NATO, allowed “overflights of coalition warplanes” and signed a letter supporting 
U.S. policy.150  Lithuania has sent roughly one hundred troops to both Iraq and to 
Afghanistan, and although there has been some debate in parliament concerning the 
possibility of withdrawal from Iraq, Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas 
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has emphasized that Lithuania is not considering a withdrawal of troops from 
Iraq.151 
7 Poland Early on, Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller was a signatory to the “letter 
of Eight,” supporting the U.S.152  Poland had decided, by March 2003, to deploy 
“up to 200 troops in non-combat role.”153 According the MacLeod, “Poland is also 
reportedly being courted by the U.S. to host a new U.S. military base,” and 
“recently received [a] $3.8-billion U.S. loan to purchase U.S. F16 combat jets.”154  
Since its initial deployment, Poland has increased the number of troops in Iraq, and 
as a close ally to the U.S., had “been entrusted with the command of the 7,000-
strong multinational force in south-central Iraq.”155  In 2005, after the Pope died, 
the Polish parliament voted to withdraw its troops by the end of 2005, and in fact 
began to reduce troop numbers in Iraq.156  However, after ousting the leftist 
government in the September 2005 elections, one of the first actions taken by the 
new right-wing President Lech Kaczyński, once taking office in December 2005, 
was to extend the Polish involvement in Iraq.157  Poland has not only extended its 
involvement in Iraq until at least the end of 2007, but it has also committed roughly 
a thousand troops to the intervention in Afghanistan.158  However, this commitment 
by the President has been challenged by the co-ruling party, the League of Polish 
families, which has called for a national referendum to be held “on Poland's 
participation in military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan” in spring 2007.159 
8 Romania Romania joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” and has deployed troops to 
the interventions in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  As of March 2003, Romania, which 
also was waiting to join NATO, had decided to have their “airspace and a base open 
to U.S. warplanes,” to send “non-combat specialists in chemical decontamination,” 
and to sign a letter supporting U.S. policy.”160  Since then, Romania has deployed 
roughly 2,000 troops to both Iraq and to Afghanistan, and it is expected to maintain 
this role in 2007.161 
9 Slovakia Like Bulgaria and Hungary, Slovakia joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” 
sending troops to Iraq and to Afghanistan, but it has since begun a withdrawal of 
troops deployed to Iraq.  Slovakia, with pending NATO membership, also had 
“committed non-combat troops specializing in chemical warfare decontamination” 
as of March 2003.162  According to Rice, Slovak “special chemical-and biological-
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weapon response forces” were already “in Kuwait, ready to act to a potential Iraqi 
WMD attack anywhere in the theater.”163  Since 2002, Slovakia has deployed 
several dozen troops to Afghanistan, and since 2003, roughly 100 troops have been 
deployed to Iraq.164 Leading into the June 2006 parliamentary elections, the leader 
of the main opposition party, Robert Fico of the Smer-Social Democracy party, 
announced that his party is opposed to the intervention in Iraq as a violation of 
international law and “will make a decision on the withdrawal of the Slovak 
military mission from Iraq immediately after it enters the new government.”165  As 
of January 2007, Slovakia began its withdrawal of troops from Iraq, to be 
completed by the end of February 2007.166 
10 Slovenia Slovenia joined the “Coalition of the Willing,” but has not deployed troops 
to Iraq.  Also, it has supported the intervention in Afghanistan, via troop 
deployments.  As of March 2003, Slovenia, another state trying to join NATO, had 
“quietly indicated a willingness to offer help,” as it also signed a letter supporting 
U.S. policy in Iraq.167  However, Slovenia has not deployed troops to Iraq for 
military purposes, but has deployed 4 officers as part of a “peace mission” to Iraq to 
aid NATO training of Iraqi security officers.168  Slovenia has deployed roughly 5 
dozen soldiers to Afghanistan and is considering other types of aid to 
Afghanistan.169 
Country Targets in Mediterranean States Acceding to the EU, 2004 
1 Cyprus Cyprus did not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” but the “Cypriot cabinet 
… granted the U.S. access to Cyprus' airspace, hours after the United States and 
Britain launched military offensive against Iraq.”170  Additionally, Cyprus also did 
not take a role in the intervention in Afghanistan, but British bases in Cyprus have 
supplied troops to Afghanistan.171 
2 Malta Malta did not join the “Coalition of the Willing,” or supply troops to Iraq or 
Afghanistan, but Maltese troops have helped train British troops, in preparation for 
deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan.172 
Table 8.1: Targets in the European Union 
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Appendix 3: Chronology of February 15, 2003 Protests in the European Union 
Country Protests in Older EU Member States, Through the 1995 Accessions 
1 Austria In Austria, more than 23,000 people protested in Vienna, Salzburg, and 
Klagenfurt, Austria.173  One journalist cites 15,000 demonstrators in Vienna while 
another cites 3,000.174  There was not much news coverage of these protests. 
2 Belgium According to Barr, police estimated 50,000 protesters turned out in 
Brussels, Belgium on February 15.175  Other protest figures cite 20,000 or 100,000 
demonstrators in Brussels, but 50,000 seems to be the number most commonly 
reported.176  Despite “helicopters flying over head and a heavy, but fairly discreet, 
police presence,” this massive protest occurred peacefully.177   
In Brussels, a multi-generational group of protesters was mobilized, with 
some demonstrators who had protested in historic movements reactivated, along 
with their children and grandchildren.178  Many organized interests were 
represented, as “many marched behind the scarlet banners of the parties of the left, 
others walked with trade unions and church groups.”179  
According to one journalist, the protesters “were a diverse lot, reflecting the 
ethnic, national and social mix in this most cosmopolitan of cities.”180  There were 
many Iraqi flags and “a group of Turks carried their own national flag - even 
though Ankara is expected tomorrow to approve the use of its territory for a U.S.-
led assault on Iraq.”181   
According to Mahony, slogans on protesters’ signs included “non à la 
guerre” (no to war in French); “geen oorlog” (no war in Dutch); and “no to war.”182  
Mahony explains that many of the protesters framed the war as indelibly 
intertwined with the pursuit of oil.183  Protesters’ messages targeted both U.S. 
President Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Blair.184  Protesters were generally 
marching in support of their government, since Belgium did not join the “Coalition 
of the Willing” and was reluctant to give NATO guarantees of protection to Turkey, 
in case of a potential spillover of the war in Iraq.  Mahony states, 
‘Vive les fritkots et la biere, merci Louis!’ read one placard referring to the 
national gastronomic pleasures (chips and beer) and the Belgian foreign 
minister, Louis Michel. Belgium along with France and Germany caused a 
rift in NATO, when it last Monday refused American requests for the 
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Alliance to protect Turkey in the event of a war - fearing this amounted to 
admitting that diplomatic efforts had been abandoned.185 
Indeed, one journalist argues that the massive public protest against the war in 
Brussels led Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt to feel pressure not to go 
along with other NATO states rallying to support the war.186   
However, some domestic targets related to the war in Iraq do remain present 
for Belgian anti-war protesters.  On Friday February 14, Greenpeace activists 
protested Belgian government decisions to permit U.S. military transports and 
usage of ports, by blockading a supply ship chartered by the U.S. Army in the 
Belgian port of Antwerp, in what Greenpeace spokesman Jan Van de Putte called a 
“floating peace camp.”187  Similarly, on Sunday, February 16, the Belgian Forum 
for Peace Action mobilized about 15 protesters in Antwerp, where they blocked a 
cargo train that they claimed was part of a U.S. military transport, and also claimed 
they were targeting the Belgian government for silently supporting the war.188 
3 Denmark According to Barr, 25,000 demonstrators turned out on February 15 in 
Copenhagen, Denmark.189  According to another article, the police estimated a 
protest mobilization in Copenhagen of 12,000 to 14,000, but “demonstrators, 
speakers, and experienced demonstration participants estimated that the figure was 
closer to 20,000-30,000” and protests also occurred in 10 other Danish cities.190  
Several young protesters were arrested, for allegedly having distributed spray paint 
that was used to paint graffiti on the Admiralty and Commerce Courts along the 
protest route, but the Deputy Police Inspector Flemming Steen Munch, the 
Copenhagen police press spokesman, stated the protest occurred peacefully besides 
these arrests.191   
The “No War With Iraq” initiative organized the February 15 protest in 
Copenhagen, and endorsers included more than 100 organizations such as the 
Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens 
(ATTAC) and the Hotel and Restaurant Workers Trade Union in Copenhagen.  
Like the protesters in Belgium, protesters in Denmark also made the linkage 
between militarization and oil interests.  Speaker Holger K. Nielsen from the 
Socialist People's Party SF stated, 
The only thing that can explain the war is that the United States wants to 
have power over oil. The American economy desperately needs cheap oil, 
and the United States’ policy in the entire Middle East cannot be separated 
from that need. But why should we support a war for which there are such 
poor reasons? Why should we contribute to thousands of Iraqi civilians 
getting killed? 
Unlike the protesters in Brussels on February 15, the Danish demonstrators 
clearly targeted their domestic government and Prime Minister Rasmussen’s 
support of the war, bringing signs asking, “Berlin, Paris, Brussels -where is 
Copenhagen?”  Since the protest started at the American embassy and passed by the 
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English embassy, the United States and the United Kingdom were also targeted, en 
route.192 
4 Finland According to police estimates, around 15,000 protesters attended the 
Finnish protest in Helsinki, Finland on February 15, making it one of Finland’s 
biggest demonstrations.193  The protest and march to the U.S. embassy occurred 
peacefully, and the mobilization exceeded organizers’ expectations.194  
Additionally, there were also other Finnish protests in Turku, Tampere, Nokia, 
Jyvaskyla, Oulu, Rovaniemi, Savonlinna, Joensuu, Seinajoki, Kuopio, Kemi, 
Tornio, and Maarianhamina.195  
The Finnish protest was organized by almost 40 civic organizations.196  
Associations involved included “leftist parties, peace organizations, college 
students and people from all walks of life.”197  Iraqis and arabs living in Finland 
also participated.198  Some Estonians who were not permitted to demonstrate at 
home, traveled to Helsinki in order to protest there, opposing the Estonian 
government’s support of the war.199   
Protesters in Finland targeted the U.S. as well as the Finnish government, 
and linked their opposition of the war to the imperialistic, self-interest of the United 
States, and called for the international community to continue weapons inspections 
and not turn to a unilateral war.  According to one source, 
The demonstrators demanded continued weapons inspections in Iraq and 
opposed acts of war. The banners bore slogans which accused the United 
States of imperialism and compared President George W. Bush to a 
dictator.200  
One organizer, Eetu Komsi, of the Left Federation Youth League, indicated that the 
protesters were opposed to the U.S.-led war and were targeting the Finnish 
leadership who would decide Finnish policy on the war, stating, “This is a message 
to our foreign policy leadership that the people do not approve of the United States' 
war plans.”201   
Protesters shared an opposition to the war in Iraq, but represented different 
viewpoints on why the war was unjustified.  One speaker, Matti Wuori, Member of 
the European Parliament (Greens), argued, 
The issue is not only the choice between war and peace. We are falling into 
an era that is shadowed by an atmosphere of violence, greed and fear. We 
would like to have a world where humanity, cooperation and justice prevail. 
This war will not be supported in our names.202 
Another speaker, Omar Bahaaldin, spoke on behalf of Iraqi refugees in Finland, 
stating, “An attack on Iraq will only make the situation worse. The United States is 
only thinking of its own interests.”203  Eetu Komsi stated, “A bomb is a bomb 
whether or not the United States or the UN is behind it,” suggesting he, in turn, 
opposes war in all cases.204   
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5 France According to Barr, an estimated 100,000 protesters turned out in Paris, 
France on February 15.205  Other articles state that 200,000 protesters turned out in 
Paris, and that overall 300,000 to 500,000 demonstrators were mobilized in France, 
at 60 different protest locations.206  Other journalists agree that the Parisian 
mobilization certainly exceeded 150,000 and cite over 70 French protest venues.207  
These numbers were surprising to organizers such as Arielle Denis, the joint 
president of the Peace Movement which coordinated the French protests, who had 
expected closer to 50,000 protesters in Paris.208   
The Parisian protest stood out because it was very multi-generational and 
because of the number of every-day people, not affiliated with particular 
organizations, who turned out.209  Protesters from many different countries attended 
the Parisian demonstration, including Americans opposed to U.S. unilateralism.210  
Many opposed the war because of the lack of evidence concerning weapons of 
mass destruction or links with terrorists, in Iraq, and would not necessarily oppose 
war in other cases.211  Signs at this protest indicated support for French opposition 
to the war, and opposition to the U.S. standpoint.212  According to one of the main 
organizers, Christian Picquet, “This demonstration is an alarm to all governments. 
The people do not want the war.”213  Several collaborating journalists describe 
many protesters “carrying posters that denounced President Bush as a ‘warmonger’ 
and chanting anti-American slogans.”214  Some signs said “we are all Iraqis,” 
pledged solidarity with other Arabs, or supported Palestine.215   
Key organizers included many leftist organizations, which marched at the 
front and were sponsors (and signatories) of the announcement to protest, entitled 
“Non à la Guerre, Oui a un Monde de Paix, de Justice et de Démocratie” (no to war, 
yes to a world of peace, of justice, and of democracy).216  Political parties, unions, 
anarchists, and many kinds of associations were present, but notably absent were 
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far right radicals from the Front National (National Front) and Action Française 
(French Action).217  There were also many Muslims at the protest, some of whom 
were part of the more militant Muslim organizations in France, the Mouvement 
immigration-banlieue (MIB), and many who were not at the protest with an 
organization.218  In fact, some of the protesters had previously been part of the 
massive protests against the National Front and Le Pen in the spring of 2002.219 
Prominent marchers at the Paris demonstration which supported President 
Chirac’s opposition to a war in Iraq included the anti-globalisation activist José 
Bové; Bernard Thibault of the Confédération Générale du Travail trade union; and 
some of Chirac’s “most bitter political opponents:” Communist leader Marie-
George Buffet; Jean-Pierre Chevènement; Noël Mamère of the Verts (Greens); 
François Hollande and Régis Passerieux of the Parti Socialiste (Socialist Party); 
Alain Krivine of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary 
Communist League); and Arlette Laguiller of the Lutte Ouvrière (Worker’s 
Struggle).220   
6 Germany
  
Berlin had “up to half-a-million” protesters, with police estimates of 
300,000-500,000. 221  Several journalists report 500,000 protesters in Berlin, while 
others report 350,000.222  According to Konev, this protest mobilization set a new 
record in German, as the largest German demonstration heretofore had occurred in 
the early 1980s, “when 250,000 people protested in Bonn against stationing U.S. 
missiles in the country.”223  Buses from more than 300 cities and towns were to 
travel to Berlin.224  There were many other protests in Germany, including 20,000 
who mobilized in Stuttgart.225   
Like the demonstration in Paris, a very multi-generational set of protesters 
were mobilized in Berlin.226  According to organizer Malte Keutzseldt of Attac, 
Germany, “Opposition is broader than at any time in the past. The peace movement 
is getting older now, but a new generation of young people is deeply concerned. 
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The churches and unions have linked to make the coalition far broader than even 
the anti-nuclear missile marches in the 1980s.”227  Associations involved in 
organizing the demonstration included “unions, rights groups, and political 
associations.”228 
Demonstrators in Berlin supported the German government’s opposition to 
the war in Iraq and the maintenance of this standpoint, American pressures 
notwithstanding.229  German protesters also made the linkage between economic 
interests, especially oil interests, and the militarization in Iraq, carrying signs like, 
“No Blood for Oil.”230  Further, some protesters carried signs accusing the U.S. of 
imperialistic and hegemonic militaristic motivations, such as “The axis of evil runs 
through the Pentagon.”231  Other protesters’ signs indicated support of the “Old 
Europe” that had been used derisively by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, against the countries that were not joining the “Coalition of the 
Willing.”232 
Participants included politicians and former pro-democracy activists.233  
There were many symbolic allusions to the recent civil society-led democratization 
in Germany, just over a decade prior.  Cowell states, “In Berlin, protesters from the 
eastern and western parts of the city met at the Brandenburg Gate, once a symbol of 
the city's cold war division.”234  According several journalists (2003), “Three 
members of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's centre-left cabinet defied his express 
wishes and joined the march.”235  The following cabinet ministers decided to 
participate in the protest as members of parliament, not as cabinet ministers:  
Economic Cooperation Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul; Environment 
Minister Juergen Trittin; and Agriculture Minister Renate Kuenast.236 
7 Greece Although one source cited 200,000 protesters in Athens and 100,000 
protesters in other Greek cities on February 15, most articles cited lower protest 
mobilizations.237  Another source said 20,000 people were mobilized at the main 
protest at Syntagma Square in Athens, Greece, before the march to the U.S. 
Embassy.238  A third source cites 30,000 people mobilized in Athens as well as the 
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city of Salonica.239 The discrepancy in these protest numbers may be due to the fact 
that several protests rallies occurred before the joint march.240  For instance, in a 
smaller protest action in Athens, “Several thousand protesters in Athens, Greece, 
unfurled a giant banner across the wall of the Acropolis – “NATO, U.S. and EU 
equals War” - before heading toward the U.S. Embassy.”241  A protest of about 
10,000 participants was mobilized in the port city of Thessaloniki.242  The city of 
Hania on Crete also had a protest of about 90,000.243  Protests also occurred in 
Patras, Kavala, Iraklio, Hania, Trikala, and Karditsa.244 
Several hundred anarchists smashed windows, burned cars, and attacked the 
offices of the Athens daily Ta Nea.245  As a result, there were “scuffles” between 
some anarchists and police in Athens that garnered a lot of media coverage.246  
Although most of the protest was orderly and peaceful, teargas was used to disperse 
the trouble-makers, many cars were destroyed and a guard hurt.247  The main 
opposition party, New Democracy condoned the violence.248  Additionally, Christos 
Protopappas, a government spokesman, spoke to condone the trouble-makers and 
support the message of many peaceful protesters: “The people who inspired these 
attacks and carried them out, who tried to stir up trouble, will not succeeding 
overshadowing the magnificent, anti-war message sent out by today's rally.”249   
Greek protests were endorsed by “the country's largest labour union and 
Greece's governing Socialist party.”250  Participants at the protest included 
“representatives of political parties, trade unions and peace groups, political 
leaders, political refugees, public figures and citizens, spanning children to 
pensioners.”251  Action Thessaloniki 2003, which would eventually be active in the 
protest and counter-summit targeting the E.U. Summit in June 2003, was already 
mobilized at this protest, on February 15.252 
Many politicians in the government were supportive of the protesters’ 
grievances.  A statement put out by parliament speaker Apostolos Kaklamanis in 
support of the protest maintained, “We refuse the United States the right, in the 
name of its military and political power, to ignore the will of the international 
community.”253  Several political parties participated in the protest, including key 
figures within these parties.  For instance, Costas Laliotis, the leader of the ruling 
PASOK party's central committee, participated, and told reporters,  
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We have joined forces to say yes to peace and no to war...We want to 
besiege (U.S. president George) Bush and (Iraqi president) Saddam 
Hussein. Bush should not embark on unilateral military initiatives and 
intervention. We are saying no to the war. … In addition, Saddam Hussein 
must respect UN resolutions and decisions, and proceed to disarm Iraq in 
terms of weapons of mass destruction.254 
Other participants in the protest who opposed the war included Aleka Papariga, the 
chief of the Communist Party; Nikos Constantoulos, the head of the Coalition for 
the Left and Progress, and Dimitris Tsovolas, the leader of the Democratic Social 
Movement.255  Support for a peaceful resolution to the conflict via the United 
Nations was also voiced by Evangelos Meimarakis, the secretary of the New 
Democracy party’s central committee.256 
Both the British government and U.S. government were targeted, with flags 
burned at their embassy or consulate en route.257  The Greek government was also 
targeted, with the call to stay out of a war in Iraq.258  Chants such as “Down with 
the United States,” “Americans are murderers,” and “War is not the only answer” 
and the many Iraqi flags that were visible revealed that protesters were largely 
targeting the United States, opposed to militarization as a solution to the conflict, 
and felt solidarity with the Iraqi people.259  Many posters read “No to War,” 
“Imperialism is the enemy,” and “No bloodshed for war.”260  Similarly, speeches at 
the protest reiterated the protesters’ demands for stopping the war; for working 
within the framework of international law, via the United Nations, to peacefully 
resolve the conflict; and for banning weapons of mass destruction.261 
8 Ireland According to one journalist, 80,000 protesters attended the February 15 
demonstration in Dublin, Ireland, whereas another journalist cites 100,000 
protesters.262  Other figures cited include 90,000.263  According to Pat Rabbitte, 
Labour leader, the most noteworthy feature of the protest was not its scope, but 
rather the diversity and run-of-the-mill character of the citizens who were 
mobilized:  “This wasn't the professional protesters.… This wasn't the round-up of 
the usual suspects or the usual political leadership or whatever.… This was 
comprised of a great diversity of ordinary people of all classes.”264  The protest 
occurred peacefully, with a minimal “Garda” presence.265   
The Irish Anti-War Movement, the Non-Governmental Organization Peace 
Alliance, and the Peace and Neutrality Alliance organized the protest.266  Both the 
Irish government and the supporters of the U.S. led war in Iraq were targeted, and 
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although protesters agreed that they opposed war, a variety of grievances were 
elucidated, as is evident from the comments made by different organizers. 
Several organizers focused on opposing all kinds of war.  Richard Boyd 
Barrett, one of the main organizers, said “The only thing that is important is that we 
are part of the human race and we stand in solidarity with any part of the human 
race that is threatened with war.”267  Brendan Butler of the NGO Peace Alliance 
called on the Government to oppose war under all circumstances.268 
Protesters also had grievances particular to the Irish involvement in the war 
in Iraq, targeting the domestic government for its willingness to permit the Shannon 
airport’s usage in refueling of American military planes.269  According to De 
Breadun,  
Speaker after speaker sharply criticised the Government for failing to take 
an unequivocal stance against military action in Iraq and some accused the 
Taoiseach, Mr. Ahern, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cowen, of 
complicity in the war-plans of President Bush and the British Prime 
Minister, Mr. Blair.270 
Along these lines, Carol Fox, of the Peace and Neutrality Alliance, argued that Irish 
historic neutrality is threatened by the government’s tacit support of the war, stating 
“Bertie Ahern is now in charge of a war cabinet, facilitating an illegal and immoral 
war. Our neutrality is in bits, we are now a colony once again, a military outpost for 
the U.S. superpower.”271 
The linkages between oil and the war and between imperialism and war 
were also attended to in Ireland.  Although acknowledging the brutality of 
Hussein’s authoritarian regimes, Fox argued that “the Blair-Bush project” was not 
about improving human rights, but rather “it is about oil rights.”272  Additionally, 
the linkage between imperialism and the cause for war was attended to by speakers 
such as Roger Cole, also of the Peace and Neutrality Alliance, who said Taoiseach 
Bertie Ahern was the “first leader of this country to lead us into an imperial war 
since John Redmond.”273   
Many politicians from the opposition parties attended protest rallies, and so 
too has there been notable labor and religious opposition of the war.  Politicians 
attending the demonstration included Michael D. Higgins (Labour), Aengus O. 
Snodaigh (Sinn Fein), and Patricia McKenna (Green, Member of the European 
Parliament).274  Politicians speaking at the rallies targeted both the Irish 
government’s standpoint on the war as well as the “Coalition of the Willing.”  
Michael D. Higgins, the Labour Party spokesman, spoke at the demonstration, 
advocating that the government “break its silence now” and oppose the war.275  
Assembly Delegate (TD) Joe Higgins (Socialist Party), said of the global protests, 
“Humanity itself directs that you (President Bush and his allies) do not unleash 
your weapons of mass destruction on the heads of the Iraqi people.” 
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Key union leaders also took standpoints opposing the war, basing their 
criticism on the likely aftermath of the war, criticizing the policy-making of the 
Bush administration, but taking care to clarify that they are not opposed to 
Americans per se and do not align themselves with Hussein.  Des Geraghty, the 
president of SIPTU, Ireland's largest trade union, said at the protest, “We are ‘pro’ 
the American people but we will not tolerate the warmongers.”276  David Begg, the 
general secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, discussed the likely 
aftermath of the war, and the possibility of unrest, instability, and humanitarian 
crisis in a post-war Iraq.277  Churches and religious organizations also organized 
demonstrators.  Dr. John Kirby, the Bishop of Clonfert, spoke representing Trocaire 
(the Third World development agency) and the Catholic Church declaring, “we are 
totally against this war.”278  
9 Italy In Rome, Italy, the protest mobilization estimates for February 15 range 
from police claims of 650,000 or 1 million protesters to activist claims of 3 million 
protesters.279  The volume is evident by the transport choices made by 
demonstrators; several thousand buses were parked on city limits after dropping off 
passengers, and 28 additional trains had to be added to the transport schedule to 
compensate for the additional demand.280  In fact, the protest march had to start two 
hours early because of police concerns that the sheer volume of protesters could 
otherwise lead to a mass trampling.281  Protests also occurred in cities such as 
Florence, Turin, Milan, Naples and Palermo in Sicily.282  A peaceful precedent for 
February 15 had already set by the massive anti-war protest at the European Social 
Forum in Florence, Italy in November 2002.283   
Over 500 organizations were involved in calling for the protest in Rome.284  
It involved “almost all of Italy's leftist parties, unions, pacifist groups and 
environmental organizations.”285  Marks, Popham, and Gumbel state,  
Those in charge of the march said 450 organisations had signed up for the 
protest, a broad coalition similar to that in Florence, including unions, 
church groups, left and centre-left parties and anarchist groups such as the 
Disobbedienti. Five thousand coaches were expected to arrive in the 
capital.286 
According to others, “leftwing opposition politicians, film stars, Catholic church 
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representatives, human rights groups and Iraqi exiles” were participants in the 
protest in Rome.287  What was striking at the Roman protest was the juxtaposition 
of the religious community (priests, monks, nuns, and Catholic organizations) 
hitting the pavement alongside of protesters from the anti-globalization movement 
and leftist unions, according to Rouard, Silber, and Marion.288  Additionally, 
organizers allowed “representatives of the ‘oppressed’ including Kurds and 
Palestinians” to join organizations in the march, “balanced, it is intended, by an 
Israeli and an American.”289  However, statements by the Jewish community 
suggest that their involvement would be contingent on the messaging concerning 
Israel at the protest, as they would refrain from protesting if Israel was criticized.290 
The focus in Rome was supporting peace and opposing war, and both the 
Italian and American government’s policy-making was targeted.  The 
overwhelming symbolism at the Italian protest were the reported 800,000 rainbow 
colored flags with “Pace” or peace written on them that were sold and then 
displayed everywhere and even used as cloaks by protesters.291  Organized called 
for protesters to refrain from making posters with anti-American or “harsh 
slogans.”292  The focus at the protest was on protesting against war, and also against 
the foreign policy of the United States and Italy via caricatures of U.S. President 
Bush and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, but not on protesting Americans 
in Rome or against the protests in the United States (images of which were 
transmitted via a giant television screen as a show of solidarity).293  Some Italian 
protesters called for Prime Minister Berlusconi to resign.294  Many protesters 
supported the actions of Belgium, France, and Germany in opposing war in Iraq.295  
10 Luxembourg There was only one article discussing the protest against the war in 
Luxembourg, which mobilized over 10,000 demonstrators on February 15.  
According to the report, the protest was the largest one in eight years.  Protesters 
carried posters with slogans such as “No to blood for oil” and called for “the 
government to give up its neutrality and oppose the intervention.”296 
                                                 
287 Chrisafis, Angelique, David Fickling, Jon Henley, John Hooper, Giles Tremlett, Sophie Arie, and 
Chris McGreal. 2003. Threat of war: Millions worldwide rally for peace: Protests: Huge turnout at 
600 marches from. The Guardian, February 17, Home Pages, 6. 
288 Rouard, Daniele, Martine Silber, and Georges Marion. 2003. L'Europe en masse dans la rue pour 
dire non a la guerre; Des manifestations sans precedent ont eu lieu d'un bout a l'autre du vieux 
continent. Le Monde, February 18. 
289 Marks, Kathy, Peter Popham, and Andrew Gumbel. 2003. The threat of war: All across the world, 
the peace demonstrations begin. Independent, February 15, 9. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Rouard, Daniele, Martine Silber, and Georges Marion. 2003. L'Europe en masse dans la rue pour 
dire non a la guerre; Des manifestations sans precedent ont eu lieu d'un bout a l'autre du vieux 
continent. Le Monde, February 18. 
292 Marks, Kathy, Peter Popham, and Andrew Gumbel. 2003. The threat of war: All across the world, 
the peace demonstrations begin. Independent, February 15, 9. 
293 Rouard, Daniele, Martine Silber, and Georges Marion. 2003. L'Europe en masse dans la rue pour 
dire non a la guerre; Des manifestations sans precedent ont eu lieu d'un bout a l'autre du vieux 
continent. Le Monde, February 18. 
294 Benoit, Bertrand, Farhan Bokhari, Joshua Levitt, and Virginia Marsh. 2003. Washington shrugs off 
protests as war preparations continue: Antiwar marches largest demonstrations since Vietnam. 
Financial Times Ltd, February 17, 5. 
295 Rouard, Daniele, Martine Silber, and Georges Marion. 2003. L'Europe en masse dans la rue pour 
dire non a la guerre; Des manifestations sans precedent ont eu lieu d'un bout a l'autre du vieux 
continent. Le Monde, February 18. 




11 Netherlands Barr states, “More than 70,000 people marched in Amsterdam in the largest 
Netherlands demonstration since anti-nuclear rallies of the 1980s.”297  Cowell 
confirms that the Dutch police estimates 70,000 protesters were mobilized in 
Amsterdam.298  Other articles cite lower protest numbers such as 10,000 or 20,000, 
but the notably higher police estimates suggest those numbers are undercounts.299  
The main demonstration on February 15 was known as “Stop de oorlog tegen Irak” 
(Stop the war against Iraq.)300  At least 60 buses from all over the Netherlands were 
scheduled to attend the demonstration, as well as several hundred Germans who 
reside in the border region.301  In Den Haag, a small protest of a dozen Iraqis 
occurred, targeting the Hussein regime.302   
The national demonstration was also followed by a small protest in the 
Rotterdam port on Monday, February 17, when the “first guarded armed train 
carrying U.S. military equipment arrived in the Netherlands for shipment to the 
Persian Gulf region in preparation for a possible war in Iraq.”303  The Dutch Prime 
Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, has just “reaffirmed his approval for the U.S. to use 
Holland's harbours, airstrips and trains to ship troops and equipment.”304  Wouter 
Bos, the leader of the Labour party (PvdA) which had been in the opposition and 
had suggested they would not approve of Dutch cooperation on the war, 
complained that Balkenende had not informed the legislature of these shipments but 
“gave his tacit agreement to the shipments,” perhaps because Labour was trying to 
negotiate its entry in a new center-left coalition government.305  On February 15, 
Dutch foreign affairs minister Jaap de Hoop Scheffer responded to the inconclusive 
report delivered by Hans Blix, head weapons inspector, the day prior, by adopting a 
moderating standpoint, calling for Iraq to be given a few more weeks to comply 
with the United Nations.306  These comments may have also been made to placate 
the Labour party with whom the ruling Christian Democrats were trying to form a 
coalition government.307 
The “Platform Against the War” (het Platform tegen de Oorlog) organized 
the national demonstration in Amsterdam, a coalition that was joined by more than 
200 organizations.308  Sometimes it is also called the “Platform Against a New 
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War” (het Platform tegen de Nieuwe Oorlog).309  Hennink states, “‘Not in my 
name’ (the war should not be carried out in my name) was the main message 
protesters, including the elderly, young people, children and immigrants.”310  A 
very diverse crowd turned out, with groups representing Americans, exiled Iraqis, 
Tibetans, Germans, and Japanese, all present (Henrik 2003).311  Some protesters 
had last protested during the anti-nuclear protests of the 1980s or even earlier, in 
opposition to the Vietnam War.312   
The political parties GroenLinks (the Green Left), and the Socialistische 
Partije (Socialists) joined the Platform.  Platform organizer H. van Heijningen 
stated that they hoped to get the Labour party (Partij van de Arbeid) and the labor 
movement to join in as well.313  He stated that he had spoken with members of the 
Christian Democrats (CDA) opposed to the war, but that CDA participation in the 
protest was not a possibility. 314  Adherents of political parties like the Socialists 
(SP) and Green Left (GroenLinks) joined the demonstration although many PvdA 
adherents refrained from turning out, in respect of a Bos request. 315  According to 
Hennink, “The speakers, including Jan Marijnessen of the Socialist party (SP) and 
Femke Halsema of left-leaning greens (GroenLinks) made it clear they were against 
Saddam Hussein's regime but didn't want the Iraqi people to suffer a war.”316 
Very few Protestant or Catholic churches and religious organizations 
officially sponsored or sent key representatives to attend the Dutch protest. 317  Only 
one Catholic bishop from Haarlem, J.L. Wirix, was scheduled to attend, and 
secretary general, father E. Kimman, was scheduled to represent the Catholic 
bishops. 318  M. Bosman-Huizinga, the general secretary of the Reformed 
“Remonstrantse Broederschap, was scheduled to attend the protest as a 
representative of the Raad van Kerken (Council of Churches) which supports the 
demonstration.319  However, she explains that she is actually not representing her 
church community because the protest invitation was not deliberated in the 
administration.320   The Raad van Kerken, which is a council of both Protestant and 
Catholic churches, had asked local churches to attend members to the protest, and 
in a variety of ways has opposed an attack on Iraq.321  J. Gruiters of Pax Christi was 
scheduled to speak at the protest as a representative of the Raad van Kerken.322  
Also set to attend the protest were quakers from “Het Genootschap ter Vrienden,” 
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which has no hierarchical administration and thus no official representation at the 
demonstration.323 
Notably absent was Mient Jan Faber, a key activist in the 1980s peace 
movement against nuclearization and previously part of Pax Christi, he chose not to 
join the demonstration and to support the war because it will liberate repressed 
Iraqis.324  Now Secretary of the Interkerkelijk vredesberaad (IKV or Inter-church 
peace council), Faber was meeting partners in Iran and Northern Iraq as the protest 
occurred.325  Jan ter Laak, Faber’s one-time colleague at Pax Christi, also was 
notably absent, as he was attending a conference of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as a representative of the Nederlands Helsinki 
Comite working for the recognition of human rights.326 
The protesters clearly supported a peaceful resolution to the conflict via 
international law, and called for a change in U.S. policy-making and Dutch policy-
making in support of the war.  Linkages between oil and militarization, and the 
conflicts in Iraq and other Middle-eastern conflicts were also made.  For some 
protesters, the Blix report was the last straw, instrumental in their decision to 
demonstrate. 327  Protesters in Amsterdam wanted to clarify that they supported 
seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict via the United Nations and in respect of 
international law but were certainly not supporting the Hussein regime. 328  
Protesters like Ruth Oldenziel in Amsterdam stated they were “against the Bush 
government and its foreign policy,” and not opposed to Americans.329 The Dutch 
also clearly targeted the domestic government’s policy-making in support of the 
American call to war and called for the government not to blindly follow the 
Americans into war. 330  Like protesters in many other countries, Dutch protesters 
also recognized a linkage between oil interests and the call to war.331  Linkages 
between Iraq and other conflicts in the Middle East were also made:  “Several 
speakers also warned against a conflict spreading across the Middle East and used 
the platform to condemn Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories.”332 
12 Portugal The Lisbon, Portugal protest drew about 80,000 participants.333  Organizers 
of the protest said 80,000 to 100,000 demonstrators were mobilized in Lisbon, as 
well as 10,000 protesters in Porto, and mentioned protests in other cities.334 There 
was not much coverage of this protest.  Included amongst the speakers at the protest 
were “former President Mario Soares, members of the Socialist Party and the 
leaders of the Communists and the Left Bloc.” 335  Portuguese Prime Minister Jose 
Manuel Durao Barroso, who has supported the war in Iraq, called a meeting to 
                                                 
323 Ibid. 
324 Dagblad Rivierenland. 2003. In lange onderbroek naar demonstratie. February 17. 
325 Stichting Algemeen Nederlands Persbureau. 2003. Irak: Slechts een bisschop loopt mee in 
demonstratie. February 14. 
326 Ibid. 
327 Dagblad Rivierenland. 2003. In lange onderbroek naar demonstratie. February 17. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Cowell, Alan. 2003. Threats and responses: protests; 1.5 million demonstrators in cities across 
Europe oppose a war against Iraq. The 5ew York Times, February 16, Section 1, 20. 
330 Dagblad Rivierenland. 2003. In lange onderbroek naar demonstratie. February 17. 
331 Ibid. 
332 Hennink, Susanna Contini. 2003. Dutch cabinet now says: ‘give inspectors time.’ Het Financieele 
Dagblad, February 17. 
333 Xinhua News Agency. 2003. Roundup: Anti-war call roars across West Europe. February 16. 
334 British Broadcasting Corporation. 2003. Thousands in Portugal demonstrate against Iraq war, 





discuss Iraq with the leader of the key political parties, as the demonstration was 
occurring, prior to the EU Summit on February 17. 336  However, because of the 
scheduling conflict with the protest, “the leaders of the Communists and the Left 
Bloc refused to attend the meeting personally.” 337  The government’s response 
came via Antonio Pires de Lima (CDS-PP leader) who represents part of the center-
right coalition with the Social Democrats and who stated, 
we will not let ourselves be impressed by the demonstrations of pacifists 
who, united by a feeling which is, allow me to call it, a pretty basic feeling 
of anti-Americanism, allow and condescend to an armed Iraq, and 
subsequently an Iraq that constitutes a threat. 338 
13 Spain According to one source, the overall protest mobilization in Spain on 
February 15 ranges from 2 to 3 million demonstrators, and thus “as many as one in 
15 Spaniards marched.”339  Others cite 1.9 million in Madrid and Barcelona.340 
Police estimates of at least 1 million demonstrators in Barcelona were later updated 
by estimates made by the Barcelona City Council based on police data as well as 
pictures of the demonstration that suggested roughly 1,300,000 were mobilized in 
Barcelona.341  Organizers from the “Let us Stop the War platform” suggested a 
higher number of 1,500,000.342  Other protest numbers cited by authorities include 
“nearly 1 million people participated in the Madrid demonstration, 1.5 million in 
Barcelona and more than 150,000 in Seville.”343  Police estimates of the Madrid 
mobilization were somewhat lower, at 660,000.344  According to some journalists, 
these protests represent, “the biggest outpouring of popular political sentiment - 
with the possible exception of some anti-Eta marches - since Spaniards took to the 
streets to protect their fragile young democracy after a coup attempt in 1981.”345  
At least 60 different marches were planned in Spain.346  The mobilization at 
Seville ranged between 200,000 (police estimates) and 250,000 (organizer 
estimates).347  Mobilization estimates for Cadiz are around 70,000 protesters.348  
The protest in Oviedo mobilized 70,000 to 80,000 participants.349 A protest in Santa 
Cruz (Tenerife Canary Islands) mobilized more than 50,000 demonstrators, 
according to police estimates.350  Further, other protest events occurred in Spain 
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during the days preceding and the days ensuing February 15.  For instance, on 
Thursday, February 13, tens of thousands of students protested against the war in 
both Madrid and Barcelona.  Additionally, another protest in Rota, Spain targeted 
an American airbase.  The students’ union organized these protests using the 
slogan: “Not a soldier, not a euro, not a bullet for an imperialist war.”351  In Spain, 
linkages between militarization and the pursuit of hegemony were also recognized. 
The Let us Stop the War platform was involved in mobilizing the largest 
Spanish demonstrations.352  Some sources suggest that roughly forty organizations 
were responsible for calling for the Spanish demonstrations.353  However, other 
sources suggest that there were far more sponsors, including “virtually every 
organization outside of Mr. Aznar's Popular party.”354 The Socialist Party (PSOE) 
of the opposition was one of the organizers of the February 15 protests.355  In the 
week prior to the global protests, they had called on Prime Minister Jose Maria 
Aznar to follow France and Germany in supporting peaceful resolution to the 
conflict.356  In response to the anticipated grievances that protesters would 
elucidate, “Spain's ruling Popular Party, under fire at home for its support for the 
hawkish U.S. line on Iraq, began circulating three million copies of a pamphlet 
defending the government's position ahead of Saturday's protests.”357 
In protests elsewhere, opposition political parties, trade unions, and NGOs 
all played a major role in organizing platforms.  The groups involved in the Cadiz 
“No to the War platform” included “NGOs, associations, trade unions and 
opposition political parties.”358  Similarly, in Oviedo, the protest was “called by 
political parties, NGOs, neighbourhood and social organizations, and the major 
trade unions: UGT General Workers’ Union, Workers’ Commissions, and USO 
Workers’ Syndical Union” and involved representatives of the regional 
government.359 
 Although Spain’s student protesters clearly targeted the U.S. and its 
imperialistic aims, a main target on February 15th was the Spanish government.  
According to several journalists, “The protest was not directed so much at George 
Bush as at his ally, the Spanish prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar. ‘The Pope says 
no to war, the People's party says yes’, and ‘Aznar, Bush's doormat’ were among 
the slogans on display.”360  In fact, some protesters called for Prime Minister Jose 
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Maria Aznar to resign.361  In Seville, posters and chants included, “No to the War,” 
“Not in our name,” and “Not with our silence,” insinuating that protesters did not 
want the government to join the war on their behalf.362  Another emphasis in the 
protests was merely on opposing war, especially one that was justified as a 
“preventive war.”363  Additionally, considerations for the Iraqi people were also 
voiced.  In Santa Cruz, Tenerife, the issues focused on by demonstrators, included 
opposing war in Iraq, supporting peace, respecting “the ideologies and the national 
and cultural identities of peoples.”364 
14 Sweden Protest mobilization estimates for the February 15 protest in Sweden also 
vary considerably, including two different estimates released by police:  35,000 
initially vis-à-vis more than 100,000 retrospectively; 60,000; and 130,000-150,000 
estimated by organizers.365  The main rally occurred in front of the U.S. embassy in 
Stockholm and mobilized about 35,000, and another protest in the city of 
Gothenburg mobilized 25,000 demonstrators.366  Another source cites 35,000 in 
Stockholm and 20,000-30,000 in Gothenberg.367  Protests in at least 25 locales 
mobilized 500 to 4,000 demonstrators.368  Other demonstrators were mobilized in 
venues such as Joenkoeping (2,000); Malmoe (3,000); Umeaa (4,000); Vaxjoe 
(over 1,500).369  Overall, these protest mobilizations exceeded the 1969-1970 
demonstrations against the Vietnam War, according to some observers.370  In any 
case, demonstration activity of this magnitude had not occurred for over three 
decades in Sweden.371  These demonstrations were largely peaceful, and in Vaxjoe, 
when “some local Nazis tried to disrupt the march, … the police stepped in.”372 
Several politicians or former politicians spoke at rallies in Sweden, 
targeting the United States and the Swedish government, and calling for a peaceful 
resolution to the conflict.  In Stockholm, the Environment Party’s spokesperson, 
allegedly critiqued the United States and American President Bush for trivializing 
war and treating it like a game of computer chess, stating, “If something goes 
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wrong, you just push delete and all the peasants live again. But it is real children 
who will lose their parents and there is no restart button and just one life.”373  
Further, Maj Britt Theorin, former social democratic member of the European 
Parliament, critiqued the Swedish government for not trying to take a stronger 
oppositional stance on the war, stating, “We demand that Sweden’s government do 
everything to stop a war. Support Olof Palme’s policy and say ‘no’ to war.”374  In 
Gothenburg, Anja Karlsson (Party of the Left) emphasized that a peaceful 
resolution could be found, saying, “We refuse to let the rhetoric of war govern our 
thoughts and we refuse to believe that the only road to peace and democracy is 
missiles and bombs.”375 
 Protesters at the demonstrations were very opposed to preemptive, 
unilateral military intervention in Iraq by Americans, which they perceive as 
motivated by economic interests and threatening international law and stability.  
Many protest participants’ signs suggest a linkage between American economic 
interests and the true reasons the Americans were pursuing a war in Iraq.376  
Additionally, many demonstrators were concerned about the precedent that could 
be set with such preemptive, unilateral warfare with the potential for huge 
gleanings in oil revenues, asking which country would be attacked next.377  A 
speaker at one protest wanted to make clear that he did not sympathize for Hussein, 
but was even more opposed to the behavior of the United States, which he labeled a 
rogue in its own turn:  “I shed no tears for Saddam. He is a rogue, but the United 
States is an even greater rogue.” 378  Other issues raised by protesters, included the 
issue of Palestine, which was salient in Gothenberg, where Palestinian flags were at 
the front of the march.379 
15 United 
Kingdom 
According to several journalists, 750,000 demonstrators turned out in 
London.380  Organizers estimated closer to 1 million protesters in London turned 
out.381  According to Kononczuk, in London, “the rallies were organised by the 
Stop the War Coalition, the veteran peace group Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) and the Muslim Association of Britain.”382  The Stop the War 
Coalition had expected in advance that the London crowd could ultimately reach 1-
2 million.383  According to one journalist, “The Stop The War Coalition filled more 
than 1000 buses with supporters. CND and the Muslim Association of Britain - the 
two other organisers - filled hundreds more.”384  Barr states that police called it “the 
city's largest demonstration ever.”385  According to Kononczuk, the London 
demonstration was certainly the biggest protest there since World War II, as 
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protests in the 1970s targeting the Vietnam War had mobilized roughly 400,000 
participants.386  The London protest occurred peacefully, with only three arrests and 
a police presence of about 4,500.387   
Key protests also occurred elsewhere in the United Kingdom, and other key 
British demonstrations had in fact preceded this global protest.  According to one 
source, “A Stop The War protest five months ago, attracted 100,000 but with 
conflict looming closer, 10 times as many felt compelled to make their voices 
heard.”388  Protesters also turned out in Glasgow, Scotland, where Prime Minister 
Tony Blair was speaking to a Labour Party Conference (estimates ranging from 
30,000 to 61,000 protesters in Glasgow), and a demonstration also occurred in 
Belfast, Northern Ireland.389   
What was unique about the turnout in London was the juxtaposition of such 
a multi-generational, diverse crowd, of old and new activists alike (Suroor 2003).  
According to Kononczuk, “In London, alongside veteran peace campaigners and 
anti-globalisation activists were pensioners, lawyers, bankers and middle-class 
housewives with their children.”390  Suroor (2003) mentions that those attending 
“cut across party and group labels,” and even included some Iraqis. 
Key politicians from various parties turned out in support of the 
demonstrators and their qualms about a possible war in Iraq.  According to Suroor,  
Noted playwright, Harold Pinter, human rights campaigner, Bianca Jagger, 
Labour veterans, Michael Foot and Tony Benn, the Liberal Democrat 
leader, Charles Kennedy, and the Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, were 
also slated to speak at the rally … (2003). 
Another journalist adds that left Labour MP George Galloway made a 
comment to the effect that the Prime Minister is changing the Labour party in 
undesirable ways that need remedying.391  Another Labour MP, Alice Mahon, 
warned about the cycle of violence that could be instigated by “the drive to war.”392  
Former Labour politician Mo Mowlam critiqued the rationale of the government, 
stating, “Theirs is a position now that, if a country has a lot of people killed from 
poverty and military dictatorship, if that number is smaller than that killed by war, 
then the war is OK. That to me is totally illogical.”393  
Many labor unions also joined in opposing the war, with representatives of 
several unions making speeches at the demonstration.  Billy Hayes, the general 
secretary of the Communication Workers Union (CWU), highlighted the newly 
mobilized trade union protesters in his comments.394  The general secretary of the 
University and College Lecturers’ Union (NATFHE), Paul Mackney, noted the 
issues in Iraq and Palestine but also domestically that should be attended to, stating, 
                                                 
386 Kononczuk, Peter. 2003. Anti-war marchers stage London's biggest protest since World War II. 
Agence France Presse, February 15. 
387 Ibid. 
388 Roberts, Lesley. 2003. One, two, three, four we don’t want your bloody war (we’d rather have a 
nice cup of tea); London protests. Scottish Daily Record & Sunday Mail Ltd, February 16, 5. 
389 Barr, Robert. 2003. Mass marches in London, Rome, Berlin and Damascus, clashes in Athens on 
day of global protest. Associated Press, February 15.; Kononczuk, Peter. 2003. Anti-war marchers 
stage London's biggest protest since World War II. Agence France Presse, February 15.  
390 Kononczuk, Peter. 2003. Anti-war marchers stage London's biggest protest since World War II. 
Agence France Presse, February 15. 
391 Roberts, Adrian. 2003. Mowlam brands Blair's war plans as 'illogical'; Politicians and union leaders 







“We're here for peace in Iraq and justice in Palestine, but we're also here to build a 
better world in Britain.”395  Mick Rix, general secretary of the train drivers’ union 
(ASLEF), called for Blair’s ouster and an end to his right-wing policy-making.396  
Finally, the general secretary of the transport workers’ union (RMT), Bob Crow, 
alluded that the government’s selective hearing of the popular will and its 
unwillingness to listen to the demonstrators suggests a democratic deficit in Britain, 
not much unlike the democratic deficits that the British policy-makers have 
critiqued in authoritarian regimes, stating, “I don't know what the difference is 
between a Romanian leader not listening to his people and Mr. Blair not listening to 
his.”397 
According to one source, protesters targeted the Prime Minister, physically 
passing by his Downing Street office and verbally opposing his government’s 
policy-making and the direction that the Labour party’s foreign policy-making has 
taken.398  One of the marches also passed by the British Houses of Parliament at 
Westminster.399  Riddell spoke to demonstrators in London and writes,  
What unites them is anger against Bush and Blair, but mainly Blair. 
Everyone I talk to says that he will not have their vote again….These are 
organised people with clear aims. They want a peaceful solution for Iraq. If 
that is not forthcoming, Blair will be punished accordingly.400 
Prime Minister Tony Blair responded to the protesters, saying that he respected 
their democratic right to protest peacefully but was resolved in his standpoint on the 
war, which might be costly in terms of popular support but was a decision that he 
made because of his convictions and leadership responsibilities.401 
Although protesters were very focused on opposing the war via slogans 
such as “No War on Iraq,” organizers also highlighted linkages between the war 
and U.S. material and political interests.402  Anas Altikriti, spokesman of the 
Muslim Association of Britain, stated, “We believe this war is primarily aimed at 
serving the interests of the current U.S. administration. Neither the U.S. nor the 
British public stand to benefit from it.”403  Former MP and activist Tony Benn 
accused the U.S. of applying a double-standard in its dealings with Iraq, vis-à-vis 
its relations with other countries.404  
The British anti-war movement was critiqued by Cohen for the 
“domination” of the Socialist Workers Party in the Stop the War Coalition; for its 
alliance with the “reactionary British Association of Muslims;” and for their 
demonization of “American and British power.”405  Along similar lines, Labour 
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Party chairman John Reid accused the protesters of supporting the repression and 
human rights violations that the Hussein regime embodied.406   
However, many protesters emphasized that they were not supporting 
Hussein and not anti-government as they have sometimes been branded, but rather 
oppose going to war and resorting to violence to solve the conflict and support 
finding a peaceful resolution.407 Suroor (2003) also emphasizes that at the London 
demonstration, “Most people made clear that their opposition to a war did not mean 
that they supported Saddam Hussein. They felt that a military conflict was not the 
way to deal with him, and wanted to speak up and be counted.” 
Country Protests in CEE States Acceding to the EU, 2004-2007 
1 Bulgaria Bulgaria’s anti-war demonstration involved about 3,000 protesters in 
Sofia.408 A second source says over 2,000 demonstrators were involved.409 Another 
source claims only 1,500 were mobilized and 10 were arrested in Sofia. 410  Other 
Bulgarian protests were mobilized in Plovdiv (200 protesters) and Sliven.411  
According to one source, “the march was organized by For Peace, Against War 
Citizens Committee which comprises some 30 parties and NGOs.” 412  Another 
source confirmed the main organizer was the “Citizens Commitee for Peace and 
against War,” and stated that some Iraqis living in Bulgaria were also involved in 
the demonstration.413   
A declaration was issued by the demonstrators, “calling upon the U.S. 
government to give up its war plans” and arguing that “a war will have a far-
reaching economic impact which will inevitably hit Bulgaria too.”414  Some of the 
protesters demanded that the government resign and the Parliament be disbanded 
“for what the protesters say was betrayal of the national interests by granting the 
U.S. request for support in a possible war.”415  Protesters’ placards included such 
mottos as, “For peace, against war,” “For peace through talks,” “Mothers, let's 
stand together and defend peace,” “Let's put and end to unjust war,” and “Don't kill 
innocent people.”416  This protest reportedly had “communist overtones, with some 




Czech Republic’s anti-war protest in Prague involved two separate 
demonstrations.418  One of the protests was mobilized by Communists, and the 
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other by the Group Against War (also known as the Initiative Against War) and by 
foreigners living in Prague.419  According to Scally, “few people besides the old 
hardliners want to be associated with the Communists’ march,” and thus two 
separate rallies emerged.420  A police spokesperson emphasized police preparedness 
for the rallies, but also on the importance of using peaceful tactics when protesting 
for peace.421  According to Scally, the choice of the protest venue for the 
Communist rally is ironic, leading history “to be turned on its head today.”422  
Namely, “Fourteen years ago, huge peaceful demonstrations in Prague's Wenceslas 
Square hastened the resignation of the Communist authorities in 
Czechoslovakia.”423 
The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) was involved in 
organizing one demonstration, calling for international law and the UN Charter to 
be upheld.424  This peaceful protest occurred at Wenceslas Square, and although 
one journalist reported roughly 500 participants another source reported 1,000.425  
Miroslav Grebenicek, leader of KSCM, spoke against the war and against Czech 
involvement in the war.426  At this rally, there were signs such as “No to war in 
Iraq, no to U.S. aggression;” “Democracy is not born of bombs;” and “Let's hang 
U.S. pirates.”427  After the rally, demonstrators marched to the U.S. embassy, where 
it was reported “The Communists want to give the U.S. embassy a resolution 
calling on the U.S. government not to make the planned aggression.”428   
Another demonstration was mobilized at the Palachovo namesti by a 
different organization, the Group Against War or the Initiative Against War.429  
Although one journalist reported 500 mobilized at this protest, other sources report 
300 demonstrators.430  Foreigners living in Prague, including several Americans, 
worked with the Initiative Against War to call for the protest, and it was also 
attended by Greenpeace activists.431  Slogans on banners included “No Blood for 
Petrol” and “God said: you will not kill.” 432  Erazim Kohak, a philosopher who 
addressed the protesters, had lived under exile in the United States during the 
Communist period, and he highlighted the linkages between oil interests and the 
war, suggested that human rights would be waylaid in the process, and 
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recommended conflict resolution via the diplomacy that France and Germany 
prefer, and not via warfare.433  The Americans opposing the war in Iraq from 
Prague focused on the likely loss of human life; the negative effects America is 
likely to feel domestically, including increasing poverty and security threats; and 
the oil interests that are the likely motivations behind the war.434  By launching this 
protest, they hoped to get the Czech public to turn their disapproval of the war into 
concrete actions indicating their sentiments that the government may attend to.435 
Several other protests also occurred in the Czech Republic.  A Communist-
led protest of around 300 was mobilized in Ostrava, and here some signed the “Not 
in our Name” petition against the war.436  Some signs at this protest included, 
“Bush = Hitler” and “We want peace, not NATO, inciting wars across the 
globe.”437 At a peaceful protest in Brno, about 200 people signed an anti-war 
protest.438 
3 Estonia Estonia’s anti-war demonstration scheduled to occur in Tallinn was 
apparently banned by authorities, leading some protesters to cross over by boat and 
attend the largest Finnish demonstration in Helsinki.439  The protest was apparently 
cancelled because “the country's security police dissuaded organizers for fear of 
disturbances,” especially by Russian nationalists seeing to cause problems.440  
Estonian protesters at the Helsinki demonstration targeted both U.S. policy as well 
as Estonian policy on the war.441  One such protester, Oliver Loode, stated 
“Estonians are a peaceful people and most Estonians are against a war. We want to 
create a counterweight to our government, which supports the United States’ 
line.”442 
4 Hungary Organizers (Civilians for Peace) and other sources claim that more than 
50,000 people were mobilized in Budapest on February 15, 2003.443  Hungary’s 
anti-war protest in Budapest was organized by Civilians for Peace, also known as 
Civilians’ Movement for Peace.444  Several dozen non-profit organizations were 
involved in this alliance.445  Some organizations involved in mobilizing the 
Budapest anti-war protest on February 15 include the Humanist Movement; the 
Solidarity Youth Alternative; the Green Youths organizations; the Hungarian Iraqi 
Opposition; Greenpeace Hungary; the Left-Wing Alternative Union; the Children 
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of the Earth; the Air Work Group; the Energy Club; and the Five Bread Christian 
Community.446  Initial attempts by Hungarian authorities to prevent the “Stop the 
War” demonstration from conducting a march on “Budapest's main thoroughfare” 
were rebuked by “the sheer weight of public opinion” which “forced them to do a 
U-turn.”447  Although initial protest plans were turned down, the police later agreed 
to a revised proposal for a rally in a square.448 
Civilians Movement for Peace was especially focused on targeting the 
domestic government in Hungary and its policy-making regarding the war.449  On 
February 17, Civilians for Peace held a press conference “at which they expounded 
their open letter to the government and Parliament” in which they argue that 
Hungary should refuse to permit its transport network to be used for American 
military transports.450  At the press conference, Civilians for Peace argued that the 
government’s support of the United States rather right-wing, hegemonic war-
making is antithetical to its mandate as a supposedly leftist government.451  
Annamaria Artner, Chair of the ATTAC Hungary and one of the leaders of the 
Civilians for Peace, emphasized that demonstrations are an excellent way that civil 
society can make its concerns heard and protests would continue to occur if the 
government did not take heed.452  Mark Bati, executive of the Alba Group, said the 
organizers were targeting all government representatives, regardless of their 
political party, to oppose permitting Hungarian transport networks’ usage in the 
war, and to hold a public roll-call vote on the policy, permitting voters to hold MPs 
accountable.453 
However, the organizations involved also had grievances concerning the 
Bush administration’s policy-making and pursuit of hegemony via warfare.454  
Organizers were quick to emphasize that they are not anti-American.455  Protest 
organizers also wanted to distinguish themselves from outsider-oriented activists 
and “said their anti-war demonstration rejects all forms of violence and expresses 
they do not accept any sort of solidarity with the cruel dictatorship of Saddam 
Hussein.” 456   
Prior to the protest on February 15, Civilians’ Movement for Peace had in 
fact met with Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy, a meeting that he 
initiated himself and in which he made clear that the Hungarian government shares 
their commitment to peace and hopes for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, but 
explained that part of that commitment to peace also is driving its concerns about 
Hungarian security, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction.457  Medgyessey 
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addressed the problems that organizers had had in getting police approval of their 
protest, and reaffirmed “that the right to demonstrate and express opinions on 
fundamental issues are among basic democratic rights,” especially for peace.458 
Annamaria Artner was at this meeting with Medgyessey, representing the Civilian 
Movement for Peace, and she states that while their desired endpoints may be 
similar, they cannot agree with the means that the government aims to arrive at 
peace.  She states, 
It became clear that we agreed on three points. One is the rejection of 
terrorism, two, the rejection of Saddam Husayn's regime and, three, the 
striving for a peaceful solution. We failed to reach agreement on one point: 
the means of guarding peace.459 
Thus, the Civilian Movement for Peace asked Medgyessey to consider changing his 
standpoint and to work for a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and it was this 
domestic focus that was maintained at the actual demonstration and ensuing press 
conference.460 
Another, much smaller, protest was held by Greenpeace demonstrators at 
Budapest’s Chain Bridge on Tuesday, February 18.  Spontaneously, a very 
transnational group of 15 activists from Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria, protested 
against war by mounting a “No War” sign by a tunnel that leads to the bridge.  
According to Roland Csaki, Greenpeace campaign staffer for Hungary, the group 
was targeting the Hungarian parliament, opposing weapons transfers in case of a 
war.  After police ordered the protest to end, the activists pulled down the sign, and 
no demonstrators were arrested and none would be charged, but the police did 
collect personal data from the protesters.461 
5 Latvia Latvian anti-war protests occurred on several consecutive days in Riga.462  
The main protest on February 15, 2003, was organized by Movement for Neutrality 
and mobilized “hundreds” or “several hundred” demonstrators. 463  Protesters 
mobilized at the demonstration included Latvians, ethnic Russians, and also 
Lithuanians.464 
Aleksandrs Bartusevics, a deputy of the Alliance For Human Rights in a 
United Latvia in the Saeima parliament, is the leader of the Movement for 
Neutrality and as such has targeted the Latvian government, asking it to end its 
support of a possible war in Iraq and support a peaceful resolution to the conflict.465  
In Latvia, the President and defense minister supported the war, even though the 
legislative (Saeima) Foreign Affairs Commission supported disarming in Iraq via 
the United Nations and in agreement with the principles of international law.466   
Thus, the legislative and executive branches have both been targeted by 
demonstrators.  Along the February 15 protest march route, the protesters stopped 
at the presidential palace, where “they expressed their disagreement with a 
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statement by Latvia's President Vaira Vike-Freiberga on Latvia's readiness to 
support U.S. military plans, although more than 80 per cent of the country's 
population, as polls have shown, are against war in Iraq.”467  Several protests 
occurred at the Saeima building prior to the February 15 demonstration.468  
Normunds Grostins, an activist who leads the Movement for Independence, 
participated in a protest outside the Saeima, stating,  
we believe that in fact this war … is one where America wants to use 
military force to gain control over Iraq's oil resources, and it needs evidence 
to do this, with the Americans mentioning that there are weapons of mass 
destruction and so on there. This evidence has not convinced such serious 
NATO member states as France and Germany, which object to an attack on 
Iraq at this stage and they believe that diplomatic means must be used. We 
also believe that diplomatic means must be used - violence and the 
annihilation of the civilian population will lead to nothing good.469  
Besides targeting the Latvian leadership, protesters also targeted U.S. policy 
on the war and the economic interests propelling the U.S. drive to war.470  Part of 
the February 15 protest occurred in front of the American Embassy, where candles 
placed to form the words “no to war” were lit.471  Other protests have also targeted 
the U.S. Embassy.472  Protesters chanted “No to war!” in Latvian, focusing on 
opposing the war in and of itself not just Latvian support of the war.473  In Latvia, 
protesters also see linkages between American economic interests and the call to 
war, with one protester stating, “After World War II all of Europe was in ruins - 
only the Americans, for some reason, got richer. What do they need now? Soon 
they will burst with their spitefulness. Latvia must remain a neutral country.”474 
In Latvia, concerns about nationalism and remnants of communism are 
clearly driving actors in the anti-war movement, and so too their critics.  Some of 
the youth organizations that announced earlier anti-war protests by the American 
embassy (Everything for Latvia, the Social Democratic Youth Association and 
Club 415) have been criticized for being unpatriotic and for being “defenders” of 
Hussein, with their objectives in opposing the war called into question.475  
Everything for Latvia is criticized as having objectives other than Latvian 
patriotism, and in fact for allying with groups like “the left-wing political 
movement PCTVL For Human Rights in a United Latvia” which has opposed 
“plans to shift Russian schools toward classes taught in Latvian.”476 Additionally, 
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these remnants of the past are evident in the work of “the popular and public 
organization Intelligence Intelligentsia,” that was involved in mobilizing several 
protests in Latvia.477 
6 Lithuania Lithuanian anti-war protest that occurred in Vilnius was organized “by 
several pacifist organizations.”478  Although there is not much coverage of 
Lithuanian protests, there is coverage that suggests “people have even been 
protesting in Lithuania” 479  According to Dudikova,  
activists, opposition parties and newspapers in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania have lashed out at their leaders for backing the United States. 
Polls say more than two-thirds of Baltic residents oppose war in Iraq.  Small 
protest demonstrations have been held across the region.480 
Additionally, some Lithuanians residing in Vilnius who wanted to demonstrate 
traveled to the protest in Riga, Latvia, on February 15, where they “held posters 
that criticized Lithuanian authorities for supporting the U.S. policy with regard to 
Iraq.”481 
7 Poland Poland’s anti-war demonstrations involved thousands of demonstrators in 
several cities, with about 2,500 protesters in Warsaw and other protests in Gdansk 
and Poznan.482  Although Clark suggests that it was expected that half a million 
protesters would turn out in Warsaw “despite the incessant pro-government, pro-
war propaganda pumped out by the state-owned television channel,” Scally claims 
that police only expected several thousand demonstrators.483  In fact, several articles 
suggest just 2,500 protesters indeed turned out on February 15.484 
Protesters targeted both U.S. President Bush as well as Polish Prime 
Minister Leszek Miller and President Aleksander Kwasniewski. The Warsaw 
protest occurred in the Castle Square which is next to Polish President Alexsander 
Kwasniewski’s residence who was targeted for his support of the Bush policy on 
Iraq.485  Protesters also rallied in front of the U.S. embassy, targeting the American 
policy directly.486   
In Poland, the economic ties to militarization and the desire for diplomacy 
with Iraq were resounding themes.  An organizer discussed the linkage between the 
war and oil interests as well as the likely benefit to U.S. companies from the war.487  
Protesters also perceived an underlying economic motivation behind the war.488  
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Instead of resorting to violence, the demonstrators demanded a peaceful resolution, 
calling the U.S. to “solve the problem not bomb it.”489 
8 Romania Romania’s anti-war protest in Bucharest involved thousands of 
demonstrators.490  There is very little coverage of the protest, other than one news 
report that discusses why there was so little debate and so little protest about the 
war in Iraq, in Romania.491  The journalist argues that Romanians are overwhelmed 
with more immediate and basic problems, “the dozens of wars that we fight every 
day against poverty, stupidity, bureaucracy and corruption,” and thus have almost 
disregarded the “shadow of the war hawk darkening our sky.”492  Although global 
protest has been mobilized throughout Europe, he states, “in Romania you can 
hardly notice the existence of a public debate regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of the position our country chose to adopt in relation to this conflict” 
and out of a “lazy neutrality” people have failed to organize or participate in 
demonstrations in the same way.493  Thus, the author argues that although the Iraqi 
people have been oppressed and Romanians “have not yet forgotten how we hated 
Ceausescu and how much we dreamt of living in a democratic society,” that 
Romanians should ask themselves honestly if in the 1980s they would “have agreed 
to pay for their freedom with the price of having hundreds of thousands of 
American soldiers and a huge military force in their country, and thousands, dozens 
or hundreds of thousands of their own people killed?”494 
9 Slovakia Slovakia’s February 15 protest were held in Bratislava and involved just 
over 1,000 people. 495  Another source lists several hundred protesters.496 
The Slovak protest was organized by Eduard Chmelar of the Slovak 
Governance Institute.497  Speakers included a Catholic priest and a representative of 
the Palestinian community in Slovakia.498  Jan Solciansky, the Catholic priest who 
spoke, described the Church’s unified standpoint on the war:  “No to war, no to 
aggression - but yes to negotiations about peace.”499  According to one article, 
“Opposition to the war united the followers of Communists, nationalists, left-wing 
parties and anarchists, environmentalists and some religious groups. The crowd 
included some opposition politicians and trade union head Ivan Saktor.”500  The 
protest occurred after 11 MPs from “Slovakia's strongest opposition Movement for 
a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS)” left the parliamentary caucus in a protest 
stemming from disagreements (and indeed a split vote) between HZDS MPs over 
whether Slovakia should send troops to support the war in Iraq, and after the HZDS 
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Deputy Chairman, Rudolf Ziak, who left the parliamentary caucus, resigned his 
post on February 14.501   
Both the United States government and Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas 
Dzurinda were targeted.502  The protest started in front of the Slovak government 
office.503  Demonstrators sent an “open letter” to Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas 
Dzurinda asking him to keep Slovakia out of the war and not to send Slovaks to 
Iraq.504  According to one report, protesters “waved Slovak and Iraqi flags and 
chanted anti-government and anti-American slogans,” and some demonstrators 
“compared U.S. President George Bush and Premier Mikulas Dzurinda” with 
Hitler.505   
Protesters in Slovakia focused on opposing a war that they see being fought 
for oil interests and being used to formalize a new East European servitude to a 
hawkish United States.  Protest slogans at the Slovak protest included “Blood is not 
Petrol,” “No to war in Iraq,” “Not in Our Name,” “Stop War!,” “Shame on USA!,” 
and “Stop Aggression.”506  One protester stated, “All that matters is petrol. Bush 
absolutely does not care about any democracy or ordinary Iraqis. I feel shame for 
the current government. The other day we were servile to Russians, but now to 
Americans.”507 
Frantisek Sebej, former Chairman of the Parliament's Committee for 
European integration, was asked by the press to analyze the low Slovakian protest 
mobilization on the global date of protest against war.508  In Sebej’s analysis, he 
mentions that the peace protests targeting the Vietnam war and supporting de-
nuclearization, which occurred in Western Europe, were not permitted in Eastern 
Europe by the communist regimes.509 Thus, the history of peace protest and the 
duration of the tradition of criticizing the government via demonstrations may 
account for some of the dynamics of mobilization from West to East.  Sebej states 
that ordinarily many of the groups protesting would have conflicts with one 
another, but the war has oddly enough provided them a “common enemy,” and he 
criticizes human rights organizations for behaving hypocritically by opposing the 
war and joining the protests, when the Hussein regime has been such a violator of 
human rights.510 
10 Slovenia Slovenia’s major anti-war protests occurred in Ljubljana and Maribor.  
Different numbers are cited for the Ljubljana protest: over 2,000; several thousand; 
and nearly 5,000.511  Maribor was said to have mobilized 500 demonstrators.512  
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Protesters targeted both the American decision-making concerning a war in Iraq as 
well as the domestic government’s possible involvement and decision-making 
concerning the war.513 
Demonstrators in Ljubljana were “from all generations: partisans, prisoners 
of war, revolutionaries of the 1960s, peace activists of the 1980s and social 
movements’ activists.”514  Mayor Danica Simssicc spoke at this protest, 
emphasizing that Slovenians had never before taken such an offensive standpoint, 
only fighting “for their motherland,” and urged decision-makers to listen to 
protesters’ concerns. 515  Dominik Cernjak, Slovenia's opposition Youth Party 
leader, opposed joining sides with the Americans, “against the efforts of the largest 
EU members, Germany and France, which strive to solve the Iraqi crisis by 
diplomatic means.”516  Thus in Slovenia, the emphasis was also on finding a 
peaceful resolution to the conflict via diplomacy and international law.   
Protesters in Slovenia focused on opposing American and Slovenian 
government standpoint on the war in and of itself, but also opposed the justification 
for war (including oil interests) and the likely character of the war for the Iraqi 
people.  Slogans at this protest included “No War,” “Peace,” “Blood Is not Oil,” 
“War = Crime, America Wake up,” “Make Love, Not Bush,” and “Imagine All the 
People, Living Life in Peace.”517  Protesters interviewed at the rally on Congress 
Square stated they were opposing the war for a variety of reasons:  “Because I 
disagree with the U.S. policy to kill millions of people in order to convince them 
that they have some kind of hidden weapons;” “Because I am always against war, 
against any kind of aggression. Because this does not solve anything;” and because 
“I believe that this is the least I can do. But I am also a wife of a man who comes 
from Iraq.”518 
The Maribor protest was organized “by the civil society Maribor for Peace” 
and occurred peacefully.519  Protesters used candles to write the Slovene word for 
peace (mir) in the Castle Square.520  Here, it is reported that “protestors demanded 
that Slovenia backs down from the Vilnius declaration in which ten east European 
states declared their support for U.S. policy.”521  Two protesters interviewed by the 
press at the Maribor demonstration supported resolving the conflict with Iraq via 
the United Nations, diplomacy, and in accordance with international law, and 
opposed the Slovenian government committing to join the U.S. war in Iraq.522  One 
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protester stated, “A war of aggression against a sovereign country is a violation of 
international law and we cannot allow this.” 523  The other protester had a message 
for the Slovenian government:  “…we would like to tell our government, our party 
LDS Liberal Democracy of Slovenia which rules our country, not to push us into a 
war and to withdraw from the Vilnius Group signature...”524 
Country Protests in Mediterranean States Acceding to the EU, 2004 
1 Cyprus According to Barr, “In divided Cyprus, about 500 Greeks and Turks braved 
heavy rain to briefly block a British air base runway.”525  Mita suggests that this 
protest (in Dhekelia) actually involved “Around 700 demonstrators from Cyprus, 
France, Belgium, Spain and the U.S.,” and it was followed by a peaceful march to 
Pyla.526  Conradi reports that the Greek and Turkish presence at the protest is 
evidence that “opposition to war also helped bridge bitter ethnic rivalries” 
otherwise salient in Cyprus.527   
According to Efi Xanthou, representing the Co-ordinating Committee of the 
“Stop the War Alliance,” people in Cyprus “are against the war on Iraq and are not 
only concerned with the Cyprus problem and the upcoming elections.”  Xanthou 
explains why the helicopter runway of the British Bases were chosen as a protest 
venue in part because activists oppose “the use of the bases as a launch pad for this 
attack.”528  Thus, protesters had clear domestic grievances concerning the possible 
usage of Cyprus “as a launch facility for a war on Iraq” which they emphasized.529 
Protesters were also opposed to the unilateralism of the Bush policy and its 
disregard for international law, and perceived connections between oil interests and 
the militarization.530  Slogans at this demonstration included “One, two, three, four, 
we don't want your ****ing war,” “Bush, Blair,Sharon -- murderers of the people,” 
and “No more blood for oil.”531  Slogans were chanted in several languages, 
including Greek, Turkish, English, and Arabic.532 
2 Malta No protest events were reported in Malta. 
Table 8.2: February 15, 2003 Protests 
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Appendix 4: Actors, Targets, and Grievances at February 15, 2003 Protests  
Note:  Tables 8.3-8.5 present the Actors, Insiders, and Outsiders; Domestic 
Targets and Grievances; and International Targets and Grievances at the February 15, 








Actors? Insiders or Outsiders?  
1 Austria No *** *** 
2 Belgium No • parties of the left, trade 
unions, church groups, 
Greenpeace 
• Iraqis, Turks 
*** 
 
3 Denmark Yes • more than 100 organizations  
such as the Association for 
the Taxation of Financial 
Transactions for the Aid of 
Citizens (ATTAC), Hotel and 
Restaurant Workers Trade 
Union in Copenhagen 
• Speaker Holger K. 
Nielsen, Socialist 
People's Party SF 
4 Finland No • diverse, almost 40 civic 
organizations such as the Left 
Federation Youth League, 
leftist parties, peace 
organizations, college 
students, Iraqis, arabs living 
in Finland, Estonians 
• Matti Wuori, Member 
of the European 
Parliament (Greens) 




unaffiliated, many Muslims 
• Political parties, unions, 
anarchists, and many kinds of 
associations; many leftist 
organizations, which marched 
at the front and were sponsors 
(and signatories) of the 
announcement to protest, 
entitled “Non à la Guerre, Oui 
a un Monde de Paix, de 
Justice et de Démocratie” (no 
to war, yes to a world of 
peace, of justice, and of 
democracy)  
• notably absent were far right 
radicals from the Front 
National (National Front) and 
Action Française (French 
Action) 
• previous protesters who 
targeted the National Front 
and Le Pen 










Mamère of the Verts 
(Greens); François 
Hollande and Régis 
Passerieux of the 
Parti Socialiste 
(Socialist Party); 





Arlette Laguiller of 
the Lutte Ouvrière 
(Worker’s Struggle)  
6 Germany
  
No • multi-generational 
• politicians, political 
associations, unions, 
churches, rights groups, 
groups such as Attac 
Germany 
• Three members of 
Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder's centre-
left cabinet defied his 
express wishes and 











Juergen Trittin; and 
Agriculture Minister 
Renate Kuenast 
7 Greece No • endorsed by the country's 
largest labour union and 
Greece's governing Socialist 
party 
• representatives of political 
parties, trade unions and 
peace groups, political 
leaders, political refugees, 
public figures and citizens, 
spanning children to 
pensioners 
• several hundred anarchists 
involved in violence in 
Athens 
• groups like Action 
Thessaloniki 2003 (which was 
already planning June 2003 
protests of the EU Summit) 
• Statements from the 
government:  Christos 
Protopappas, a 
government 
spokesman, spoke to 
condone trouble-
makers and support 
the message of many 
peaceful protesters; a 
supportive statement 
put out by parliament 
speaker Apostolos 
Kaklamanis 
• Protest participation:  
Costas Laliotis, the 
leader of the ruling 
PASOK party's 
central committee; 
Aleka Papariga, the 
chief of the 
Communist Party; 
Nikos Constantoulos, 
the head of the 
Coalition for the Left 
and Progress; 
Dimitris Tsovolas, 
the leader of the 
Democratic Social 
Movement 
8 Ireland No • organized by Irish Anti-War 
Movement, the Non-
Governmental Organization 
Peace Alliance, and the Peace 
and Neutrality Alliance 
• diversity, notable labor and 
political opposition, churches 
and religious organizations 
• Michael D. Higgins 
(Labour); Aengus O. 
Snodaigh (Sinn Fein); 
Patricia McKenna 




(TD) Joe Higgins 
(Socialist Party); Des 
Geraghty, the 
president of SIPTU, 
Ireland's largest trade 
union; David Begg, 
the general secretary 
of the Irish Congress 
of Trade Unions 




almost all of Italy's leftist 
parties (left and centre-left), 
unions, Catholic church 
representatives, pacifist 
groups, human rights groups, 
environmental organizations, 
anarchists such as the 
Disobbedienti, anti-
globalization activists, 
• Iraqi exiles, representatives of 
the ‘oppressed’ including 
Kurds and Palestinians 
• Previous protesters of 
European Social Forum 
(November 2002) protest in 
Florence 
 
10 Luxembourg No *** *** 
11 Netherlands Yes • “Platform Against the War” 
(het Platform tegen de 
Oorlog) or Platform Against 
the New War” (het Platform 
tegen de Nieuwe Oorlog).was 
joined by more than 200 
organizations 
• groups representing 
Americans, exiled Iraqis, 
Tibetans, Germans, and 
Japanese 
• Some protesters had last 
protested during the anti-
nuclear protests of the 1980s 
or even earlier, in opposition 
to the Vietnam War. 
• The political parties 
GroenLinks (the Green Left), 
and the Socialistische Partije 
(Socialists) joined the 
Platform.  Platform organizer 
H. van Heijningen stated that 
they hoped to get the Labour 
party (Partij van de Arbeid) 
and the labor movement to 
join in as well. He stated that 
he had spoken with members 
of the Christian Democrats 
(CDA) opposed to the war, 
but that CDA participation in 
the protest was not a 
possibility. 
• speakers, including 
Jan Marijnessen of 
the Socialist party 




• Only one Catholic 
bishop from Haarlem, 
J.L. Wirix, was 
scheduled to attend, 
and father E. 
Kimman, was 
scheduled to 
represent the Catholic 
bishops.   
• M. Bosman-
Huizinga, the general 




scheduled to attend 
the protest as a 
representative of the 
Raad van Kerken 
(Council of 
Churches) 
• J. Gruiters of Pax 
Christi speaking for 
the Raad van Kerken 
• Notably absent was 
Mient Jan Faber, a 








Christi, he chose not 
to join the 
demonstration and to 
support the war 
because it will 
liberate repressed 
Iraqis (Now Secretary 
of the Interkerkelijk 
vredesberaad IKV or 
Inter-church peace 
council) 
12 Portugal Yes *** • former President 
Mario Soares, 
members of the 
Socialist Party and 
the leaders of the 
Communists and the 
Left Bloc 
13 Spain Yes • “Let us Stop the War 
platform:”  opposition 
political parties (especially 
the Socialist Party or PSOE), 
trade unions, NGOs, students 
• biggest outpouring of popular 
political sentiment - with the 
possible exception of some 
anti-Eta marches - since 
Spaniards took to the streets 
to protect their fragile young 
democracy after a coup 
attempt in 1981 
*** 
 
14 Sweden No *** 
 
• Maj Britt Theorin, 
former social 
democratic member 
of the European 
Parliament; Anja 






Yes • Stop the War Coalition 
(STWC), the veteran peace 
group Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND) and the 
Muslim Association of 
Britain. 
• alongside veteran peace 
campaigners and anti-
globalisation activists were 
every-day citizens 
• the biggest protest there since 
World War II, as protests in 
the 1970s targeting the 
Vietnam War had mobilized 
roughly 400,000 participants 
• Labour veterans, 
Michael Foot and 
Tony Benn; Labour 
MP George 
Galloway; Labour 
MP Alice Mahon; 
Former Labour 
politician Mo 
Mowlam; the Mayor 










• Socialist Workers Party said 
to “dominate” the STWC 









Mick Rix, general 
secretary of the train 
drivers’ union 
(ASLEF); Bob Crow, 
the general secretary 
of the transport 
workers’ union 
(RMT) 
• Noted playwright, 
Harold Pinter; human 
rights campaigner, 
Bianca Jagger 
1 Bulgaria Yes • For Peace, Against War 
Citizens Committee which 
comprises some 30 parties 
and NGOs 
• Iraqis 
• The protest reportedly had 
Communist overtones, with 
some of the protesters waving 
red banners and carrying 
posters of former Soviet 





Yes • one protest organized by the 
Group Against War (also 
known as the Initiative 
Against War), by foreigners 
living in Prague, and 
Greenpeace 
• another protest:  The 
Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia (KSCM) 
• Miroslav Grebenicek, 
leader of KSCM 
(Communist Party) 
3 Estonia Yes * * 
4 Hungary Yes • Organizers (Civilians for 
Peace) also known as 
Civilians’ Movement for 
Peace:  several dozen non-
profit organizations, including 
ATTAC Hungary; the Alba 
Group; the Humanist 
Movement; the Solidarity 
Youth Alternative; the Green 
Youths organizations; the 
Hungarian Iraqi Opposition; 
Greenpeace Hungary; the 






the Children of the Earth; the 
Air Work Group; the Energy 
Club; and the Five Bread 
Christian Community 
5 Latvia Yes • Main protest organized by 
Movement for Neutrality 
• Latvians, ethnic Russians, 
Lithuanians 
• At other protests:  concerns 
about nationalism and 
remnants of communism are 
clearly driving actors in the 
anti-war movement (groups 
involved:  Everything for 
Latvia, the Social Democratic 
Youth Association, Club 415, 
Intelligence Intelligentsia)  
*** 
 
6 Lithuania Yes • organized by several pacifist 
organizations, opposition 
parties, and newspapers 
• some Lithuanians went to 
Latvia to protest 
*** 
 
7 Poland Yes *** *** 
8 Romania Yes *** *** 
9 Slovakia Yes • organized by Eduard Chmelar 
of the Slovak Governance 
Institute 
• Communists, nationalists, 
opposition politicians, left-
wing parties, representatives 
of trade unions, anarchists, 
religious groups, 
environmentalists, and human 
rights organizations (who 
have been critiqued for 
opposing war against a 
regime known for its rights 
violations) 
• Palestinian representation 
• trade union head Ivan 
Saktor, Catholic 
priest, and a 




10 Slovenia Yes • from all generations 
• partisans, prisoners of war, 
revolutionaries of the 1960s, 
peace activists of the 1980s 
and social movements’ 
activists 
• Mayor Danica 
Simssicc 
• Dominik Cernjak, 
Slovenia's opposition 
Youth Party leader 
1 Cyprus No • Committee of the “Stop the 
War Alliance:” has brought 
together Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots whose “opposition to 
war also helped bridge bitter 
ethnic rivalries” 
• Protesters from Cyprus, 







2 Malta No ** ** 
Table 8.3: Actors, Insiders, and Outsiders at the February 15 Protests 
 
Note:  *=Protest banned by authorities. **=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information 












Domestic Grievances at 
Protest? 
Description 
1 Austria No   *** 




• Support government 
stance on war in Iraq 
• oppose usage of 
domestic transport 
networks for U.S. 
military transports 
(e.g., train lines, ports, 
or airports) 
• not so much, generally 
marching in support of 
their government 
• in another protest, oppose 
Belgian government 
decisions to permit U.S. 
military transports and 
usage of ports 
3 Denmark Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 
• clearly targeted their 
domestic government and 
Prime Minister 
Rasmussen’s support of 
the war, bringing signs 
asking, “Berlin, Paris, 
Brussels -where is 
Copenhagen?” 
4 Finland No • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• were targeting the Finnish 
leadership who would 
decide Finnish policy on 
the war 
5 France No • No  • Support government 
stance on war in Iraq 
• not so much, indicated 
support for French 
opposition to the war 
6 Germany
  
No • No  • Support government 
stance on war in Iraq 
• supported the German 
government’s opposition 
to the war in Iraq and the 
maintenance of this 
standpoint 
7 Greece No • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• the Greek government 
was also targeted, with 
the call to stay out of a 
war in Iraq 
8 Ireland No • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• oppose usage of 
domestic transport 
networks for U.S. 
military transports 
(e.g., train lines, ports, 
or airports) 
• had grievances particular 
to the Irish involvement 
in the war in Iraq, 
targeting the domestic 
government for its 
willingness to permit the 
Shannon airport’s usage 
in refueling of American 
military planes 
• stated “our neutrality is in 
bits, we are now a colony 
once again, a military 
outpost for the US 
superpower,” advocating 
that the government 
“break its silence now” 




9 Italy Yes • Yes • Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 
• against the foreign policy 
of Italy via caricatures of 
Italian Prime Minister 
Silvio Berlusconi, some 
called for him to resign 
10 Luxembourg No • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• called for “the 
government to give up its 
neutrality and oppose the 
intervention” 
11 Netherlands Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 
• ‘Not in my name’ (the 
war should not be carried 
out in my name) was the 
main message, called for 
a change in Dutch policy-
making in support of the 
war, not blindly following 
US 
12 Portugal Yes   *** 
13 Spain Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 
• called on Prime Minister 
Jose Maria Aznar to 
follow France and 
Germany in supporting 
peaceful resolution to the 
conflict 
• protest was not directed 
so much at George Bush 
as at Aznar, whom some 
protesters called to resign 
• slogans such as “The 
Pope says no to war, the 
People's party says yes;” 
“Aznar, Bush's doormat” 
14 Sweden No • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• targeting the Swedish 
government, demand 
Sweden does everything 
to stop a war, calling for a 
peaceful resolution to the 
conflict, “Support Olof 
Palme’s policy and say 
‘no’ to war” 
15 United 
Kingdom 
Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 
• What unites them is anger 
against President Bush 
and Prime Minister Blair, 
but mainly Blair; thus 
targeted the Prime 
Minister, passing by his 
Downing Street office 
and opposing his 
government’s policy-
making and the direction 
that the Labour party’s 
foreign policy-making 
has taken.  One of the 
marches also passed by 





1 Bulgaria Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Arguing that “a war will 
have a far-reaching 
economic impact which 
will inevitably hit 
Bulgaria too 
• Some of the protesters 
demanded that the 
government resign and 




Yes   *** 
3 Estonia Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 
• targeted Estonian policy 
on the war. 
4 Hungary Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 
• oppose usage of 
domestic transport 
networks for U.S. 
military transports 
(e.g., train lines, ports, 
or airports) 
• especially focused on 
targeting the domestic 
government in Hungary 
and its policy-making 
regarding the war 
• targeting all government 
representatives, 
regardless of their 
political party, to oppose 
permitting Hungarian 
transport networks’ usage 
in the war and to hold a 
public roll-call vote on 
the policy, permitting 
voters to hold MPs 
accountable 
5 Latvia Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 
• targeted the Latvian 
government (executive 
and legislative branches), 
asking it to end its 
support of a possible war 
in Iraq and support a 
peaceful resolution 
6 Lithuania Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 
• targeting leadership for 
backing the US policy on 
Iraq 
7 Poland Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• targeted both Polish 
Prime Minister Leszek 





at the Presidential 
residence 
8 Romania Yes   *** 
9 Slovakia Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• protest started in front of 
the Slovak government 
office 
• sent an “open letter” to 
Slovak Prime Minister 
Mikulas Dzurinda asking 
him to keep Slovakia out 
of the war and not to send 
Slovaks to Iraq 
• anti-government slogans, 
some demonstrators 
compared Premier 
Mikulas Dzurinda with 
Hitler 
10 Slovenia Yes • Yes • Called for the 
government to join 
countries opposing the 
war in Iraq 
• Opposing the domestic 
foreign policy  stance 
supporting the war 




concerning the war; 
protestors demanded that 
Slovenia backs down 
from the Vilnius 
declaration in which ten 
east European states 
declared their support for 
U.S. policy. 
1 Cyprus No • Yes • oppose usage of 
domestic transport 
networks for U.S. 
military transports 
(e.g., train lines, ports, 
or airports) 
• oppose the use of the 
British bases on Cyprus 
as a launch pad for the 
attack on Iraq 
2 Malta No   ** 
Table 8.4: Domestic Targets and Grievances at the February 15 Protests   
 
Note:  *=Protest banned by authorities. **=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information 
















1 Austria No   *** 
2 Belgium No • US 
• UK 




war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
• framed the war as indelibly 
intertwined with the pursuit 
of oil 
• targeted both U.S. President 
Bush and U.K. Prime 
Minister Blair 
• slogans like “non à la 
guerre” (no to war in 
French); “geen oorlog” (no 
war in Dutch); “no to war.” 
3 Denmark Yes • US 
• UK 




war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
• make the linkage between 
militarization and oil 
interests 
• protest started at the 
American embassy and 
passed by the English 
embassy, targeting both 
countries’ policies 
• a slogan:  “No War With 
Iraq” 
4 Finland No • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Oppose 
unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 





war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 




the war in Iraq 
• linked their opposition of the 
war to the imperialistic, self-
interest of the United States 
• called for the international 
community to continue 
weapons inspections and not 
turn to a unilateral war 
• represented different 
viewpoints on why the war 
was unjustified 
5 France No • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 




the war in Iraq 
• carrying posters that 
denounced President Bush as 
a ‘warmonger’ and chanting 
anti-American slogans. 
• Some signs said “we are all 
Iraqis,” pledged solidarity 




No • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Opposing 
• made the linkage between 
economic interests, 





war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 




the war in Iraq 
the militarization in Iraq, 
carrying signs like, “No 
Blood for Oil;”  carried signs 
accusing the U.S. of 
imperialistic and hegemonic 
militaristic motivations, such 
as “The axis of evil runs 
through the Pentagon;” also 
signs supporting “Old 
Europe” 




• Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Oppose 
unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 
not involve the 
international 
community 




the war in Iraq 
 
• Both the British and U.S. 
government were targeted, 
with flags burned at their 
embassy or consulate en 
route 
• speeches at the protest 
reiterated the protesters’ 
demands for stopping the 
war; for working within the 
framework of international 
law, via the United Nations, 
to peacefully resolve the 
conflict; and for banning 
weapons of mass destruction 
• “NATO, U.S. and EU equals 
War” banner placed 
Acropolis 
• chants such as “Down with 
the United States,” 
“Americans are murderers,” 
and “War is not the only 
answer;” Slogans such as 
“No to War;” “Imperialism 
is the enemy;” “No 
bloodshed for war;” many 
Iraqi flags that were visible 




war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 




the war in Iraq 
• Several organizers focused 
on opposing all kinds of war 
• The linkages between oil and 
the war and between 
imperialism and war were 
also attended to in Ireland 
• opposing the war, basing 
their criticism on the likely 
aftermath of the war, 
criticizing the policy-making 
of the Bush administration, 
but taking care to clarify that 
they are not opposed to 
Americans per se and do not 
align themselves with 
Hussein. 
9 Italy Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• supporting peace and 
opposing war 




flags with “Pace” or peace 
• Organized called for 
protesters to refrain from 
making posters with anti-
American or “harsh slogans” 
• against the foreign policy of 
the United States and Italy 
via caricatures of U.S. 
President Bush and Italian 
Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi, 
• Some Italian protesters 
called for Prime Minister 
Berlusconi to resign 
• against the foreign policy of 
the United States … 
caricatures of U.S. President 
Bush and Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi, 




war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
• slogans such as “No to blood 
for oil” 
11 Netherlands Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Oppose 
unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 





war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
• called for a change in U.S. 
policy-making:  seeking a 
peaceful resolution to the 
conflict via the UN and 
international law, but 
certainly were not supporting 
the Hussein regime. 
• Linkages between oil and 
militarization, and the 
conflicts in Iraq and other 
Middle-eastern conflicts 
were also made 
12 Portugal Yes   *** 
13 Spain Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Oppose 
unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 
not involve the 
international 
community 




the war in Iraq 
• clearly targeted the U.S. and 
its imperialistic aims 
• another emphasis in the 
protests was merely on 
opposing war, especially one 
that was justified as a 
“preventive war” 
• argued that the Iraqi people 
should be considered 
• slogans such as “No to the 
War,” “Not in our name,” 
and “Not with our silence” 






unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 





war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
government, and calling for 
a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict 
• suggest a linkage between 
American economic interests 
and the true reasons the 
Americans were pursuing a 
war in Iraq 
• protesters at the 
demonstrations were very 
opposed to preemptive, 
unilateral military 
intervention in Iraq by 
Americans, which they 
perceive as motivated by 
economic interests and 
threatening international law 
and stability. 
• concerned about the 
precedent that could be set 
with such preemptive, 
unilateral warfare with the 
potential for huge gleanings 
in oil revenues, asking which 
country would be attacked 
next 
• speaker claimed “the United 
States is an even greater 
rogue” than Iraq 




Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Oppose 
unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 





war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 




the war in Iraq 
• highlighted linkages between 
the war and U.S. material 
and political interests 
• accused the U.S. of applying 
a double-standard in its 
dealings with Iraq 
• many protesters emphasized 
that they were not supporting 
Hussein and not anti-
government as they have 
sometimes been branded, but 
rather oppose going to war 
and resorting to violence and 
support finding a peaceful 
resolution. 
• slogans such as “No War on 
Iraq” 
1 Bulgaria Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• calling upon the US 
government to give up its 
war plans 
• Protesters’ placards included 
such mottos as, “For peace, 




through talks,” “Mothers, 
let's stand together and 
defend peace,” “Let's put and 
end to unjust war,” and 
“Don't kill innocent people.” 
2 Czech 
Republic 
Yes • US 
• NATO 
• Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Oppose 
unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 





war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
• highlighted the linkages 
between oil interests and the 
war, suggested that human 
rights would be waylaid in 
the process, and 
recommended conflict 
resolution via the diplomacy 
that France and Germany 
prefer, not via warfare 
incited by NATO 
• signs such as “No Blood for 
Petrol;” “God said: you will 
not kill;” “No to war in Iraq, 
no to U.S. aggression;” 
“Democracy is not born of 
bombs;” “Let's hang U.S. 
pirates”  
3 Estonia Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• target U.S. support for a war 
in Iraq 
4 Hungary Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 




the war in Iraq 
• had grievances concerning 
the Bush administration’s 
policy-making and pursuit of 
hegemony via warfare 
• emphasize that they are not 
anti-American and do not 
support Hussein 




war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
• protesters targeted U.S. 
policy on the war and the 
economic interests 
propelling the U.S. drive to 
war; linkages between the 
war and oil were raised 
• A slogan: “no to war” 
6 Lithuania Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• oppose U.S. policy on Iraq 
7 Poland Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Oppose 
unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 





war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
• targeted U.S. President Bush 
at U.S. Embassy 
• the economic ties to 
militarization and the desire 
for diplomacy with Iraq were 
resounding themes:  
discussed the linkage 
between the war and oil 
interests as well as the likely 
benefit to U.S. companies 
from the war 
• called for a peaceful 
solution: “solve the problem 




8 Romania Yes   *** 




war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 




the war in Iraq 
• focused on opposing a war 
that they see being fought for 
oil interests and being used 
to formalize a new East 
European servitude to a 
hawkish United States 
• Slogans like “No to war, no 
to aggression - but yes to 
negotiations about peace,” 
“Blood is not Petrol,” “No to 
war in Iraq,” “Not in Our 
Name,” “Stop War!,” 
“Shame on USA!,” and 
“Stop Aggression.” 
• some demonstrators 
compared President Bush 
with Hitler 
10 Slovenia Yes • US • Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Oppose 
unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 





war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
• targeted the American 
decision-making concerning 
a war in Iraq 
• support resolving the conflict 
with Iraq via the United 
Nations, diplomacy, and in 
accordance with 
international law  
• opposed the justification for 
war (including oil interests) 
and the likely character of 
the war for the Iraqi people 
• Slogans like “No War,” 
“Peace,” “Blood Is not Oil,” 
“War = Crime, America 
Wake up,” “Make Love, Not 
Bush,” “Imagine All the 
People, Living Life in 
Peace.” 
1 Cyprus No • US 
• UK 
• Israel 
• Oppose war in 
Iraq 
• Oppose 
unilateral war in 
Iraq that does 





war in Iraq and 
oil and corporate 
interests 
• opposed to the unilateralism 
of the Bush policy and its 
disregard for international 
law 
• perceived connections 
between oil interests and the 
militarization 
• Slogans like “One, two, 
three, four, we don't want 
your ****ing war,” “Bush, 
Blair, Sharon -- murderers of 
the people,” “No more blood 
for oil” 
2 Malta No   ** 
Table 8.5: International Targets and Grievances at the February 15 Protests   
 
Note:  *=Protest banned by authorities. **=No coverage of a protest. ***=Not enough information 
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